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The Infernal Machine: From Powder to Dust

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To understand why a company called ViSalus is the fastest-growing company of its size in the United States, just watch cofounder Nick Sarnicola in action at one of the company’s periodic sales conferences.

In the video that ViSalus posted on YouTube of a July conference in Miami, Sarnicola’s turbocharged pitch inside a packed 18,000-seat arena has people on their feet, pumping fists, clapping, waving, even dancing. A politician or entertainer can only dream of an audience response like this.

People don’t usually pay good money to travel to Miami in sweltering summer heat and then readily wedge themselves into a packed arena to see someone strut around and talk on a hastily assembled theatrical stage — about a company whose major product is powder for a weight-loss shake.

Sarnicola is an unlikely standard-bearer. He has no real college training in health care or any related field; briefly he was a salesman for a collapsed telecom company. Though he is the author of an evangelistic tome about becoming rich by age 25, he was evicted just a few years shy of that for not paying his apartment’s rent.

To this audience, however, Sarnicola is a superstar. No one sells more products for ViSalus; the sales group he and his wife founded is responsible for 75% of its revenue.

Rich, good-looking and with an attractive spouse, Sarnicola is proof to the throng that through ceaseless effort and unyielding commitment, they too can live a glamorous lifestyle like he does.

Called a “global ambassador,” a sales rank only he and his wife hold, Sarnicola did not deliver his Miami speech to impart hard-won sales tips. He was giving a sermon designed to morally validate a congregation where salvation is found through selling ViSalus’ weight-loss and nutrition products to networks of their friends, relatives, neighbors and colleagues.

ViSalus is a multilevel marketing company that promises ordinary folks a shot at financial success based solely on their skill at building a sales group that essentially draws on personal social circles: A distributor must recruit customers (usually starting with friends, neighbors, relatives) who are asked to enroll still others as customers, who are then encouraged to bring in more new members to the sales group.

The Miami sales conference was designed to reinforce the secular theology of economic independence and self-help advocated by ViSalus — and other multilevel marketing enterprises. For 60 years, such companies have used their sales gatherings to dangle the prospect of a path away from corporate drudgery or limited means.

During Sarnicola’s dramatic closing speech in Miami, where surrounded by fellow ViSalus cofounders Blake Mallen and Ryan Blair, he embarked on a riff reminiscent of a thousand 12-step meetings and evangelical pulpits: He confessed his imperfection and weaknesses, pledging an authentic and single-minded focus to help them in the hunt for health and prosperity.

Every multilevel marketing firm, including industry leaders like Nu Skin, Herbalife and Amway, relies on a variation of this appeal. Most multilevel marketing presentations contain so much language about independence that they could be backdrops for a small town’s Fourth of July celebration. But ViSalus has a different, thoroughly modern approach.

ViSalus wants its freelance distributors to party like rock stars and look like models. While Amway appeals to the Norman Rockwell-like sensibilities of faith, country and community, ViSalus is in your face, bringing in wrestlers like Hulk Hogan and rappers such as Master P and Lil Romeo to pitch its products.

So not only does Sarnicola’s somewhat erratic personal background fail to detract from his appeal with members of his adoring audience; it’s proof that their own imperfections can be forgiven. If they buy into the philosophy and sell like mad, they, too, can live in a Miami beachfront penthouse like Sarnicola, fly in a corporate jet like Mallen or build a home in the Hollywood Hills like Blair. ViSalus, in other words, is a corporate version of the French Foreign Legion, where one’s past is forgotten as long as the present is dedicated to the cause.

What the thousands of applauding people in that Miami arena and the other halls and hotel ballrooms ViSalus fills for its confabs are dedicating themselves to, however, has every indication of being a classic pyramid scheme.

Sarnicola, Mallen and Blair are making off like bandits, living precisely the type of life they claim can be had through a total commitment to ViSalus. Yet its corporate filings tell a very different story: Despite plenty of hard work and expense — which often end up being much more than the company lets on — ViSalus’ army of believers are probably in for a big letdown.

Those flocking to the arenas and ballrooms are likely to be fleeced as ViSalus’ management team and corporate owners reap the rewards of a remarkably effective promotional and marketing effort fronted by Sarnicola. (And while most multilevel marketing executives run from any mention of the word pyramid, ViSalus embraces it. Indeed Sarnicola, his wife and a few others recently even created their own online reality show about ViSalus sales, which they brazenly titled “That Pyramid Thing.”)

There’s nothing new about the risks of losing gobs of money and time in a pyramid scheme: Voluminous research has documented the astronomical failure and dropout rates of participants in dozens of multilevel marketing companies. Seen in a cold light, ViSalus is just another fast-growing player in a field that has seen dozens rapidly emerge, only to fade quickly.

What makes ViSalus stand out is its highly unusual relationship with its corporate parent, Blyth, a publicly traded marketing and catalog company based in Greenwich, Conn. Blyth owns most of ViSalus and has come to depend on the subsidiary’s rapid growth to sustain it.

And that’s a very big risk for Blyth’s investors. Because as ViSalus’ fortunes fall to Earth, Blyth will undoubtedly fall much further and much faster.

ViSalus Mixes It Up

In the pantheon of Michigan companies, ViSalus doesn’t quite command the level of brand awareness that Ford, General Motors or even Domino’s Pizza enjoy, but those companies would surely love to have a fraction of the growth rate registered by ViSalus. In a recent filing, sales figures for ViSalus’ main product, a powdered meal-replacement shake that is part of a 90-day weight loss and marketing initiative it calls Body by Vi, suggest annual growth so massive that Americans appear to be skipping meals with ViSalus shakes in the same numbers that they download music through iTunes.

For the first half of this year, ViSalus’ weight-management unit logged a 482% rate of growth, compared with the first half of last year. It wasn’t just that one unit either that had spectacular results; the entire company’s sales mushroomed 451% over the same period.

ViSalus took in $327.3 million in sales this year through June 30, with about $222 million of that derived from its weight-management unit. As any analyst knows, it’s vastly more difficult to realize a spike in growth rate of that magnitude when the sales numbers are in that range.

The sales figures seem to indicate that the ViSalus shake mix isn’t just a popular product but that a paradigm shift in American behavior is under way.

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation tried to find any company with a remotely comparable growth rate. We searched publicly traded companies also headquartered in the United States and with at least $1 million in annual revenue and a compound yearly growth rate of 300%. (The search excluded companies in the pharmaceutical, biotech and energy exploration and development sectors whose fortunes hinge on external factors like regulatory approvals and geopolitics.)

The result: Among companies of its size, ViSalus stands alone in a category of one.

Plus, ViSalus is posting astronomical growth rates while operating as a multilevel marketing business. This is a hard road to travel: ViSalus competes against the established products and sales networks of multilevel marketing giants like Herbalife as well as the well-located niche retail stores like GNC’s and universally distributed brands like Slim-Fast with deep-pocketed corporate parents.

Having tons of established competition usually prompts a bitter price war in which only the fittest — and most ruthless — survive, not the shattering of sales records.

But that’s ViSalus in a nutshell: It seems to defy the laws of marketplace math.

At least that’s what its company executives want outsiders believe.

But some cracks in the carefully constructed veneer are already starting to show. An IPO for ViSalus announced in August was pulled in September because, as Blyth’s chief executive said in a conference call, ViSalus’ growth wasn’t being “properly valued.”

What a corporate statement like that probably means is that ViSalus’ bankers at Jefferies told Blyth no one was willing to pay the price being asked for the stock. (ViSalus CEO Ryan Blair hosted a chat on Facebook on Sept. 26 during which he claimed that it was his idea to cancel the IPO, Blyth management deserved credit for listening to him and that he was overjoyed. Blyth, in other words, spent $4.7 million in fees prepping an IPO of a subsidiary even though its CEO was dead set against it.)

When audited 450% growth rates can’t attract a proper bid from the same investor universe that happily gobbled up shares from Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae and AIG in 2008, something has to be amiss.

A good place to start looking for the real reason the IPO was grounded is the prospectus filed by ViSalus’ holding company, FVA Ventures. In the columns of numbers and buried in the footnotes, a pattern emerges: Neither management skill nor the soundness of its products has anything to do with ViSalus’ record-breaking growth.

Blyth’s Makes ‘Folksy’ Pay

The key to understanding what makes ViSalus tick is to know just how different it is from its corporate parent — and onetime rescuer — Blyth.

Founded in 1977 and cobbled together from half a dozen different candle, potpourri and gourmet food companies, Blyth has made money by dispensing with conventional wisdom. As much of the consumer business world has leaped onto various digital sales platforms, Blyth’s main business unit has persisted with its relatively folksy, old-fashioned method of enlisting sales consultants to host house parties where they sell candles and home fragrances to friends and acquaintances.

Don’t let the low-tech approach fool you, though; Blyth’s tactics have been every bit as effective as the slickest Madison Avenue marketing campaign. Research shows that in a slow economy consumers will hold off on a new car or fancier wardrobe, but when a neighbor five doors down whose daughter is on the same soccer team as yours invites your wife to a “product party,” there is a statistically excellent chance the checkbook will open for a few holiday-themed candles or gourmet jellies.

In recent years, many American businesses have undergone transformation in ways big and small, but Blyth didn’t seem to need to.  As Amazon’s Kindle scotched interest in bookstores and Apple’s iPod killed stereo companies, people still continued to fork over $25 and $35 at a steady clip to have Blyth candles for the living room and den and potpourri for the downstairs bathroom.

Largely disengaged from the typical Wall Street promotional hype, Blyth takes its nondescript low-key approach to extremes, eschewing public relations and operating out of a modest office building in Greenwich, Conn. The company’s treasurer doubles as the investor relations representative. Even so, Blyth’s stock spent years above the $50 mark and Robert Goergen Sr., the former investment banker who founded Blyth, became seriously rich along the way. There have been richer and flashier CEOs, to be sure, but for investors who respected results, Goergen made betting against Blyth a dicey proposition.

That is, until 2008, when Blyth’s world came crashing down. The staggering decline in household discretionary spending, Blyth’s microeconomic lifeblood, was a knife directly aimed at its heart.

According to Blyth’s 10-K annual report, from 2010 to 2011, U.S. sales at its direct-selling PartyLite unit — traditionally the core of Blyth’s revenue — declined 22% and the number of independent consultants hawking products to the public fell 11%. Over the same span a year prior, sales at PartyLite’s U.S. operations plummeted 25% and the number of consultants dropped 17%.

There’s a grim playbook for management at publicly traded companies facing full-bore decline: radical cost-cutting, immediate asset sales and eventually a sale to a stronger competitor or bankruptcy.

Yet Blyth had an ace up its sleeve.

In August 2008, in a little-noticed move, Blyth bought a 43.6% stake in ViSalus, for $13 million. (Blyth later increased its ownership to 72.7%.) Perhaps Blyth’s thinking behind the investment resembled that of the veteran horseplayer who ignores the handicapper’s advice and on a hunch lays down $100 on the leggy long shot in the fourth race. The move paid off handsomely, and it seemed that for a while, ViSalus might have been one of the greatest investments in recent corporate history.

The year it inked the purchase agreement, Blyth recorded $1.16 billion in sales. Last year, factoring in ViSalus’ $230.1 million in sales, Blyth managed to post just $888.3 million in revenue. Without ViSalus, more than 50% of Blyth’s revenue since 2008 would have been gone, and to be frank, companies losing half their sales in less than five years usually exist only in the memories of the people who used to work there.

But unlike in horse racing, where the bet either pays or it doesn’t, the ViSalus acquisition was not a zero-sum game: Blyth got to live to fight another day, but it also committed to buy the final chunk of the company by the end of this year at a price that, because of ViSalus’ incredible growth, eventually became extraordinarily steep.

By this past summer, coughing up the sum of $271 million for ViSalus by the holidays seemed impossible for Blyth. (The final price Blyth pays could be $30 million higher, based on something ViSalus called the “Equity Incentive Plan,” allowing its distributors to get a cut of the purchase price.)

An IPO was an elegant solution for the company, allowing Blyth to sell a majority share of ViSalus, while retaining a minority stake and keeping control through the board of directors. Nonetheless, Blyth pulled the offering on Sept. 26, offering only a terse “market conditions” as the reason.

At Blyth, sporadic asset sales had taken place over the past four or so years but sinking home decor brands are not fetching many bids these days. Writing a check was out of the equation; Blyth had about $167 million in cash apart from ViSalus and once Moody’s Investors Service became aware of the company’s dire financial straits, it acted swiftly on Sept. 20 to change its outlook on the company to negative, closing the door on Blyth’s ability to borrow money below loan shark rates.

On Oct. 1, in a press release light on details, Blyth announced that its purchase of the final share of ViSalus would take place in April 2014 and that ViSalus’ founders agreed to have new employment contracts drawn up.

Blyth effectively took a cue from the U.S. government and pushed forward the day of fiscal reckoning 18 months. Management perhaps hopes that the shelved IPO can be relaunched when investors have forgotten what’s in the prospectus. The reality is that Blyth’s leadership bought a little more than a year and a half to devise Plan B. Regardless, even if consumer spending swells, it is difficult to imagine Blyth’s being able to generate enough cash to buy the remaining ViSalus stake.

A Merger of Opposites

The relationship between ViSalus and Blyth has its roots in a routine wireless Internet installation job in 2002 at a ranch in Santa Barbara, Calif. Over the course of the installation, the property owner, private equity veteran Frederick Warren, struck up a conversation with Ryan Blair, the chief of the company doing the job, SkyPipeline.

Outside of that chance meeting, a conversation between the two was perhaps unlikely. Warren is a well-established executive in the private equity and venture capital worlds, deeply involved with his alma mater, the University of Pennsylvania. In contrast, Blair had been a violent gang member in Los Angeles who had spent time in jail until his stepfather led him out of that life and interested him in business, as Blair explains at length in his book, Nothing to Lose, Everything to Gain.

Blair’s wireless Internet service provider was a young company in search of cash, according to his book, and Warren, presumably always on the hunt for a new opportunity, was looking to better understand the possibilities in the wireless market.

Warren ultimately became convinced that Blair’s company had potential. He happened to be an outside adviser to Ropart Asset Management, a private equity fund owned and run by Robert Goergen Sr., the founder of Blyth. Warren suggested that Ropart invest in SkyPipeline and Ropart took the advice. In 2004 when NextWeb bought SkyPipeline for $25 million, both Blair and Ropart made out nicely.

The SkyPipeline sale gave Blair his first real money. At the time, Blair didn’t make such great decisions, as his book describes; he spent his windfall on a sports car and plenty of fun with girlfriends who had expensive tastes. Indeed one thing Blair omitted from the book designed to be a “warts and all” account of his entrepreneurial life, including peeks at his playboy lifestyle, is his declaration of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in October 2005. His bankruptcy filing listed $125,000 in credit card debt and just $500 in assets; he was living in a Marina del Rey, Calif., condo leased by his stepfather. (ViSalus’ IPO prospectus does mention the bankruptcy.)

Still, in 2005 after Blair did a leveraged buyout to buy a company called ViSalus Science (later ViSalus) and needed some cash, he found a ready ear at Ropart. Blair retained the previous sales chief, Nick Sarnicola, and chief marketing officer, Blake Mallen, and in six months ViSalus’ sales grew 200%, according to Blair’s book. Traveling to Ropart’s Greenwich, Conn., offices, Blair met with Robert Goergen Sr. and his son Todd, the managing partner.

The pitch worked. Robert Goergen Sr. personally gave the go-ahead to invest $1.5 million in the ViSalus venture.

But there was a hook: Blair was prohibited from disclosing the role of the Goergen family or Blyth in the investment.

The anecdote suggests a recurring theme: the Ropart fund-Blyth Inc.-Goergen family nexus. Though Ropart and Blyth are two legally distinct entities, in practice they and the Goergen family form separate sides of one triangle, a mix of investments and personnel so fluid one needs a scorecard to track whose interests come first.

Then again, it was probably designed that way.

Consider this: Robert Goergen Sr., a former Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette banker and McKinsey partner, founded Blyth in 1976, serves as its chairman and CEO, and personally owns 30% of its shares. He also founded Ropart Asset Management, which his family completely owns. His son Todd, the managing partner of Ropart, is Blyth’s former head of mergers and acquisitions. Ropart Asset Management’s offices are inside Blyth’s headquarters. Todd’s brother Robert Jr. is the head of Blyth’s PartyLite unit and an outside adviser to Ropart. For good measure, their mother, Pamela Goergen, is a long-serving Blyth board member.

Ropart Asset Management owns more than 576,000 shares of Blyth, part of the 3.4 million shares controlled by the Goergen family.

The Goergens are hardly the only family to practice corner office nepotism and everything listed above has been disclosed in one filing or another. The conflicts of interest involved in the Goergens’ running ViSalus as an ATM for themselves are another matter.

When Blyth struck a deal in August 2008 to buy ViSalus in stages, the Goergen family used shareholder capital to buy out Ropart’s private investment in the firm at what Blair’s book indicates was 10 times forward earnings. So far the Ropart Asset Management Funds (and thus the Goergen family) have netted $15 million from the ongoing buyout. It is fair to wonder what — if any — incentives existed for Blyth to aggressively negotiate the sale price lower when Goergen family members were the sole beneficiaries.

Soon after the August 2008 deal, Goergen family members started landing board or executive roles at ViSalus, with Todd serving as chief strategy officer. It’s not unheard of for private equity executives to temporarily assume management roles in companies they invest in, but usually this is for the short term. They claim to be experts in managing assets, after all, not operations.

Todd Goergen’s situation illustrates just how lucrative wearing two hats can be. Todd has kept his Ropart job, while collecting a $500,000 annual salary as ViSalus’ chief strategy officer; he is eligible for a performance bonus of as much as $1 million. If an IPO is completed, Todd will receive 2.05% of the company’s shares in options and restricted stock.

The blurring of the lines between the Goergens’ personal investments and professional obligations seems to be by deliberate design, not accident, and part of their strategy for ViSalus. Ropart owns 4% of ViSalus and its funds charge ViSalus $8,500 a month for management services. The incentive for the Goergen family to complete an IPO is obvious: Based on Blyth’s $1 billion valuation of ViSalus, the shares held by Ropart should be worth at least $40 million, with Todd holding another $20 million stake. Whether the IPO happens is, of course, up to the market. In the meantime, family members are being paid while they wait; other Blyth shareholders are not.

Through Ropart, members of the Goergen family also own minority stakes in some of ViSalus’ key vendors. As of June, ViSalus had paid FragMob LLC $1.7 million in fees this year for services, including development of an app for mobile phones, as well as some credit card swipers, and $800,000 to iCentris, a maker of direct-selling software. Todd Goergen is a member of FragMob’s board and ViSalus’ founders own stakes in both these companies.

Credit the Goergens for their patience, though. When ViSalus stumbled some in 2009 and Blyth was forced to write down many of the assets in its investment to zero, it did not exercise its right to walk away from the deal. Only beginning in 2010 did ViSalus begin the growth that would prove such a double-edged sword.

Then again, the Goergens have direct experience with the darker side of network marketing companies. In 2006, shortly after putting cash into ViSalus, Ropart also took a stake in iMergent, a Utah-based software company cofounded by legendary stock promoter Shelly Singhal. (In 2010 Singhal was indicted for his role in a securities fraud; the charges were reduced to mail fraud last summer.)

From the minute Ropart made its investment, iMergent’s management was embroiled in a pitched battle with short sellers who derided iMergent’s software as worthless and its business model as that of a poorly disguised multilevel marketing company.

In keeping with the Blyth-Ropart-Goergen family tradition of interlocking ownership, Neal Goldman, a Blyth board member since 1991, was the largest holder of iMergent stock and its most vocal defender. He accused the short sellers of illegal tactics and fraudulent claims. Eventually the company sued short seller Andrew Left (a court tossed out the suit two years later with iMergent paying his legal fees).

Goldman probably should have kept his mouth shut. After numerous state attorneys general sued iMergent for making misleading claims, its CEO unceremoniously left the organization in 2008 when the board found he had violated disclosure rules. Then Todd Goergen took over the reins. The company moved its headquarters to Arizona, entered the Internet services business and changed its name to Crexendo. After the company’s stock price peaked at $29 a share in early 2007, the shares now trade at just a tad over $2.

Shake Economic$

What the Goergens and Blyth are involved in with ViSalus is as conceptually different from Blyth’s neighborhood candle and potpourri parties as Pat Boone is from Motley Crüe.

The type of selling done for Blyth’s PartyLite unit is what a management expert might call “high touch,” since the emphasis is on social gatherings of friends and neighbors who personally view and sample the products. While the process is fruitful over the long haul, it can be time-consuming and imprecise. Someone attending an initial sales party might buy a single product and wait months or a year before really opening her wallet. Over time, though, that customer might host a sales party and bring in 20 new customers, a few of whom might organize additional parties.

The entry point for the ViSalus consumer experience is the Body by Vi challenge, a 90-day period during which a person picks a weight-loss goal and tries to achieve it using the Vi-Shape shake mix and supplements. Distributors — or “promoters” as they are called — are supposed to stage “challenge parties” to market the product.

ViSalus’ fast sales growth might seem to indicate that its products work. The truth isn’t so cut and dry.

The company claims to have engineered “millions of pounds lost” and prominently features online pictures of customers made sexier and slimmer from consuming its shakes.

But to evaluate the products’ true effectiveness, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation asked two independent experts to examine ViSalus’ 90-day challenge and the ingredients of the Vi-Shape shake mix: Dr. Melina Jampolis, a nutrition specialist and author of The Calendar Diet, and dietician Keri Gans, author of the Small Change Diet: 10 Steps to a Thinner, Healthier You.

Gans was blunt. “Do they work? Absolutely [shakes] will help you lose weight over a 30-day period.” But she added, “They will absolutely guarantee you gain it all back, if not more.” Since ViSalus provides no instructions for how a person should modify his behavior and does not help introduce changes in how he relates to food (what to eat more of and what to consume less of), the old eating habits remain, Gans argued. Plus, the minute a person exits any shake plan, weight gain inevitably results, she said.

“When the weight comes back, it’s really devastating,” Gans said about shake diets in general and their users. “They simply give up and remain unhappy and unhealthy, or double down, with the same results. I’ve never seen shakes work for anyone wanting permanent weight change.”

Dr. Jampolis was more circumspect. “My concerns are more nutritional and about the marketing than the program,” she said. “Shakes are proven to be an effective first step as someone begins a permanent shift in approach to food. It’s not clear to me, however, that enough emphasis is placed on nutrition after the shake program ends.”

“The cost is much higher than it needs to be,” Dr. Jampolis added. “You could very easily make a much lower-priced shake with ground chia fiber, for instance, and other higher-quality ingredients.” (Diet products and vitamins are two staples of the multilevel marketing universe because they are inexpensive for a company to source and are often in high demand.)

The doctor is right that a Vi-Shape regimen is not cheap; 30 days’ worth of product in ViSalus’ Transformation Kit runs about $249. So figure that a three-month setup costs $750, not including shipping fees. (At least one enterprising ViSalus skeptic managed to put together a nutritionally similar shake for about two-thirds less per serving.)

The back-and-forth between shake opponents and supporters about the alleged nutritional value of ViSalus products is playing out on numerous websites. See the comments from readers here and here, as well as this video critique of ViSalus’ marketing presentation. Nonetheless, ViSalus makes a seductive appeal to consumer psychology: It sells a quick fix to a thorny problem on an installment plan. Skeptics are left to play the role of Cassandra, citing the stern medicine of long-term behavioral and lifestyle changes.

ViSalus asserts numerous claims about the remarkable scientific basis of the products behind its sales success. The company has spared no effort to brand its products as the nutritional heir to the meal-replacement shakes around in one form or other since the 1970s. Until the company updated its website after the name change to ViSalus Inc. from ViSalus Sciences, it declared, “Comprehensive research and development (R&D) is critical to the success of ViSalus’ products” and that it is “dedicated to bringing the best minds together with the best science to deliver cutting edge nutraceuticals.”

That’s a mighty tall order for a company whose scientific advisory board consists of just two people: Dr. Michael Seidman and Steven Witherly. ViSalus’ product development expenses of $1 million were paid entirely to Dr. Seidman for product royalties and consulting fees. He earns another $180,000 a year for appearances at promoter conferences.

And ViSalus conferences extol massive enthusiasm for anything to do with science. Dr. Seidman is regularly given a rock star’s welcome — replete with an entrance song — when he makes his jargon-dense presentations to ViSalus promoters about Vi-Pak, a vitamin and mineral supplement that he developed. Audience members, hanging on every word, eat it up. What they might not know, however, is, speaking skills aside, there is nothing very special about what Dr. Seidman does for ViSalus, according to the company’s filings: “We believe that the products covered by the [Seidman] license are replaceable in the event that the license is not renewed … and do not believe that … the non-renewal of the license would have a material impact on our results of operations and cash flows.”

Dr. Seidman is an ear, nose and throat specialist with an extensive research background in hearing loss. He frequently mentions that he holds several patents in his appearances before ViSalus distributors, but only one of his patents is for vitamins; the rest pertain to hearing loss. Dr. Seidman owns the Body Language Vitamin Co., serves as a staff hearing and throat surgeon for the Henry Ford Health System in West Bloomfield, Mich., acts as a paid endorser of an herbal remedy for tinnitus and edits several academic journals dealing with hearing loss. ViSalus prominently features a White Papers tab on its website, to proudly display a series of Dr. Seidman’s papers — mostly dealing with hearing loss.

Witherly is a nutritionist with a doctorate from Michigan State University. His career is more of a pure play at the intersection between nutraceuticals and direct sales; he has held research positions at Herbalife and a unit of Amway. He is now CEO of Technical Products Inc., a Valencia, Calif., consultancy that has advised companies whose formulations include supplements for erectile dysfunction and hangovers. Though Witherly generally has a lower profile within ViSalus, as a multilevel marketing veteran, he displays a level of enthusiasm and a hyped sales approach in his presentations in keeping with the concert-like aspect of promoter conferences.

That Pyramid Thing, for Real

In the 1980s the Federal Trade Commission laid out guidelines for multilevel marketers concerning acceptable business practices. At a minimum, they have to move away from “inventory loading” (obligating distributors to buy a certain amount of product each month) and have retail sales operations, through which distributors sell to a public customer base, not just to one another.

Yet as long as multilevel marketers have described their compensation structure in a way that addresses these issues, they have largely been left alone and can retain a pyramid structure. While trade and securities regulators have scrambled to bring about compliance — and have sent the occasional message — multilevel marketing companies have become legally sanctioned outposts within the American economy.

In its prospectus, ViSalus bluntly assured would-be investors that the company is not running a pyramid scheme, but an analysis of the details of its operation as explained on its website and in the prospectus suggests an entirely separate reality.

 

ViSalus directly addressed the pyramid structure issue in the prospectus as follows: “Our individual promoters are paid by commissions based on sales of our products and services to bona fide purchasers, and for this and other reasons we do not believe that we are subject to laws regulating pyramid schemes.” ViSalus also pointed out that its distributors are not required to buy products monthly.

Written this way, ViSalus is in the clear. And, to be fair, consumer sales account for 66% of ViSalus’ revenue, with distributors’ purchases making up for the rest. Yet the company’s prospectus shows that on average for the first six months of this year the typical customer spent $240 versus $1,286 by distributors. This seems odd if ViSalus is claiming its distributors are not required to buy products.

Most ViSalus’ kits for promoters come with individual sample packets to give to prospective clients, so a promoter would have no reason to hold any inventory beyond a personal supply. Moreover, company filings say products are shipped directly to a customer. It’s hard to conclude anything other than that promoters are buying product to improve their sales performance or to maintain their perks.

While ViSalus’ promoters do not have to buy a fixed monthly allotment of products, they do spend money — often a lot. Corporate policy requires every promoter to buy at least a $49 “basic” membership, essentially providing a packet of marketing materials and three shake samples. Yet ViSalus’ entire marketing and training program is geared toward directing promoters toward buying one of two options: a $499 Executive Success System package, with promotional materials, videos and free samples, or a $999 offering, basically two Executive Success System packages.

Without the Executive Success System package, according to ViSalus materials, promoters cannot participate in a weekly revenue sharing pool and the ViSalus Bimmer Club. (For those in the Bimmer Club, ViSalus pays $600 toward the lease of a ViSalus-branded black BMW, as long as the promoter’s sales network brings in $12,500 a month in revenue; if sales fall under that figure, the lease becomes the promoter’s obligation.)

In other words, good luck to distributors trying to get ahead at ViSalus without shelling out at least $499.

ViSalus further emphasizes in its prospectus its pyramid avoidance through its manner of sales compensation, stating unequivocally that ViSalus pays “individual promoters commissions based on product sales, not recruiting.”

Narrowly cast, this is correct: A promoter can earn a commission for selling a single bag of shake mix to a customer. But a close read of ViSalus’ compensation plan makes it very clear that life as a ViSalus promoter is built on recruiting additional promoters.

If a promoter sells to a consumer, he earns a commission of at least 10% that can rise to 25%, based on the order’s dollar volume. To earn a respectable living, he would have to sign up customers multiple times a day, every day of the year, with few of them dropping out. Selling a $249 Transformation Kit, for example, brings in slightly less than $25 in commission.

But if a promoter immediately turns new buyers into promoters and builds a network right away, the income can potentially skyrocket. When a promoter adds three customers to her network, she receives a month’s supply of product. If this is done within her first 30 days of joining the Body by Vi Challenge, she becomes eligible for a whole new tier of rewards called Rising Star: a share of the weekly enrollers’ commission pool (2% of ViSalus’ sales). But she must also enroll three other promoters during those first 30 days with a minimum of $2,000 in total product sales.

See how ViSalus tries to have its cake and eat it too? Its filings meet the letter of the law by allowing a participant to earn some money selling to a customer but the spirit of all its programs is clear: Bigger payoffs come from immediately turning a customer into a promoter who is part of an actively expanding network.

In a video posted to YouTube of another ViSalus national sales training seminar this past summer in Miami, Sarnicola underscores the underlying goal to a room full of promoters who have achieved the vaunted status of director: “So I want you guys to make a distinction here between what the marketing message is and what the business model is. The marketing message is ‘challenge, challenge, challenge.’ But once you’ve got somebody in as a promoter, it’s ‘director, director, director.’” No elaboration here about nutrition or the process of weight loss.

Yet, being a ViSalus distributor is a risky proposition. Though the company does not disclose the dropout or “churn” rate for promoters, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation pieced together this rate from annual filings and the prospectus: 197.1% for last year. This year through June, on an annualized basis, the churn rate was 194.2%. (In contrast, Herbalife, whose churn rate has been a major headache for its company, has about a 51% turnover among its distributor ranks.)

Perhaps ViSalus’ high churn rate can be explained by additional Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation analysis from data disclosed in the prospectus: This year through June, the typical distributor for ViSalus bought on average $1,286 in products but earned only $1,638 in commissions, netting $352.

Promoter churn becomes even more significant because it appears that ViSalus is able to count recently dropped-out promoters in its much touted customer total, which it claimed was as high as 1,058,000 in June. Read the fine print below to see how this is possible.

ViSalus defines a customer as “[a]nyone who has purchased products from us at least once in the previous 12 months, other than any purchaser who qualifies as an individual promoter on the measurement date.” Under that definition, ViSalus could include its customer tally promoters who bought items within the past year but who are no longer active and so can’t be considered “individual promoters.” That’s because ViSalus defines an “individual promoter” as a “person eligible to receive a commission within the ViSalus promoter compensation plan on the measurement date.” And to qualify for a commission, a promoter must have booked $125 or more in monthly automatically shipped sales.

So if one assumes the (very) conservative estimate of about 150,000 promoter dropouts in the past year, ViSalus’ 1,058,000 customer figure — more than 1 out of every 300 U.S. residents — is greatly inflated by the inclusion of promoters who are no longer active.

Waning Health

Blyth’s third quarter 10-Q document filed Nov. 7 shows it is a company in poor health, with every page of the filing indicating that the subsidiary is propping up the corporate parent.

Most important, Blyth’s liquidity situation is becoming dire, according to this chart, whose figures were culled from the recent filing. With $85.4 million of 5.5% bonds due in November 2013 against $80.2 million in readily accessible cash, the company has reached panic button time. Fortunately for Blyth, it was able to sell its Sterno unit for $23.5 million last month to build its cash reserve back up to almost $103.8 million.

The sale of the Sterno unit is a good example of how ugly things have become for Blyth: As a profitable unit entering its busiest part of the year, Sterno is the type of division any healthy company would ordinarily hold onto.

Blyth’s non-ViSalus businesses remain in free fall, with sales dropping 16% in the third quarter, to just under $99 million. PartyLite’s revenue declined 21%, with the unit posting an operating loss of $10.7 million. (PartyLite’s big season is the holidays, so the fourth quarter may show improved sales.)

ViSalus is Blyth’s saving grace, bringing in $169.9 million in revenue for the quarter, a 132% increase from the same period the prior year. ViSalus earned $27.4 million for the first nine months of this year, allowing Blyth to turn a profit.

Which is why the Goergens should be feeling worse than ever.

ViSalus, the only thing standing between them and heartbreak, appears to be beginning to wind down its era of unprecedented growth. To be clear, ViSalus’ posting a 132% sales increase in the third quarter over the same period last year is remarkable, but the company looks a lot closer to Earth than it did when posting 451% revenue growth. Unlike PartyLite, diet product companies tend to do their worst in the fourth quarter.

On Nov. 7, for the first time, Visalus announced that its number of promoters shrank from the second quarter to the third, from 114,000 to 110,000. A few days later, on Nov. 12, ViSalus posted a video on YouTube, explaining how it is sharply increasing the cash rewards for promoters moving by March to the upper ranks of distributors. Increasing promoter commissions might help boost or stabilize sales, but it will definitely weigh on profits. And Blyth’s management needs every penny of ViSalus’ profit to make up for its own losses.

In another first, on Nov. 21, Blyth announced Visalus’ inaugural dividend payout — some $22 million in total, with almost $16 million going to Blyth. Naturally, the Goergens shared in the good fortune, with their Ropart fund collecting $880,000 for its 4% stake. Like the Sterno sale, this is another clear sign of weakening financial health: If the goal is to ultimately consolidate ViSalus into Blyth, paying taxes on a dividend makes little sense unless the cash is desperately needed. And no manager would pull capital out of a business growing at 100% or more annually to reinvest it in a shrinking business unless it was to stave off a collapse.

It would be interesting to hear what Blyth’s management, the Goergens and the crew at ViSalus have to say about all this, but they ignored all questions posed them by the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation. For the record, more than a dozen attempts were made via email, phone, Twitter and overnight mail to get someone at Blyth, ViSalus or Ropart to answer questions about liquidity, promoter churn and whether ViSalus is a pyramid scheme. (We even sent emails to Blyth’s outside legal counsel and its board of directors but received no reply.)

Blyth’s stock price is now about $15. Perhaps once investors saw the prospectus and examined the figures, they began to run. For those doing their homework, it’s easy to see why: epic churn, an unsustainable business model and a weak corporate parent that can’t readily make good on a deal to finish buying ViSalus.

The trio of Ryan Blair, Nick Sarnicola and Blake Mallen are slick opportunists who have built the latest infernal multilevel marketing machine, promising everything to the desperate and gullible, if only they buy in.

It will undoubtedly end badly for most, if not all, who rely on peddling shake powder. For ViSalus’ leaders sitting atop the pyramid in the Hollywood Hills and Miami, there’s plenty of cash on hand for now — until they figure out how to make their next fortune.

What no one saw back in 2008 was that it would end so badly for Blyth. Then again, with multilevel marketing — as in life itself — very few ever see the end coming.


The Paper World of Brookfield Asset Management

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Enter the name of Toronto-based public company Brookfield Asset Management into a search engine and it delivers more than 1 million results.  The global conglomerate, whose annual sales exceed $18 billion, controls ports in England, owns Manhattan’s prestigious World Financial Center and sells Chicago a fair measure of its electricity. Yet the massive enterprise is better known for what it owns than how it operates.

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation began a full-time investigation into Brookfield’s far-flung operations in late fall. Our reporting and research uncovered a series of earnings quality problems, the presence of a mostly hidden ownership group that effectively controls Brookfield’s governance and corporate structure, and a business model that involves heavy reliance on related-party transactions with its subsidiaries.

Few companies bear a structure as complex as Brookfield’s: Analyzing the company’s organizational tree and its web of entities, stakes, partnerships and operating companies is to behold the work of gifted accountants and lawyers. Similarly, Brookfield’s financial filings are mind-boggling in their complexity.

A brief glance at a stock chart, which shows that Brookfield’s share price has been on a fairly steady climb from a low of $11 in 2009 to almost $40 in recent months, might give credence to the argument that the labyrinthine structure works.

No one doubts that Brookfield’s share price performance has pleased investors, but how it is achieved should matter.

Control Without Risk

Brookfield bears a pyramidal control structure, a design that U.S. regulators have frowned on since the 1930s. Simply stated, this type of structure lets a small group of shareholders exercise control of a business without putting a proportionate amount of capital at risk.

(This kind of corporate structure is often depicted by a pyramid; hence the name. It is legal and to varying degrees common in Europe, Asia and Canada. But it should not be confused with a pyramid scheme.)

As has been deeply parsed in academic literature, pyramidal control structures are either tremendously efficient or very worrisome, depending on one’s vantage point. Indeed, legendary investor Benjamin Graham devoted an entire chapter of his still influential 1934 book Security Analysis to their risks.

Those in the founding group can leverage their capital to effectively control a broad network of assets or investments; often members of this group do so by creating a holding company with the right to appoint half or more of the board of directors of the parent company.

In turn, these directors can oversee a series of acquisitions using the company’s capital, most of which belongs to other people.

For the shareholders outside of the control group—even if their capital is doing most of the buying—their influence upon the board of directors is perpetually limited, no matter how much they have invested.

Brookfield’s Formula

Here’s how Brookfield’s pyramidal control structure works: Partners Limited, a private holding company with 45 equity holders (a mix of current and former Brookfield officers, with just eight publicly named) owns slightly more than 20 percent of Brookfield’s Class A shares via a combination of trusts and direct holdings valued at more than $4.7 billion. Partners Limited also owns 100 percent of Brookfield’s 85,120 Class B shares, allowing it to elect 50 percent of Brookfield’s board of directors. Owning just 20 percent of the Class A shares but electing half of Brookfield’s board, those who run the almost invisible Partners Limited end up with effective control over all Brookfield’s operations and governance, and anyone else who happens to be a Brookfield shareholder with a gripe cannot do much but grin and bear it.

Should an enterprising Brookfield shareholder summon the nerve to put forth a measure for a vote, its adoption requires approval from two-thirds of both the Class A and Class B shareholders alike. In other words, if the 45 Partners Limited shareholders who own Class B stakes believe a measure goes against their interests, the motion is dead even if 80 percent of the Class A holders approve it. Ultimately this creates a public-private hybrid: a corporation that has ready access to public capital but whose governance can be a private matter.

The use of A and B classes of shares is almost universally panned by governance advocates for its allegedly unfair treatment of minority shareholders. But Brookfield is hardly the only company with what is known as a dual-class share structure. The roster of companies with such a structure includes Google, Berkshire Hathaway and The New York Times Co. Whatever their merits, dual-class share structures are designed to keep the company’s operating assets in the hands of founders. When Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett likes another company, he does not use his publicly traded corporation as a springboard to build a string of downstream corporate investments via minority stakes; he generally buys all of it.

Want to know more about Partners Limited, its history and how it goes about business? Apart from mentions in Brookfield’s management information circular (equivalent to a U.S. corporate proxy statement), the entity is rarely mentioned in the filings of Brookfield and its subsidiaries. Examining public filings, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation came up with a list of 40 of the 45 current and former Partners Limited equity holders; a sizable number of them were instrumental to the rise and fall of Brookfield Asset Management’s high-profile predecessor, the Edper Group.

In response to a U.S. Securities and Enforcement Commission comment, Brookfield recently came close to acknowledging that it has a pyramidal control structure in the “Risk Factors” section of a prelaunch filing for its Brookfield Property Partners unit: “The company at the top of the chain may control the company at the bottom of the chain even if its effective equity position in the bottom company is less than such controlling interest,” the document states.

(With its shares traded on the Toronto and New York exchanges, Canada-based Brookfield submits filings to the SEC but does so as a foreign issuer, which allows it to legally bypass some U.S. laws.)

No matter how little Brookfield Asset Management controls economically of Brookfield Property Partners, Brookfield Asset Management will retain control of Brookfield Property Partners’ board.

All this fine print has paid off handsomely for Partners Limited.

Consider just this one, commercial real estate branch of the Brookfield Asset Management ownership tree: Partners Limited, with a stake worth $4.7 billion, is able to control Brookfield Asset Management, whose market capitalization is $23.8 billion. One of Brookfield Asset Management’s investments is its 50 percent stake in Brookfield Office Properties, a commercial real estate developer with $8.5 billion in market capitalization, that in turn owns 73 percent of Australian real estate investment trust Brookfield Prime Property Fund. With what ultimately amounts to a 7.3 percent blended equity stake in these three entities, the 45 people in Partners Limited exert managerial control over many billions of dollars’ worth of commercial real estate around the world.

Asked about the role Partners Limited plays in Brookfield Asset Management, Andy Willis, a company spokesman replied, in part, with the following:

“We believe [Partners Limited] creates a significant alignment of interests with our shareholders that sets us apart from other companies and is valued by shareholders and our clients alike. We believe that Partners’ participation in the ownership of Brookfield will result in greater long‐term value creation for all shareholders.”

The U.S. regulatory distaste for pyramidal control structures can be traced to the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Then Federal Trade Commission analysts fervently argued that a series of collapses in the 1930s by pyramidal control structure companies (primarily utilities) had deepened the Great Depression. The FTC analysts seized on three things: real and potential abuses by “minority” shareholders (resulting in investors who did not exert control over corporate affairs), the prospects for one-sided related-party transactions—and most important—weak accounting controls that led to the inflation of asset values.

What the Numbers Really Say

Investors in Brookfield have remained loyal to the corporation despite such governance issues perhaps because it has grown assets and earned billions of dollars annually. With Brookfield’s shares widely held in Canada and finding increasing favor among American money managers over the past few years, members of Partners Limited and the rest of Brookfield’s senior management likely are optimistic about prospects.

But a sunny outlook might not be what comes to mind after close scrutiny of Brookfield’s financial filings and an analysis of how the company interacts with several of its subsidiaries.

Despite its profits, Brookfield is not doing as well as investors might suppose.

Brookfield is a creature of the capital markets, relying on financing to fuel its growth and meet its commitments to investors, as the chart below shows. From the start of 2010 to the third quarter of 2012, Brookfield’s distributions—its dividend payments to investors—were $272 million greater than its cash flow from operations, according to filings. Fortunately for Brookfield, its investors are a truly generous bunch; they helped the company eliminate this deficit and raise almost $1.75 billion more than it paid back out, ensuring that its increasing dividend obligations were met—with cash to spare.

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But relying on a constant stream of investor capital has proved a substantial risk for many corporations—the 2008 credit crisis serves as an object lesson—since companies whose business models center on a constant stream of capital market funding hit trouble when the markets seize.

And U.S. tax policy toward dividends is a major stumbling block for companies with pyramidal control structures.  The primary method a pyramidal control structure company has to sustain itself—using preferred stock dividends to shuttle cash from the subsidiaries through the structure to the publicly traded holding company—becomes impractical when both the dividend payer and recipient are being taxed.

Postmodern Accounting 

Generations of businesspeople have assessed the success of enterprises based on a set of simple criteria: Are they profitable? Do they sell enough goods or services in a given period so that after fixed and variable costs are subtracted and taxes paid, something is left to reinvest, retain for future use or even return to shareholders?

Using net income as a barometer of financial achievement is not without its flaws; any business that requires a substantial investment or a longer time frame for its assets to generate a return is likely to eke out a meager income in the short term. But net income is a rational and understandable measurement of where a business stands.

Brookfield sees things very differently and suggests investors judge its success by relying, as the company does, on a measure called “total return” to accurately capture the growth in asset value and cash flow generation in its units. The company describes this view in its annual report as follows: “We define Total Return to include funds from operations plus the increase or decrease in the value of our assets over a period of time.” (“Funds from operations” consist of the cash flow from its businesses.)

Accordingly, Brookfield’s management says it is not the biggest fan of using net income to define profit because only “fair value” adjustments from its real estate and timber segments can be included but not any from its renewable power and energy businesses. (A company can make fair value adjustments if it decides that the market value of its assets has significantly changed from their book value.)

Whatever the merits of “total return” as a measurement, Brookfield’s investors would need to determine net income to gauge the return on their invested capital in comparison to other investment possibilities.

Management’s linguistic preferences are not the sum total of the drama surrounding Brookfield’s accounting, however. Its income statement has several line items that suggest flaws in the company’s earnings quality. 

A frequently debated subject in the accounting community, earnings quality is usually defined to include, in part, how closely a company’s reported net income tracks its so-called true income (or what it can easily convert to cash).

Those willing to put on the green eyeshade and examine Brookfield Asset Management’s 2011 Consolidated Statement of Operations can find $3.67 billion in net income. It’s an eye-opening number. More interesting, however, is discovering just how much of that figure is generated from accounting entries and not from profits related to business activity.

The problem starts a few rows above the line for net income where one can view the various streams that comprise it. In 2011, almost $1.29 billion, or 35 percent, of Brookfield’s profits came from fair value gains. (This figure, however, is listed as $968 million in the 2012 earnings release; it is not clear why there is a difference between the two filings.) For 2012, according to Brookfield’s most recent earnings release, more than 43 percent—or $1.19 billion—of its net income of $2.74 billion came in fair value changes.

Accounting standards allow for including fair value changes in net income. But any gimlet-eyed investor knows that they are nothing more than paper entries, and in Brookfield’s case, they represent its own assessment of its timber, commercial real estate and agricultural asset values; they have nothing to do with the cash typically associated with profits. Even though company executives may legally term a fair value change as profit, this sum cannot be used to pay dividends, build new plants or be readily tapped for a rainy day. All it represents is that the company thinks an asset has increased in value. As a key driver of the much larger net income figure, however, it certainly appears to have added some heft to Brookfield’s share price in recent times.

Consider a complex line item titled “equity accounted income” in the 2011 annual report’s Consolidated Statement of Operations, representing Brookfield’s share of income from its far-flung investments in entities it controls. Pegged at slightly more than $2.2 billion, this amounts to 60 percent of its total net income of $3.67 billion. Similar to fair value adjustments, equity accounted income is (mostly) noncash. For 2012, it totaled $1.24 billion and equaled more than 45 percent of earnings. (Brookfield released its 2012 earnings in mid-February but not its entire annual report, so details about the components of 2012 earnings are not yet available.)

The primary driver of the “equity accounted income” entry in 2011 was Brookfield’s high-profile 22 percent investment in General Growth Properties, a New York-based commercial real estate developer and manager. (Funds managed by Brookfield own another 18 percent of the stock.) Buried in the back of the annual report, this notation is easy enough to miss, but the carrying value—the value Brookfield assigns to the General Growth Properties position—was $1.17 billion more than its market value: Brookfield valued the highly liquid, New York Stock Exchange-traded shares of General Growth Properties at about 40 percent above the market’s valuation at the end of 2011. All told, about $1.4 billion from this one investment eventually wound up in equity accounted income, but it added only $204 million in cash to the till, according to the annual report. (In 2010, Brookfield reported equity accounted income of $765 million but its only source of actual cash from that input was $374 million in dividend payments from companies it had invested in.)

Thus, accounting entries are making Brookfield look really good. Without including fair value changes and equity accounted income, Brookfield’s earnings sharply decrease.

What does this situation look like numerically speaking? As shown in the chart below of Brookfield’s net income in the last couple of years, after adjusting for fair value changes and equity accounted income, the sum that might be called the “true profits”—the earnings from all the investments and assets Brookfield has the world over—is relatively low.

Paper_profits

Investors may accept Brookfield’s desire to be analyzed this way but the SEC has publicly questioned how Brookfield used specific investment terms and its valuation methodology. In one instance in July 2011, the SEC noted its concern that Brookfield’s use of the phrase “cash flow from operations” was outside the standard definition. Despite the unambiguously skeptical tone in the SEC’s correspondence about the phrase, Brookfield held its line for more than five months. The company repeatedly parried the SEC’s concerns in a dispute that played out in a cat-and-mouse series of filings before Brookfield finally consented to change its wording in November

The real number for Brookfield’s earnings is anyone’s guess. The sheer complexity of its income statement and management’s insistence on nontraditional measurements seem to work in Brookfield’s favor, as virtually no analysts or investors have raised public concerns in this regard.

As Brookfield’s auditor, the accounting giant Deloitte & Touche, notes in an article it wrote in 2002, the prevalence of noncash earnings is an important criteria in assessing earnings quality.

In 2011 Brookfield paid Deloitte $38.7 million for audit work for Brookfield and its subsidiaries. Below, view a chart showing how much Brookfield and other large Canadian corporations compensated their auditing firms.

The Curious Case of an Infrastructure Player

As is the case for some icebergs, much of Brookfield Asset Management’s activity is happening below the surface, at the level of its operating subsidiaries and limited partnerships.

Brookfield Asset Management’s approach to navigating the myriad disclosure, accounting and valuation challenges of its pyramidal control structure is perhaps most clearly seen in the filings of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P., a publicly traded affiliate spun off from Brookfield Asset Management in early 2008.

Holding Brookfield Asset Management’s infrastructure investments in commodities like utilities, timber, toll roads and seaports, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners is structured as a publicly traded limited partnership. Though Brookfield Infrastructure Partners is legally autonomous from Brookfield Asset Management and sports brand-name investors like Morgan Stanley Investment Management and Fidelity Investments, there is no apparent practical distinction between the two. Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Limited currently owns about 29 percent of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ units (down from 60 percent in 2008) and acts as its general partner, earning a 1.25 percent management fee and incentive fees, which amounted to $53 million in 2011, according to the annual report.

(Using an unusual approach, Brookfield Asset Management calculates its management fee from enterprise value, meaning that the larger Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ capitalization gets, the bigger the fee. Brookfield Asset Management also receives 25 percent of surplus cash each year from Brookfield Infrastructure Partners if Brookfield Asset Management’s quarterly distribution is more than $.305 per unit; it was $.370 per unit for the most recent quarter. Other limited partnerships have a similar clause for paying out additional dividends with surplus cash but have very strict guidelines about when it applies; in Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ case, these extra distributions are at the “sole discretion” of the general partner, according to the 2011 annual report.)

For all practical purposes, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners exists solely on paper and has no employees or assets. What Brookfield Infrastructure Partners does have is a series of remote and indirect ownership claims on about 15 assets managed by Brookfield Asset Management employees and held in private-equity partnerships domiciled in Bermuda and controlled by Brookfield Asset Management.

Tracking Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ cash flow is a fool’s errand: Its filings don’t indicate the cash flow from all its investments. Until recently Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (like Brookfield Asset Management) has had some rough times; it failed to generate enough cash from its operations to cover its distributions to unit holders in 2010 and 2011. This turned around sharply during the first nine months of 2012, when Brookfield Infrastructure Partners booked a surplus of $171 million. But look at the difference between the finances raised and what was invested: Brookfield Infrastructure Partners regularly raised more capital than it needed to finance asset purchases and had some left over.

Like its parent, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners has an earnings quality problem. As the consolidated statement of operations shows, the partnership reported $106 million in net income for 2012 but fair value changes amounted to $200 million of that. In 2011, the $187 million in net income for the partnership was dwarfed by $356 million in fair value changes.

In 2010, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners made a pair of accounting changes (described in Note 7 of its 2010 annual report as a $239 million “remeasurement gain” and a $194 million “bargain purchase gain”); these were related to the purchase of a remaining 60 percent stake in Prime Infrastructure Fund that it didn’t already own. (The fund was founded by Babcock & Brown, an Australian infrastructure finance investment firm that began liquidation in 2009.) The $433 million noncash gain was the majority of the year’s $467 million in net income for Brookfield Infrastruture Partners. In a 15-page response to the SEC’s questions about this gain and other accounting and valuation issues, the partnership offered a host of reasons why the book value of its new assets were markedly above the purchase price; the cited reasons included the appreciation of the Australian stock market from 2009 to 2010, as well as Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ own unit price.

The conclusion is stark: Noncash accounting entries are saving Brookfield Infrastructure Partners and the market value of its units from some hard times and harder choices.

The Charms of Consolidation

The balance sheet gets even more convoluted. In 2010, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners began reporting its financials in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards—as opposed to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles—after Canadian law mandated the switch. In an attempt to harmonize accounting treatments around the world, IFRS does away with GAAP’s strict definitions, granting financial managers wider latitude to determine the fair value of assets. The end result for Brookfield Infrastructure Partners has been remarkable.

In 2010, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners reported its 2009 balance sheets using both GAAP and IFRS. Under GAAP, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners reported $1.07 billion in assets. Under IFRS, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ assets ballooned to slightly more than $6 billion.

IFRS_BIP

Recall that nothing save the accounting system had changed; it was the same company through and through, except one with a much larger balance sheet. And indeed from the spring of 2010 onward, the price of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ units have found much more favor in the market.

Brookfield Infrastructure Partners has been able to do this because as it switched to IFRS, it also changed its policy about an accounting concept called consolidation. At its core, consolidation is an easy concept to grasp; it occurs when Company A takes Company B’s financial statements onto its books and presents the combined results to investors. (This usually happens when Company A owns a majority of Company B’s equity, giving it effective control over Company B’s governance and operations.)

Under U.S. GAAP, consolidation can take place when a company owns 80 percent of another; but with IFRS, a corporation has plenty of freedom to define consolidation.

So Brookfield Infrastructure Partners consolidated the financials of five companies it had invested in even though its stake was less than 80 percent. It seems this move amounted to a deft legal maneuver, whereby Brookfield Asset Management—which managed these investments—ceded to Brookfield Infrastructure Partners the voting rights for these companies, giving the latter the right to select board members and direct corporate actions.

A fair question to ask is, What changed after the voting rights transfer? The answer is apparently not very much. The Brookfield Asset Management executives in charge of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners before this ceding of voting rights were the same executives, in the same roles and with the same incentives, as the ones afterward.

What wasn’t immaterial was Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ ability to add about $2.4 billion of assets to its 2010 balance sheet from two investments, Longview Timber and Island Timber L.P., even though it had less than a 40 percent equity stakes in each.

The SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance raised specific questions in its previously mentioned Jan. 31, 2012, letter about Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ consolidation practices.

Consolidation of investments in which Brookfield Infrastructure Partners has a minority stake has not been a one-off occurrence. In 2012 Brookfield Asset Management purchased minority stakes in Warwick Gas Storage and Columbian Regulated Distribution (22 percent and 17 percent, respectively) and then transferred the utilities’ voting rights to Brookfield Infrastructure Partners, which consolidated the companies on its balance sheet.

But finding consistency in Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ approach to consolidation is difficult, as it has made investments in seven companies (with the equity stake ranging from 10 percent to 50 percent) that did not lead to a consolidation, according to its documents.

The most important aspect of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ consolidation policy is the part we know the least about: cash flow. While consolidating select minority stakes certainly improves the appearance of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ income statement and balance sheet, this also skews any attempt to figure out just how much cash is flowing into the partnership from these investments.

When it comes to discussing the merits of consolidating its minority stakes, Brookfield says this is done for shareholders and analysts, so they can get a “much clearer depiction of [Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’] underlying investments by showing on a consolidated basis the company’s assets, liabilities and financial performance.”

Asked by email how consolidation makes these metrics clearer, Brookfield’s spokesman refused further comment.

A Question of Independence

Using the standard interpretation of good corporate governance, an autonomous board of directors is supposed to serve as the investors’ advocate and ensure that senior management is effective in building shareholder value.

Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ eight-member board of directors includes seven individuals classified as independent. Research shows, however, that five of the eight have clear professional, economic or board ties to Brookfield Asset Management and its subsidiaries.

When pressed on the matter, Brookfield Asset Management disputed the notion that  Brookfield Infrastructure Partners’ board of directors lacks autonomy. Responding to questions from the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, Brookfield Asset Management stated, The BIP board has eight directors of which seven are independent. The BIP board approves all significant matters involving BIP. BIP also has fully independent audit, compensation and governance committees which are required to approve the matters within their purview.”

What exactly constitutes an independent corporate board is certainly the subject of much debate. Following the letter of the law, Brookfield Asset Management can term Trevor Eyton an independent member of its board as long as he has not drawn a paycheck from Brookfield within the prior three years and has no family members working for the company. Yet this ignores the fact that from 1979 to 1997, Eyton (a longtime shareholder in Partners Limited and its predecessors) served variously as chief executive and chairman of Brascan, a key Brookfield subsidiary, and also had been for an extended period one of the most public executives of Brookfield’s predecessor, Edper.

The Terrific Value of Related Parties

One area where little doubt remains about Brookfield’s intent is its frequent use of related-party transactions; they happen so often—across so many subsidiaries—that they are clearly part of an overall corporate strategy. The risks inherent with doing a lot of related-party business are apparent: Non-arm’s-length transactions can disproportionately benefit one party’s investors at the expense of the other’s. Such a practice also raises concerns about whether certain deals can be replicated outside of the pyramidal control structure.

One related party transaction stands apart from all others: Buried deep in the rear of Brookfield Renewable Energy’s 2011 annual report are the details surrounding two adjustments to a pair of power purchase agreements with Brookfield Asset Management-controlled parties. Brookfield Renewable Energy, an electricity-generating partnership that’s 68 percent owned by Brookfield Asset Management and that sold 55 percent of its output in 2011 to Brookfield Asset Management-related parties, was able to amend two power purchase agreements with its wholly owned subsidiaries Mississagi Power Trust and Great Lakes Power Limited on remarkably favorable terms.

How favorable? In one instance, the new contract was repriced 50 percent higher; another time it was 20 percent. As far as the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation can discern, this appears to be an unusual event within the renewable power industry. (Power purchase agreements, typically struck for 10- or 20-year durations, are indeed repriced annually, but only to account for an agreed-upon change in an inflation measure, such as the consumer price index. The delivery price, however, is almost never touched and if it is, it certainly is not augmented 50 percent.)

The results from the changed contracts were indeed significant, amounting to $140 million in additional revenue, 17 percent of Brookfield Renewable Energy’s 2011 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and taxes (Ebitda) and 33 percent of its funds from operations. More important to Brookfield Renewable Energy, its annual report discloses that these power purchase agreement revisions were pure profit, contributing an additional $140 million in Ebitda and funds from operations.

Brookfield Asset Management, for its role in the upward revision of the two power purchase agreements, was paid $292.3 million Canadian dollars. The payments kicked off a complex chain of transactions, according to a publicly filed merger document from 2011, resulting in Brookfield Asset Management’s receiving an additional $292.3 million in Brookfield Renewable Energy units.

Getting paid to revise power purchase agreements upward was not always so complex. In 2009, a pair of such revisions netted Brookfield Asset Management a $349 million cash payment, according to Brookfield Renewable Energy’s annual report.

For providing management and “energy marketing services” to Brookfield Renewable Energy, according to its annual report, Brookfield Asset Management was paid a total of $40 million in 2011.

Brookfield’s Response

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation does its reporting based on publicly available documents and seeks to fully engage with the subjects of its reporting.

So it was when it came to the foundation’s reporting about Brookfield Asset Management.

After the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation conducted preliminary reporting for many weeks, it submitted detailed questions via email to Brookfield on Feb. 8 and Feb. 11. On Feb. 15 the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation had a phone conversation with Willis, Brookfield’s media relations chief and a former business journalist. Among other issues, the foundation’s disclosure and trading policies were discussed, and it was reiterated that no one at the foundation has any economic interest in Brookfield’s shares, long or short, and no one outside the reporting foundation sees its work prior to release. Plans were discussed about setting up interviews of some Brookfield executives.

Prior to the call, Brookfield’s Willis also provided the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation a letter of introduction and the company’s replies to the first two sets of questions.

On Feb. 17 the foundation submitted a third round of questions.

On Feb. 19 Brookfield’s Willis said the company refused to answer further questions and had referred the matter to its U.S. legal counsel, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP; the firm informed the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that its client was considering legal action.

While engaged in other reporting assignments, members of the board of the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation have previously experienced contentious exchanges with Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman as well as with Michael Sitrick, who is now serving as an outside public relations adviser to Brookfield. (Sitrick has provided media representation to Kasowitz, Benson clients who have unsuccessfully sued short-sellers and analysts, allegedly for conspiring to damage their share prices.)

A Rousing Relationship

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 This is a sidebar to “The Paper World of Brookfield Asset Management.” For more coverage, click here.

A series of transactions beginning last winter involving Brookfield Asset Management and Rouse Properties (a New York-based mall developer in which Brookfield has a substantial investment) illustrates how complex financial moves with related parties can prove remarkably advantageous.

The backstory: Rouse Properties, a developer of Class B malls (a real estate industry term referring to malls that are non-dominant competitors in their region, with sales of less than $400 a square foot), was spun out of General Growth Properties in August 2011.

In February 2012, Rouse conducted an unusual $200 million stock purchase rights offering, whereby existing shareholders were given the opportunity to “subscribe,” or buy, shares at $15 for one month when the shares were trading around $13.75. (Rights offerings are usually offered at a slight discount to the prevailing share price to motivate shareholders to participate without diluting their stake.)

Lasting a month, Rouse’s rights offering never reached the $15 level but instead of the embarrassment of a failed deal—less than 15 percent of Rouse’s non-Brookfield shareholders participated in the offering—Rouse got its money. That’s because Brookfield “backstopped” (or guaranteed) the completion of the deal—for a $6 million fee. After the deal was done in March 2012, Brookfield owned an additional 11.35 million shares, taking its stake in Rouse from 37 percent to 54 percent, giving it effective control over the company. Of note, Brookfield was able to do this without paying a control premium to Rouse’s investors.

Shortly after the rights offering was closed, Brookfield and Rouse engaged in a series of transactions that seem to show how Brookfield obtained a large block of Rouse shares by spending only $13.7 million.

It began January of last year, when $150 million of the cash Rouse raised was transferred to a wholly owned Brookfield subsidiary, Brookfield U.S. Holdings, that pays Rouse an annual floating interest rate of Libor plus 1.05 percent. According to Rouse’s filing, this was structured as a demand deposit due to mature on Feb. 14 of this year. No reason was given in either company’s filings for making the demand deposit at BBB-rated Brookfield as opposed to a traditional bank, like A-rated J.P. Morgan.

At the same time, Rouse opened a $100 million credit line with Brookfield U.S. Holdings that costs Libor plus 8.5 percent, plus a onetime initiation fee of $500,000, and had made $250,000 in interest payments through the third quarter. To date, the credit line does not appear to have been touched.

Visually, the cash transfers look like the list on the chart, below:

Northern Exposure

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 This is a sidebar to “The Paper World of Brookfield Asset Management.” For more coverage, click here.

Beginning at about 9 a.m. on Jan. 24, 1996, in the offices of Toronto law firm of Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington, a combative former Ontario Securities Commission regulator named Joseph Groia made a small piece of Canadian legal history by deposing a native South African named Jack Lorne Cockwell. Though not a shy man, the 55-year-old Cockwell had thus far achieved astounding career success, due in some measure, to avoiding people like Joe Groia.

Though Cockwell invariably bore impressively nondescript titles like vice chairman and took pains to keep out of the limelight, he had been chief strategist of the Edper Group and the architect of its constellation of nearly 360 separate subsidiaries. He had not been alone; he built a small band of intensely loyal colleagues who shared his singular view of business. Though Edper became many things over the years of its operation from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, it began as a sleepy holding company for the shareholdings of its two original owners, Edward and Peter Bronfman, the scions of the Seagram’s liquor fortune.

The combination of the Bronfmans’ capital and the ruthless intelligence and vision of Cockwell’s team proved unstoppable and Canada’s business firmament bent before it. By the late 1980s, Edper controlled an empire that included everything from Labatt brewing company, Brazil’s largest utility, huge real estate holdings, the Toronto Blue Jays and mining giant Noranda.

Edper was no ordinary company by any measurement, in any era: At points in the late 1980s, nearly 15 percent of the Toronto Stock Exchange’s daily trading volume involved the shares of its various subsidiaries and more than 110,000 people drew their paycheck from one of its companies.

It had not ended as planned, however. After the debt crisis of 1989, Edper’s spiderweb structure, in which every unit seemingly owned the debt or the preferred shares of another, underwent a sudden rapid shift away from the diversified conglomerate model. By February 1993 its stakes in Labatt and pulp and paper giant MacMillan Bloedel were sold off in a single night in what Canadian business reporters took to calling “the great Edper lawn sale.”

(Yet despite losing 90 percent of its market capitalization from 1989 to 1993, Edper survived. Emerging unscathed, Cockwell folded many of the company’s assets into Brascan, an already asset-rich Brazilian subsidiary. After a series of asset transfers, a newer, more streamlined company surfaced in 2005. The company, based in Toronto’s tony Brookfield Plaza, was renamed Brookfield Asset Management.)

Groia’s deposition of Cockwell concerned the matter of Lionel Conacher’s case against Hees International Bancorp, which was one of the central components of Edper’s empire. Like all such cases, sharply divergent viewpoints came into play: Lionel Conacher, a Dartmouth College-educated former Citicorp banker, had been hired by Hees International Bancorp as assistant treasurer.

Conacher argued that Hees had failed to honor a key compensation clause and left him with worthless options, and Hees (represented by Cockwell) defended the company’s actions as proper and just. The merits of Conacher’s claim soon became secondary to what was uncovered during discovery: how Edper really worked.

Behind the corporate facade and the track record of success lay Edper’s universe of related-party deals and a nonstop continuum of managerial investments into or out of subsidiaries. Publicly, Cockwell and his colleagues proclaimed the benefits of having managers with a personal stake in their businesses; privately, the reality was often different.

The complexity of the effort is astounding. According to Conacher’s sworn affidavit, he and his Edper colleagues set up private investment companies that issued preferred shares to investment vehicles controlled by senior Edper managers like Cockwell’s brother Ian. Such managers then used the proceeds to buy shares in a subsidiary of a private holding company of Edper, which in turn held a mix of public and private shares in other Edper entities. Depending on the cash needs of management, the publicly held Hees could act as a financial intermediary, buying back shares or providing loans.

At the center of this whirlwind of loans and secret deals was Jack Cockwell and a small group of senior Edper executives. They held shares in Partners Holdings Inc., which Conacher described as a “financial partner with Peter Bronfman in the control of the Edper group.” And there was another layer: Quadco, a company that appeared to hold a controlling interest in Partners Holdings Inc., which was a partnership between the two Cockwell brothers and two other long-serving Edper executives, Tim Price and David Kerr.

The filings also disclosed an August 1993 deal involving Hees subsidiary Great Lakes Holdings and designed to help relieve some of the financial pressure on Hees executives as a result of loans they had assumed to buy stock in Hees or its subsidiaries. That August Hees allowed executives like Conacher to buy shares at .50 Canadian dollars and bought them back six months later in February 1994 at 7.04 Canadian dollars. The loan to buy the shares came from Cockwell’s private management company and the more than 563,000 Canadian dollars in proceeds from the Great Lakes trade were used to pay off a bank that wanted back the money it had loaned Conacher.

Roughly 10 million Canadian dollars in shareholder cash were transferred to Hees executives to pay off loans they had taken to participate in various equity investments.

Lurking within the Hees-Great Lakes Holdings deal was the real threat—one posed by the massive web of undisclosed private guarantees to a series of otherwise healthy operating companies, with Hees using public capital to stave off private risk.

After some additional legal wrangling, Conacher reached an out-of-court settlement with his former business associates within the year; the terms were never disclosed. Conacher, reached at his new employer, Roth Capital Markets, declined comment.

Disclosure Diligence

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 This is a sidebar to “The Paper World of Brookfield Asset Management.” For more coverage, click here.

Brookfield Asset Management’s disclosure practices have raised regulatory eyebrows before. In a nine-page June 10, 2009, letter, the Securities and Exchange Commission raised with Brookfield a laundry list of concerns it had about Brookfield Asset Management’s homebuilding subsidiary Brookfield Homes, requesting more detailed disclosure. One issue was the Brookfield’s failure to disclose that Craig Laurie, Brookfield Homes’ chief financial officer, had also been serving as the CFO of Crystal River Capital, a company that was then being managed by another Brookfield Asset Management unit. Brookfield Homes replied two weeks later, and among other things, agreed to disclose Laurie’s dual role. In 2011, Brookfield Homes became Brookfield Residential Properties.

The Erstwhile Hedge Fund King of Akron, Ohio’s Very Difficult Summer

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On Aug. 4, 2012, a bright young mortgage department employee at J.P. Morgan named Ben Sayer was all smiles: The head of a rapidly expanding hedge fund said to have almost $200 million in assets—one Anthony Davian of Davian Capital Advisors—had invited him to attend his fund’s annual golf outing for clients at the swanky Firestone Country Club in Akron, Ohio. And this meant, to Sayer at least, that he might be on the verge of snagging a job offer at Davian’s Akron-based fund.

While a job offer at any hedge fund certainly represented a dream opportunity to him, the prospect of being offered a slot at Davian Capital was something apart: It was a fast-growing and remarkably successful effort, with annual returns allegedly exceeding 20 percent when other, much more well-known funds were struggling to earn half as much.

Better still, Sayer liked the way that Davian himself used social media—Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other services—to share ideas and market his two funds. It seemed to Sayer, a 27-year-old University of Akron graduate, that Davian was as willing to swap insights with him as readily as he would kick around ideas with veteran traders managing hundreds of millions of dollars. Davian’s informality and willingness to engage in dialogue made him appear entirely different from the hedge fund industry legends in New York.

Sayer was right about one thing: Davian eventually did offer him a job as an analyst at Davian Capital and he could dream, briefly at least, of acquiring the experience that would propel him to riches and perhaps enable him to launch his own fund one day.

But within a month of Sayer’s taking the position, the smile had vanished from his face and questions about the firm came to him fast and hard. Not only could he not get a straight answer from Davian about where the $200 million of client capital was, but by this past June, the fund itself had come to a standstill after being besieged by fraud allegations from all directions.

Things got even worse: After Anthony Davian’s wife found him passed out in their car suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning earlier this month, he was rushed to the intensive care unit of a hospital. Meanwhile, a growing number of regulators swarmed over the fund asking some very pointed questions about what had happened.

When the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation examined the fund’s documents and conducted multiple interviews with investors and the fund’s founder and employees, it uncovered a very different reality behind the well-constructed image of Anthony Davian and his fund. It appears that Davian’s greatest accomplishment may be the invention and marketing of his image as a tech-savvy fund manager of an immensely successful hedge fund portfolio.

While Davian’s assertions that his fund’s asset base reached about $200 million appear to be pure fiction, there’s no doubt that the fund’s investors have suffered sharp losses in their investments, with the extent of the damage still unknown. Though the Davian Capital Advisors drama can’t rival other hedge fund sagas in size, for sheer difficulty in sorting out the true from the false it has few rivals.

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If potential investors had done any advance digging, they might have encountered several red flags in Anthony Davian’s background. Raised in the Greater Cleveland area, Davian attended Holy Name High School in Parma and the University of Akron, from which he claimed to have received a 2003 degree in accounting, following a course of study that helped make him “a lethal short seller.”

While Davian did attend the University of Akron and appears to have studied some accounting, he did not graduate, according to the school’s registrar’s office. Moreover, according to public records, the school had a $2,221 lien in place on Davian’s assets as of April 2011 for nonpayment of unspecified debts. An attempt to garnish Davian’s wages from a series of bank accounts he disclosed to the courts proved unsuccessful in 2011 and 2012 since the accounts were closed or empty.

Some years earlier, in April 2003, Davian had sought personal bankruptcy protection from his creditors in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Ohio, and the online record indicates he was granted relief by that July. At least six other claims against Davian from creditors remain outstanding, including another lien attached by a law firm he once hired.

After Davian attended college and before he began managing money, he spent some time working for his father’s Cleveland-based tool and die factory.

In recent years, though, Davian’s appeals to investors, especially online, were anchored by his frequent assertions that money management simply came easily to him. Less clear is when he started and with how much capital; Davian himself has presented two separate versions of his debut.

In a February 2012 video posted on YouTube with the immodest heading “Financial Rockstar,” Davian claims to have started his fund in 2007, raising capital in a classic “bootstrapping” fashion. While he may have scrambled for money, he seemed to avoid early worries about profits, with his video declaring he had realized returns of 42 percent after accounting for fees in just his first year of trading. This sharply outpaced the returns of dedicated short sellers and equity long and short managers, whose returns for that year averaged 13 percent and 12.8 percent, respectively, according to the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Index.

His trading proved so profitable that by August 2007, Davian was spending much of his time “golfing and fishing,” according to his YouTube account.

Yet an October 2012 letter that Davian wrote to a short seller (who requested anonymity) offers quite a different launch narrative, yet equally superlative in its instant success. The letter states that Davian’s first fund started in 2008 and by that August it had grown 52 percent after having shorted the stock of Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and National City Corp., affording him the ability to “basically travel around raising capital, golfing and eating and drinking along the way.”

In this same correspondence, Davian explained that he attempted to fight off boredom by launching the Davian Letter, which disseminates his trading ideas to subscribers at $79 or $99 a month. The newsletter generates profits of “several hundred [thousand dollars] annually,” Davian wrote, implying that by the fall 2012, he had at least 2,000 subscribers. (In fact, the newsletter never earned more than than $30,000 a year.)

Investors don’t seem to have lodged any complaints after hearing Davian’s extraordinary assertions; instead they appear to have swooned over the massive returns Davian alleged to have realized. (The initial years of a money manager’s career are often closely scrutinized by prospective investors who watch for how market volatility is handled—but that does not appear to have been the case for Davian.) No one asked why a money manager capable of earning returns in the 40 percent to 50 percent range (during one of the most volatile stretches of stock market history) would have troubled himself with a newsletter business peddling daily stock tips to subscribers for $1,200 a year.

Davian’s vigorous promotional activity had few peers. In the YouTube video, he comes very close to guaranteeing “high 20 percent or mid-30 percent” returns.

For Davian, would-be investors’ embracing of his social media posts afforded him endless promotional opportunities. Davian became a popular Wall Street voice on Twitter, with his @hedgieguy handle issuing dozens of messages daily on everything from macroeconomic issues to potential trades. In what became his trademark, he made identifying a worthwhile trade appear very easy, especially during 2011’s rout in Chinese reverse-merger stocks: Once a stock he highlighted as problematic collapsed, he would tweet out, “Ching!” (simulating the sound of a cash register closing) to signal even more profits for Davian Capital.

(Following questioning by the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, Davian has “locked” his Twitter account, closing public access to his messages.)

As someone who had almost 5,000 followers on Twitter in late May and who had sent out more than 43,000 tweets, Davian has a name recognition that typically takes established money managers a decade and billions of dollars in assets to muster. For the members of the public who plugged into Davian’s Twitter stream, it was like walking into a nonstop conversation at a party full of traders swapping ideas, jokes and opinions. This vitality was not lost on others. Indeed Ben Sayer initially connected with Davian in 2011 by following him on Twitter.

Davian’s success at deploying social media led him to strike a populist pose online, deriding the graduates of high-profile universities and graduate schools: He argued that their very academic training made them “smidiots” (a pairing of “smart” and “idiots”) and vowed to never to hire them.

Yet, results are all that matters in money management. At the end of the day, as Davian liked to tell his investors, keeping focused on this mind-set is how he managed to build a successful hedge fund and why guys who went to Ivy League schools were trying to get into his firm.

According to its quarterly letters to investors, Davian Capital Advisors certainly deserved to be sought after: The company reported gains of more than 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, for its two main portfolios in the nine months through the end of September 2012. The company boasted that a newly hatched small-cap short-only fund, the Rubber City Gravity Limited Partnership, reported 21.2 percent returns during its first eight months of operation last year.

Such returns made it seem as though Davian’s performance compared quite favorably with that of the legendary fund managers dominating Wall Street’s landscape.

Rewards soon followed. Davian began building a big house in a woody section of Bath, just outside of Akron, promoted by his builder on his Web site. He diversified beyond money management, telling everyone about a brewpub he was backing and an organic pet food and supplies business he cofounded.

Social media seemed to grant Davian the luxury of an online forum where he could say whatever he wished as long as his company’s numbers appeared to be rising.

That is—until the day some people showed up at his office with very specific questions they wanted answered. It was the day of the client event attended by Sayer: Aug. 4, 2012.

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Brian Clark and his former college roommate at Florida State University first encountered Davian on Twitter in 2011 and struck up a dialogue with him that led to the latter’s subscribing to the Davian Letter. (Clark’s former roommate, who requested anonymity, is referred to here as “Nick Miller,” to shield him from job loss and litigation from his employer. His account was supported by personal and business documents and corroborated by numerous on-the-record sources.)

Miller and Clark each have taken different routes to following the capital markets. Clark runs an information technology consultancy in Tallahassee, Florida, and stock trading is his hobby. Miller is an analyst and trader for a bank’s portfolio management arm.

Davian invited Miller and Clark to visit his company because they had completed a pair of research reports for his newsletter and he was interested in exploring if they might do more; Davian and Miller had spoken about the possibility of Miller’s working for the fund.

Yet Davian would have been better off if Miller and Clark had missed their flights since the two Floridians had an entirely separate agenda: They had been doing their homework on Davian’s fund and planned their visit as a way to find answers to a growing list of questions.

As a trader who had dealt with dozens of hedge funds, Miller could not stop thinking about Davian’s frequent remarks about the hassles of setting up a new fund. Davian complained about lawyer fees—a standard hedge fund manager gripe—but then would let slip that he had been forced to spend “a few thousand dollars on legal bills.” In Miller’s experience, most fund managers would click their heels in joy if they could launch a new fund with less than $75,000 in legal fees.

Then there was the fact that virtually no one seemed to work at Davian Capital Advisors. In conversations with the attendees at the client event, Miller and Clark learned that the fund’s staff amounted to Davian, an accountant referred to by Davian as the chief financial officer and an analyst who worked as a bank teller three months before joining the fund, according to her résumé. This appeared to be a very different workforce from the “team” described in videos by Davian as “the best.” When Miller and Clark questioned Davian about how he could make the $200 million fund’s investment decisions with effectively one other person, they did not get an answer.

Their chance sighting of a rather humdrum marketing document for the hedge fund served to crystalize their concerns about Davian and his fund. After arriving at the Davian fund’s offices following the cocktail reception, Miller and Clark picked up a flyer from a stack on a table and immediately noticed something awry in the section on risk management measurements: specifically in the rendering of the Sharpe ratio, an equation measuring variability of reward. The Sharpe ratio is often used as a risk management barometer to assess whether a fund’s investors are being adequately compensated for the risks being taken with their money by the fund’s managers.

A high Sharpe ratio indicates that investors are generally being rewarded for the risk assumed; but an astronomically high Sharpe ratio for a fund exposed to the daily risks of the stock market suggests that something is greatly out of whack. The Sharpe ratio for Davian Capital Advisors seemed to suggest that the fund was generating exceptional returns while taking on virtually no risk, a scenario too good to be true. The fund’s Sharpe ratio was more than 6; anything over 3 would have been remarkable. This meant that Davian had not caught the single biggest error that could be made in calculating the hedge fund industry’s baseline risk measurement.

Bearing a more reserved demeanor than his old roommate, Clark patiently explained to Davian that the Sharpe ratio was mathematically impossible. In short order, it was removed from display.

There was a final thing that struck the pair from Florida as odd at the festivities: the complete lack of clients. At the party of 20 or so, most attendees were people invited by Davian from his Twitter following; just two or three were investors, a remarkably light showing at the primary social event for a fund with $200 million in assets.

After their return to Florida, Clark and Miller had no more direct dealings with Davian or his fund, but their overheard questions and pointed observations to Davian and other client event attendees last August appear to have had some effect: Investor withdrawals increased and little new money came in.

One investor who had seen enough and wanted his money back was Richard Weilnau, a semiretired real estate developer and motorcycle buff who splits his time between Florida and Ohio. He had been waging a low-intensity conflict with Davian for most of 2012 in an effort to withdraw his $100,000 investment after Davian failed to provide him with trade activity updates, he told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation.

“During our discussions about investing in the funds [Anthony Davian] assured me that I would get a frequent update on the fund’s trades so I could track performance myself,” Weilnau said. Shortly after he made his investment, “Anthony told me managing the paperwork from the [fund’s] three prime brokers made that impossible. So I tried to redeem immediately.”

Weilnau said he encountered “every excuse in the book” from Davian, but most were a variation of “we’re in some illiquid investments and can’t pull them right now,” a baffling excuse from a long and short equity fund, whose long investments were mostly liquid, larger capitalization stocks, including those of Volkswagen and eBay, and whose short investments were in companies like Herbalife and Nu Skin. There was, of course, the penny stock short portfolio, which was sharply less liquid, but most funds with a stock portfolio valued at $200 million can easily meet a $100,000 redemption request within a month’s time.

Weilnau’s struggles to get back his investment and the sorts of questions that Clark and Miller raised finally led Davian Capital employee Robert Ake to confront Davian this past May over his growing inventory of concerns about the fund’s health.

That was a problem for Davian because Ake was the fund’s chief financial officer. “By late spring nothing made sense [financially] and someone had to say it,” Ake told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation.

To be sure, Ake’s title was CFO, but in no serious understanding of the title was that the job he performed. The limits placed on Ake were akin to those imposed on journalists in the former Soviet Union, with a great deal of crucial information being considered off-limits—matters like the fund’s bank statements.

Ake never got an answer from Davian about why he was forbidden to see the fund’s bank balances, he said. The few times Ake tried to broach the subject, he was brushed off.

Recognizing a major problem, Ake referred to the brokerage’s account statements to begin to find answers to some of his questions about the fund’s business. The first thing Ake tried to determine was the exact amount of the fund’s assets. In the accounts that Ake saw regularly, there had not been more than a couple million dollars in client assets. For a year or more, whenever Ake had asked Davian about the location of the nine figures’ worth of client assets, he was ignored or given a nonsensical reply.

What Ake observed—and Davian could not explain—was that the ebbs and flows of the cash reserves in the fund’s brokerage statements tracked the fund’s expenditures on renovations for a new office space. Ake also supposed that perhaps some of the money was being siphoned off for Davian’s personal expenditures.

Ake’s confrontation about this, the minute revenue earned by the Davian Letter and Davian’s statements to clients—with insuations like the fund had special access to popular initial public offerings—went nowhere.

The fund’s director of investor relations and marketing, Sean-Michael Kvacek, took a similar tack with Davian, who poorly received his blunt assessment of the skepticism in the institutional capital world about Davian Capital. The traditional sources of hedge fund capital—endowment and pension funds, as well as many high net worth individuals—had too many questions that could not be answered to their satisfaction, Kvacek told his Davian Capital colleagues. Everyone approached by Kvacek for money seemed to share the assessments of Nick Miller and Brian Clark.

On May 15, Kvacek phoned Davian about the difficulties the fund was facing in bringing in new investment capital. Davian responded to Kvacek that there had been months when he wasn’t sure the fund could make payroll because of withdrawals, adding, “I’ve been able to plug the holes and in one case I brought in an additional $500,000.”

Kvacek told Davian that with the fund’s having close to $200 million under management, plugging holes should not be a problem. (He assumed this because the fund was entitled to a fee of 2 percent of assets, which would have come to roughly $4 million, if $200 million were the total.)

Responding bluntly, Davian began listing the expenses that eat up that $4 million: a 32 percent tax rate, payroll, payroll taxes, medical costs, Bloomberg terminal fees, as well as legal and accounting expenses. But in trying to rebut Kvacek, Davian listed less than $3 million in expenses and some of the costs cited seemed improbably high, such as $250,000 for accounting fees.

Kvacek was fired two weeks later when, according to a lawsuit filed by Davian Capital against him, he was discovered forwarding his notes from work and fund documents to an acquaintance at a Nevada-based fund of funds. Davian told the people at his company that the Kvacek suit was about protecting Davian Capital’s intellectual property.  The fund’s lawyers even reached out to the person at the Nevada fund who had received Kvacek’s emails to inform him that attempting to use the sent documents could result in litigation.

To resurrect the moribund fund-raising effort, Davian instructed Kvacek’s coworker Natasha Ivan to tell prospective investors that the fund had $5 million in assets. (It was not clear how Ivan was to explain the sudden shift in the fund’s overall size.)

Kvacek, who did not return repeated phone calls requesting comment, had not forwarded files to hurt Davian Capital, he told Ake and Sayer. Rather he did so because the other fund was Carter Global, founded by Jack Carter, the eldest son of former President Jimmy Carter, Kvacek told his colleagues. He figured that if anyone could effectively alert authorities to what he had come to believe was a complete fraud, it was a former senatorial candidate and president’s kid.

On June 3, Davian Capital’s four remaining full-time employees and a summer intern (the son of the architect building Davian’s new house) quit, never to return to the office.

Kvacek’s hunch that Jack Carter could get results proved to be on target. Within two weeks of Kvacek’s departure, the U.S. Secret Service called Robert Ake and he cooperated fully. As part of that process, Ake wore a wire and recorded Davian discussing “everything,” Ake said. (The Secret Service’s investigative efforts are traditionally associated with currency counterfeiting, but the agency does have jurisdiction over allegations of Ponzi schemes attempted by money managers.)

In late June the Secret Service and the U.S. Postal Service searched the offices of Davian Capital Advisors and confiscated records and computer hard drives.

Brian Leary, a Secret Service spokesman, declined to comment about Davian Capital Advisors, citing a longstanding policy of refraining from discussing potential or current investigations.

Toni Delancey, a Postal Service spokeswoman, did not return repeated requests for comment.

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On June 25 in a phone interview, Davian strongly denied that his fund had any problems, saying, “Rumors are being spread by an ex-employee we are suing in court.” He added that only one other employee, research analyst Ashley Cook, had resigned in order “to attend law school.”

Davian insisted four full-time employees still worked for the fund but declined to name them or put them on the phone with a reporter. When told that he sounded like he was talking in an empty office, Davian responded that his colleagues was very busy trading and that there was no time for an interview.

Responding to a question about the actual amount of client assets under management, Davian acknowledged that there had been a misunderstanding. He said he had often stated that the fund had “between $150 million to $200 million under management” but had been referring not to internally managed client assets but to the assets owned or managed by the client base of the Davian Letter.

Davian then declined to discuss the dollar amount of assets currently managed by Davian Capital Advisors.

On both July 1 and July 8, Davian missed scheduled phone interviews with the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation. On July 9 he sent the foundation an email from what he said was the intensive care unit of a local hospital, as he recovered from what he called “a near death experience.” He said he had been on life support through July 10, but declined to explain how he was able to send an email from his iPad on July 9.

In later emails, Davian declined to respond to questions about whether he had attempted suicide. (In an email exchange provided to the foundation, between the angry investor Weilnau and Davian over Davian’s management of the fund, Davian referred to his illness  as resulting from an “accidental carbon monoxide poisoning.”)

Davian Capital Advisors appears to have suspended operations, according to former employees, and investors are scrambling to figure out what, if anything, remains of their money.

Weilnau said optimism about recovering all or most of investors’ capital might not be warranted given that the whistle-blower was a CFO who sent an ad hoc group of frantic investors in several states an email stating that he had been prohibited from seeing the fund’s cash position.

The relatively little amount of money that Ake was able to discover, Weilnau said, has led the ad hoc network of investors to believe that the outlook for recovery of their funds is grim: “I asked Ake what was in the brokerage account cash balances and he told me it was about $30,000 total,” Weilnau said. “That makes me think the money is far from Akron.”

“I’ve had calls with the Secret Service, Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice and none of them can tell me what’s happening because of the ongoing investigation,” Weilau added.

In conversations with investors as recently as July 13, Davian strongly denied that any problems existed at the fund and insisted that the quarter’s investing was profitable, although he said June’s results are still being tabulated.

The Penny Stock Lawyer

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When in Southern California and in need of a lawyer who understands the needs of a company that may exist largely on paper (and that may never materialize), Phillip Koehnke is your man.

The 45-year-old former Colorado State wrestler, who serves as Medbox’s chief legal adviser, has carved out a niche representing penny stock companies in their brief interludes as going concerns.  Koehnke’s clients are virtually identical: Exceptionally small and barely capitalized, they often have the skimpiest outline of a serious business plan and little in the way of experienced management or serious governance and operational controls.

Koehnke’s ability to earn a living in the bowels of the capital markets has placed him in proximity to the rich tapestry of the penny stock universe’s movers and shakers. A licensed broker, Koehnke has served as a legal adviser to a series of firms whose business model appears centered on small cap stock trading and promotion and possessing extensive regulatory problems. One of these was Scottsdale Capital Advisors, an Arizona-based brokerage run by John and Justine Hurry, a husband and wife duo who are no strangers to litigation or censure. Koehnke advised Scottsdale when it hired a pair of brokers, Andrea Ritchie and Joseph Padilla, who were under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission for a stock promotion scam related to football player Daniel “Rudy” Ruettiger’s  erstwhile sports drink company.  (The two brokers received three-year suspensions from the securities industry; the company is no longer publicly traded.)

Both of Koehnke’s other brokerage firm clients, OC Securities and Aaron Capital, have also run afoul of market regulators on several occasions.

Not shy about starting a fight on behalf of a client, Koehnke sent Seeking Alpha contributor Alan Brochstein a cease and desist letter threatening legal action if he didn’t remove his article critical of AVT. (Brochstein didn’t comply and has continued to criticize the company.)

According to Mehdizadeh, Koehnke came up with the idea to select Tim Quintanilla as the company’s accountant. After the SEC and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board faulted Quintanilla’s diligence, Koehnke approved the appointment of Alexander Anguiano, Mehdizadeh’s personal accountant. In addition, Koehnke also did not stop the internal transfer of Mehdizadeh’s holding company to Medbox’s chief executive, a highly unusual maneuver.

 Pressed on the matter of how Koehnke’s continuing advisory work jibes with Medbox’s desire to be seen as a serious company, Mehdizadeh said, “[Medbox] is looking to phase Phillip out soon.”

Read more about Medbox.

The Man Behind the Marijuana Boxes

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Shannon Illingworth is the founder and chief executive of AVT Inc., a Corona, Calif.-based maker of automated dispensing machines that manufactures the pot-vending units for Medbox. A former college offensive lineman who spent a season on the Los Angeles Rams in 1993-1994 and who now touts the lessons learned on the gridiron, Illingworth is perhaps more reticent to discuss his 1992 arrest for possession of methandrostenolone, a popular anabolic steroid. That turn of events forced him to spend a little time cooling his heels in prison.

Vincent Mehdizadeh bought 50 percent of the broken-down shell of MindfulEye Inc. from Illingworth in November 2011 and the other half in August 2012 (all for what Mehdizadeh referred to as “less than $1 million”) and renamed the company Medbox. Once holder of a large block of Medbox preferred stock, Illingsworth now owns only about 10,000 shares of common stock. (AVT billed Medbox about $500,000 last year for the sale of machines.)

Why the suddenly lower profile for Illingworth? “Shannon is a very aggressive businessman and our risk tolerance and instincts are different,” Mehdizadeh said.

Being aggressive gave Illingworth about 15 minutes of capital markets’ fame when, according to author Randall Lane, Illingworth gave former market pundit and New York Met Lenny Dykstra $250,000 in (undisclosed) AVT shares for pumping the stock in his then widely followed Street.com column. According to Lane, Dykstra was introduced to Illingworth via financial adviser Richard O’Connor, who was a co-defendant with Illingworth in a 2003 suit filed by investor Kurt Knecht over losses he sustained in Out-Takes, an old Stratton Oakmont deal. Apparently Knecht’s sore feelings quickly faded and by 2006 he was an investor in AVT.

Certainly Illingworth’s AVT is an odd sort of corporate duck: It makes a real product that has found willing buyers, but because  of significant amounts of related-party transactions involving Illingworth’s father Jon, a consistent pattern of missed filing deadlines and the firing of its auditor, its shares have been on an uninterrupted slide south this year.

More recently, AVT disclosed that it had received more than $1 million in funding from private equity shop Ironridge, an investor with a profitable niche taking stakes in a host of struggling and profoundly troubled companies. AB Analytical Services analyst Alan Brochstein has argued that the investment is little more than standard death spiral financing whereby Ironridge purchases shares at a sharp discount and then becomes  eligible to obtain as many shares as triple its initial stake should AVT fail to meet specific goals.

Read more about Medbox.


Tinkerer, Lawyer, Hustler, Lies: One Man’s Path to a Dope Fortune

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SIRF artwork

Edel Rodriguez

In the spring of 2010, exasperated police detectives from all over Los Angeles began phoning the county’s consumer affairs department to complain that an outfit calling itself the Active Lawyers Referral Service had misled its working-class customers from 2005 to 2008 by referring them to a law firm that billed them for work—but never finished the job. Their tales got positively woolly: Several claimed that Pejman Vincent Mehdizadeh, the founder of the referral service and the manager of the law firm, had posed as a lawyer and his father, Parviz, had given them legal advice as they sought work visas. (Pejman and Parviz use the names Vincent and Paul, respectively, for business.)

Three years later the consumer affairs unit, along with the Los Angeles County district attorney’s office, sought to prosecute Vincent Mehdizadeh, who, after months of wrangling, pleaded no contest to various criminal charges. He consented to pay $450,000 in restitution to his victims, thereby avoiding a four-year sentence in a California state penitentiary. (His father, Parviz, pleaded no contest to one misdemeanor charge.)

Ordinarily the playbook for those who have narrowly avoided a hefty prison sentence is standard: Assume a lower profile, make amends and go about getting life in order. Not so for Mehdizadeh, however, who decided to go on the offensive, putting out a press release that openly mocked the prosecutors and consumer affairs inspectors.

Then again, the fact that Vincent Mehdizadeh has in a few short years pivoted from hustling legal contracts to being the control man of a publicly traded company called Medbox goes a long way to explaining why lying low isn’t in his vocabulary.

Never heard of Medbox? This $27-a-share company has a fully diluted market capitalization of slightly under $800 million dollars and just happens to be the highest-profile service provider in the booming new business of legally selling marijuana in the United States. The company sits at the intersection of two American passions—the stock market and getting high—and its shares hit $215 at one point last November. Worth more than $200 million, Mehdizadeh is the first multimillionaire (legally) connected to the pot trade, no mean feat in an industry where prior to the start of legalization those at its pinnacle were often rewarded with long jail terms or the occasional bullet to the head.

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation pored over Medbox’s public filings, examined the records of the people involved with the company and Mehdizadeh’s background. We uncovered a host of disclosure issues, baffling related-party transactions and substantial problems with the company’s accounting—and its accountants.

The heart of Medbox’s business is a freestanding vending machine that dispenses bags of marijuana to registered users in states where the substance is legal. The company’s sales pitch to owners of marijuana dispensaries is touting its cashless inventory control system whose biometric thumbprint scan and Medbox-issued debit card ensure that only those with prescriptions can access pot.

What Medbox is really trying to do is carve out an alternative apart from traditional dispensary culture—warm, concerned, very stoned but inefficient—to a more corporate model. In California, lighting up one’s “meds” inside a dispensary is just fine; and operating a dispensary might seem to some people a cool way to earn a living for a while. But those places tend to run into expensive legal problems from crusading cops. Marketing vending machines costing upwards of $25,000 a piece, Medbox is selling dispensaries insurance as much as efficiency.

Running his own dispensary business had proved to be a profound headache for Mehdizadeh: In 2007 the Drug Enforcement Agency raided Herbal Nutrition Center, his dispensary; and a lawsuit resulted from another dispensary transaction in which he was accused of posing as a lawyer and a real estate agent at different times. (Mehdizadeh told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that he paid $350,000 to the plaintiffs to settle the matter and “make it go away.”)

But the dispensary drama inspired Mehdizadeh. He and Bruce Bednick, a chiropractor from Arizona who had also entered the dispensary business and who now is Medbox’s president, have set up 165 of these machines in dispensaries in four states with legalized marijuana sales: California, Arizona, Colorado and Massachusetts.

Lately Bednick and Mehdizadeh want Medbox to graduate from the over-the-counter market and become fully compliant with all Securities and Exchange Commission reporting rules so it can snag a listing on a national stock exchange. It’s not an easy hoop to jump through; there is an extensive list of accounting and legal standards to meet. But if the SEC approves the company’s registration, it will be able to raise capital from the public and its shares can attract bids from institutional money managers. More importantly, company insiders who bought the stock months back at the massive discount of $5 per share can begin to cash in on the market’s insatiable appetite for anything to do with legalized pot and sell as many as 346,000 Medbox shares potentially worth more than $9 million, based on current values. (Mehdizadeh says he won't sell any of his stock.)

Few would begrudge an entrepreneur his payday, but Medbox investors might be surprised to learn of Mehdizadeh’s past, including his many brushes with the law.

As Mehdizadeh tells it, he’s just a middle-class child of immigrants whose dreams for college got derailed when his parent divorced and then suffered a series of economic reverses. Towards the end of high school, the bottom fell out, forcing him to scrap school and hit the streets to drum up some revenue. He claims that against all odds he turned around a dormant legal referral business and earned a handsome living, all the while taking care of his two parents.

Despite there being a grain of truth to that narrative, the documents tell a very different story of the man behind Medbox.

A search of Los Angeles area criminal records databases shows that from 1997 to 2007, Mehdizadeh was arrested or pleaded no contest for breaking and entering, solicitation, trespassing and credit card fraud. He declared bankruptcy in July 2010, after landing up to his neck in back taxes owed to the Internal Revenue Service. Earlier this year, he wound up in the middle of the aforementioned consumer affairs investigation.

Mehdizadeh, now 34, insists he has explanations for all these troubles; mostly he attributes blame to the mistakes of others. While assuring the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation he is an “open book,” he said he surmounted his problems five years ago and that dishonest message board critics who want to see Medbox fail have often overblown his past missteps and stumbles. The little he acknowledged of the legal headaches was offered with the caveat that he had been wrestling with anger over family troubles, as well as displaying poor youthful judgment about whom he associated with.

Consider Mehdizadeh’s tax problems. In his 2010 bankruptcy filing, he listed just under $2 million in back taxes owed the IRS for the 2003 to 2007 tax years. He attributed this situation mainly to a careless accountant who didn’t properly handle a series of allowable deductions.  His lawyer negotiated the owed amount down to $1.2 million, Mehdizadeh said, claiming that his role in the mess was simply not having filed his federal income tax return in 2004 and 2005.

“I knew taxes had to be filed but I got careless,” Mehdizadeh said. “I actually enjoy writing a monthly check to the IRS now; it reminds me of how far I’ve come.”

The allegations that legal client cases were handled improperly did not arise because he scammed anyone, Mehdizadeh asserted; rather they resulted from the lawyer he worked for, Thomas Lee. For his part, Lee retired suddenly in 2008 and resigned from the California state bar with charges pending.

Attempts to reach Lee by publication time were unsuccessful.

Mehdizadeh similarly claimed a 2006 arrest for solicitation of a prostitute and criminal trespassing with intent to injure was nothing more than a coverup of police brutality writ large. His account of the matter has him merely driving around in his new Porsche and being randomly stopped by the Los Angeles police. After asking the officer the reason for the stop, “I was taken out of my car and beaten,” he said. Moreover, his car was impounded and he was arrested.

Despite his allegations of police brutality, Mehdizadeh did not press charges, sue or even file a complaint. Rather, he pleaded no contest to both charges, was given two years probation and paid thousands of dollars to retrieve his impounded car. (A spokeswoman for the Los Angeles Police Department said she could not discuss details about the arrest with the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, citing California privacy statutes.)

“If something like this happened today, I would be holding a press conference and sticking up for myself,” Mehdizadeh said. “I was a lot more green back then—still smart but much more green.”

As for the Los Angeles County district attorney’s case against him? Well, now Mehdizadeh is gearing up to fight back by suing the Los Angeles County department of consumer affairs, he said. “They need to be held accountable for their lies,” he harrumphed.

One area where there is little room for debate is Mehdizadeh’s penchant for posing as a lawyer. After the raid on his marijuana dispensary he wrote in a signed December 2007 post on Weedtracker.com, a dormant pro-marijuana legalization website, “I have a law degree and made managing partner in my firm before the age of 26.”

Moreover, in a testimonial for a Web marketing company, Mehdizadeh signed his name “Vincent Mehdizadeh, J.D.” Short for juris doctor, J.D. signals an accredited law school awarded a degree.

After Mehdizadeh initially strongly denied that he had posed as a lawyer, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation presented these two online claims to him and he acknowledged the fabrication: “I felt really insecure for many years not having gone to college, and it just came easily, occasionally telling people I was a lawyer,” he said. “That was a dark place and time for me. I don’t do anything like that anymore.”

Mehdizadeh’s many legal problems have never been disclosed to Medbox investors—except for a 2007 incident when he failed to produce a clear title to a car he was selling yet accepted a credit card payment for the vehicle anyway. The consumer affairs investigation, which had been headed for trial with the possibility of prison time for Mehdizadeh before he pleaded no contest, was blithely waved away in a Medbox filing as “a private matter.”

When questioned about his past, Mehdizadeh endlessly repeated a simple mantra: “I made mistakes long ago and I want to show investors that I can build and run a good company.”

But whether investors would agree with Medizadeh’s definition of what’s “good” for their capital is another story.

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At first glance, Medbox appears to be a growth stock on steroids, perched at the leading edge of an industry in which demand is effectively doubling every year.

But linger for a time with its filings and Medbox looks less like something in the vanguard of a revolution and more like a throwback to 1980s Wall Street bucket shop deals.

Medbox began life as an outfit called MindfulEye Inc., a collapsed penny stock that had tried to make a business from selling downloadable movies through a network of shopping mall kiosks. Mehdizadeh bought 50 percent of the shares  in November 2011 with a man named Shannon Illingworth and the rest in August 2012. 

For its audits and filing preparation, Medbox turned to Irvine, Calif.-based Q Accountancy. But Q Accountancy had a problematic history of its own with regulators and a legacy of troubled clients. In 2012, a congressionally appointed industry watchdog group—the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—uncovered a sweeping array of deficiencies in Q Accountancy’s auditing practices. And last November the SEC sued Q’s founder, Timothy Quintanilla, for issuing misleading audits based on “reckless and deficient work.”

In June, Medbox dumped Q Accountancy and turned to Alexander Anguiano LLC, the two-man auditing outfit helping Mehdizadeh out of his IRS problems. This firm signed off on a six-page second quarter earnings release issued on Aug. 20; it lacked a cash flow statement and footnotes, was formatted in the manner a college student would track expenses and filed at the very last moment. (One day later the company released a 20-page document with standard disclosures.)

How does a company that’s trying to smarten its profile before selling more stock get into these jams? One way is to have no one in charge of financial oversight on a full-time basis. Until Sept. 1, the company’s finance chief, Leila Guieb, was moonlighting part-time at Medbox while she worked as an employee at Toyota Financial Services. (Thomas Iwanski, a full-time finance executive, has since assumed her duties.)

Another interesting hire in Medbox’s crucial first years of existence was that of William Smith III, a man the company’s fawning December press release framed as the Warren Buffett of the pet insurance industry. He was charged with launching a mergers and acquisitions department in a company with six full-time employees. Smith’s numerous academic degrees on the press statement suggested that he had more accounting experience than the legendary Abraham Briloff.

But what was not disclosed is telling: He was chairman of a pet insurance venture called Ensurapet Inc. when the SEC tossed it from the markets because it failed to file annual and quarterly reports. Moreover, what business the company did do appears to have been centered around the ancient practice of selling unregistered securities in the form of promissory notes to retail investors, as a 2009 claim from the Arkansas Securities Commission argued.

That’s not the only blot on Smith. During his tenure at the company,  the general counsel was Joseph Emas, someone the SEC had barred for two years from advising publicly traded clients in 2010 for drafting misleading filings for another client.

Smith was terminated from Medbox within months of his hire, according to a disclosure in the prospectus and has filed an arbitration claim against Medbox. And that’s about par for the course for Medbox’s  M&A effort, as two of the three companies it had sought to merge with are now litigating against the company, according to a footnote in the S-1.

The tangled tale of Medbox becomes somewhat clearer when the role of a veteran penny stock lawyer named Phillip Koehnke is understood.

Listed as the company’s primary legal adviser, Koehnke was supposed to be especially valuable because he knew MindfulEye “like the back of his hand,” according to Mehdizadeh, and for his suggesting the hiring of Tim Quintanilla and other moves. But the volume of disclosure issues indicate that he either did not press terribly hard to learn the truth about his client, did not ask or did not think investors needed to know these  things.

Then there is the share transfer incident. When Mehdizadeh and the Los Angeles district attorney’s office negotiated a plea in the legal advisory firm case, Mehdizadeh transferred Vincent Chase Inc., a holding company possessing more than 7 million shares of company stock, to Bedrick, Medbox’s chief executive. (Mehdizadeh had named the holding company after the lead character in the HBO series Entourage—an interesting choice, given the character’s drug habit and prodigious love life.)

In effect for only two months and disclosed only briefly in the S-1, the move appeared to have little precedent. Mehdizadeh denied there was a problem, saying the sale was performed “for the good of the shareholders.”

How shareholders were protected is not clear, though, and the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation could find no instance of a corporate executive temporarily deeding his holdings to a colleague.

Mehdizadeh is firmly convinced that had he gone to prison, Bedrick’s control of Vincent Chase Inc. would have protected shareholders from harm. He is astounded that anyone would question the wisdom of the move: “Are you seriously asking me what impact a control person of a public company going to trial on 15 felony counts would have on investor confidence?” he said in reply to repeated requests from the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation to clarify the reasons behind the move.

What the move did accomplish, however, was to keep the shares—potentially worth potentially hundreds of millions of dollars when they are registered—out of any settlement negotiations.

And questionable share transfers aren’t the only things standing out in the Medbox filings.

On March 8, a Medbox press release announced a $6 million equity cash infusion, with $1 million already paid and $5 million to arrive in May. Yet, there’s no sign of any of this in the company’s SEC filings.

In April, Medbox filed a Form 10 as part of its effort to register its shares; the only reference to stock sales was this line in a footnote at the very end: “During January 2013, the Company received a total of $71,520 as payment for the sale of 16,000 shares of common stock during that period.”

The S-1 filed in July offered no clues about the whereabouts of the promised millions.

Share sales did take place, but not along the lines promised by the press release. A note toward the back of the document stated, “From January 1 through July 11, 2013, the Company sold a total of 331,450 shares of common stock to accredited investors for $5 per share, or an aggregate of $1,407,250.”

One of the market’s longer standing measures of value is what investors will pay for shares even if they have to accept reduced liquidity or even none, for a period of time. The accredited investors who ponied up $5 a share from January to mid-July, when the share price ranged from $65 to $26, certainly locked in a discount. They also sent a clear signal of their view on whether the market was fairly valuing Medbox’s prospects.

One might expect that with marijuana legalization a near reality that Medbox would be, to use a phrase, “rolling in the green,” but that’s not the case. The company’s 2013 midyear revenues approached $3 million, according to a quarterly earnings release, putting it on track to eclipse last year’s $3.5 million. But the company lost almost $419,000 in the second quarter and accounts receivables amounted to more than 50 percent of its assets. Mehdizadeh said this is largely a function of the company’s having to fight an expensive (and successful) legal battle in Arizona on behalf of its dispensary clients—something that won’t be repeated. But there’s the possibility of unforeseen headaches emerging in other states and having to spend six figures in legal fees per state would be more than Medbox can bear.

And with receivables greater than last quarter’s revenues, if anything happens to Medbox’s clients and payments don’t emerge, a write-down of bad debt would prove devastating to Medbox’s balance sheet.

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In preparing this article the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation examined numerous legal briefs, public filings and interviewed many former clients of Vincent Mehdizadeh, who responded to many requests for comment on the record by both phone and email.

Worried greatly that Medbox would be harshly treated in a full-length investigative article, Mehdizadeh remarked via email, “I fully realize that your hard-hitting journalistic pieces don’t work if the company you are reporting on is beyond reproach. We make no illusions of being a mistake-free seasoned public company. However, no one can doubt our effort in becoming a solid company.”

Clarification: Neither Vincent Mehdizadeh nor Bruce Bedrick are selling shares in a proposed stock offering as the story earlier stated. The selling shareholders mentioned in the prospectus are not the management, but rather investors who had purchased shares months earlier during a private fund-raising effort.

Correction: Vincent Mehdizadeh's initial IRS liability for back taxes was $1.99 million, not $2.2 million as the story earlier stated. The back taxes were accrued between 2003-2007, per his bankruptcy claim, not 2002-2007.

Brookfield’s Looking-Glass World

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Brookfield's Looking-Glass World

Edel Rodriguez

A wry investor might be forgiven for concluding that peering at Toronto-based Brookfield Asset Management’s filings is akin to Lewis Carroll’s Alice peeking behind the mirror and finding a universe in reverse.

Consider the third-quarter earnings just released by the real estate management, energy and infrastructure conglomerate, disclosing a handsome $813 million in net income for those three months, walloping the $334 million the public company reported for the same period last year. But instead of popping corks, investors who read the filing will probably want to reach for a bottle of aspirin.

The reality is that a combination of legally permissible accounting maneuvers and Brookfield Asset Management’s singular definition of profit allowed it to script a victory.

Pulling the numbers apart, one can find a $77 million fair value gain, representing Brookfield Asset Management’s assessment of the appreciation of its assets. While asset values do rise and fall, and corporate managements do have to note such things, at Brookfield an increase in asset values lands in the income statement. Even though this makes the bottom line look better, a smart investor knows to discount every penny of it since this adds no cash to the business.

Also noteworthy is how a $525 million one-time gain booked from a litigation settlement became the quarter’s profit driver. This is where the accounting profession goes down the proverbial rabbit hole: Brookfield’s filings seem to follow the reasoning of a character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass: “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”

The backstory of the litigation settlement is interesting on its own merits. It begins in 1990 when a relatively unknown unit of the AIG insurance colossus called AIG Financial Products struck a 25-year interest rate swap with Brookfield Asset Management’s predecessor, Edper, as Edper fell into serious financial trouble. From the start, it appears that much of the AIG Financial Products-Edper relationship was star-crossed. And in 2008 when AIG collapsed (before a $137 billion U.S. government rescue), Brookfield decided to terminate the agreement, arguing that this amounted to a default under the terms of their agreement, according to Brookfield Asset Management’s 2011 annual report.

Carried on Brookfield Asset Management’s books as a $1.4 billion prospective liability in the second quarter of this year—a spike from the $988 million reported at the end of 2011, the number served as the management team’s best estimate of what it would eventually have to shell out to square away the matter.

Ultimately Brookfield paid AIG $905 million to settle the suit.

What some investors might find slightly surreal is how, using established accounting rules, a company can settle a liability for less than its previously declared amount (for example, by buying back bonds below their face amount) and consider the transaction a profit. So even though $905 million in cash was sent out the door, Brookfield Asset Management claimed a “profit” of $525 million and flowed the figure through its income statement.

This speaks to the larger issue of Brookfield Asset Management’s quality of earnings, a matter discussed in detail in the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation’s March 11 story on the company. Paper gains on an income statement contribute nothing to the growth of corporate value: Because there is no cash, the company can’t use these “earnings” to make timely investments, increase dividends or buy back shares.

Brookfield Asset Management is hardly the first company to benefit from paper gains: Big banks and securities brokers have perfected the gambit. But Brookfield Asset Management uses them to great effect.

Many of Brookfield Asset Management’s investors and investment bankers dismiss concerns about such issues because a higher income level (usually) serves as ballast to command a higher stock price. But there is a reason that Brookfield seems to have gone to great lengths to keep its share price higher: Partners Limited.

Amounting to what is in effect an old-line Wall Street partnership built into a publicly traded company, Partners Limited consists of a group of about 45 current and former corporate officers of Brookfield Asset Management who privately control 20 percent of its shares—and given Brookfield Asset Management’s dual-share structure, its operations and governance, Partners Limited is an oasis of concentrated corporate wealth. Considering Partner Limited’s big stake in Brookfield Asset Management and its other subsidiaries, and the widespread cross ownership of shares by Brookfield Asset Management and its subsidiaries, there is plenty of incentive for the managers of Brookfield Asset Management to use every last loophole to boost earnings.

With Partners Limited’s current worth exceeding $5 billion, no one has benefitted more from its public-private hybrid model than Brookfield Asset Management’s chief executive, Bruce Flatt. His stake in Partners Limited is now worth more than $713 million.

This is a far cry from the $77 million Brookfield Asset Management disclosed as his aggregate compensation for serving as its CEO from 2002 to 2004 elsewhere in the management information circular.

Regulatory Concerns

Investors brave enough to wade through Brookfield’s opaque public filings might take solace in knowing that they aren’t the only ones with a laundry list of questions and concerns.

Recently the Securities and Exchange Commission has been peppering Brookfield with a series of increasingly probing queries and, in its own, stilted bureaucratic language, demanding some serious changes to how Brookfield and its subsidiaries disclose details about their operations to investors.

Brookfield Property Partners, a publicly traded limited partnership spun out of Brookfield Asset Management to hold its commercial real estate operations, has been an object of fascination for the SEC’s accounting mavens. Their communications, in a series of letters and responses carrying on for several months from 2012 to this year, represent an unusually bold turn for the SEC, an agency whose track record is anything but aggressive when it comes to parsing corporate filings to find looming investor headaches.

Using the 2011 annual report as a springboard, the SEC last year sent a series of letters to Brookfield Property demanding clarification of its valuation policy, which, as laid out in footnotes, states in part, “All properties are externally valued on a three-year rotation plan.”

To an investor reading the above, the implications appear both rational and plain: Brookfield Property—poised to be one of world’s leading real estate managers—calculates the fair value of its assets using a combination of its own (internal) assessments and, for a third of the properties each year, the input of qualified and independent consultants.

Except it doesn’t.

The SEC’s sustained questioning of Brookfield Property Partners last year about property valuation process eventually forced Brookfield Property Partners, in a written September 2012 reply, that it does not use “external valuations” to value its investment property. So investors can now see that Brookfield Property Partners describes the worth of its portfolio, much in the manner of Humpty Dumpty; the words selected mean whatever it says they are.

(Furthermore, while Brookfield Asset Management and Brookfield Property Partners are legally distinct entities, with separate investors, filings and boards of directors, Brookfield Asset Management directs all of Brookfield Property’s operations and consolidates its earnings and assets as its own—as it does for all its subsidiaries. Brookfield Asset Management insists that the boards of its subsidiaries are independent. Yet although the board of one subsidiary, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners, meets the legal definition of independent, as the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation described in March, five of its eight members have deep economic ties to parent company Brookfield Asset Management.)

But what about all that fancy legal wording describing “internal and external appraisal,” which was prominently displayed and repeated throughout the filings of Brookfield Asset Management and its subsidiaries? It seems that this was primarily used for financing purposes. The goal was to give investors and lenders the distinct impression that Brookfield Property Partners relies on a rigorous arm’s-length process to value its portfolio when the reality was the opposite.

All seems to be fair in value

Plus there are big ramifications to some clever wording buried in the footnotes of Brookfield Property’s annual report.

Last year more than $1.3 billion in fair value changes were flowed into Brookfield Property Partners $2.7 billion in net income, according to its 2012 annual report. In other words, nearly 50 percent of its profits were attributed to accounting entries—existing only on paper—that had nothing to do with leasing or selling properties at a profit.

So here’s where a set of truly independent set of eyes reviewing Brookfield Property’s portfolio could mean something beyond an abstract legal concept, perhaps a check and balance. Indeed an independent review could result in a different opinion of the value of Brookfield Property’s billions of dollars of assets and perhaps a substantial change to its bottom line.

After all, if Brookfield Properties excluded fair value changes from its filing and reported earnings of $1.4 billion, the subsidiary might have warranted a sharply different stock price.

And Brookfield Asset Management seems to be quite mindful of its own stock price of late: After the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation’s March article, Brookfield Asset Management launched an expensive share-buyback program. In putting up the company’s cash, a share buyback can serve to increase (or stabilize) a company’s stock price by removing the amount of shares publicly available —with the result of establishing a temporary floor for the share’s value. It is a popular practice, if rarely as successful as anticipated. (See a chart of Brookfield Asset Management’s buybacks.)

An Obscure Company Called MS451 Inc.

Even though some investors might find it promising that the SEC has recently tried to prompt Brookfield Asset Management to be more transparent, a previous attempt by the SEC to elicit more disclosure in 2009 ended up with the agency backing off.

While few companies have financial filings as opaque as Brookfield Asset Management and its subsidiaries, occasionally the veil surrounding their operations can be pierced. And a diligent detective can piece together the lengths to which Brookfield Asset Management has gone to generate even the thinnest claim to income.

A 2008 related-party transaction by another Brookfield Asset Management subsidiary, its residential property developer Brookfield Homes, thatprompted the SEC to write an epic 2009 letter with a seemingly endless parade of disclosure-oriented questions.

One of the issues that caught the SEC’s attention was a deal struck late in the disastrous real estate year of 2008, when Brookfield Homes sold 451 land plots in the Morningside Ranch residential development outside of San Diego to a Brookfield Asset Management-affiliated related party. This was Brookfield Homes’ only land sale in the region for that year. Brookfield Asset Management revealed the stark terms of the deal in its 2008 annual report: On a $18.5 million sale, Brookfield Homes lost $15 million, suggesting that the land’s true value was $33.5 million.

In its letter in 2009, the SEC demanded more details about related-party aspects of the deal. But in a departure from the typical response of a public company to the U.S. regulatory body, Brookfield Homes refused to elaborate, saying that Brookfield Asset Management’s ownership stake in the entity purchasing the lots was less than 10 percent.

The SEC’s response a month later was unambiguous: The agency demanded full disclosure, arguing that regardless of the size of Brookfield Asset Management’s equity position, it had “a significant financial interest” in the related party.

Brookfield Homes’ subsequent reply was conciliatory: “The Company notes the Staff’s comment and will provide the requested disclosure in its next Definitive Proxy Statement.”

Yet Brookfield Homes’ next proxy statement (known in Canada as a management information circular), in 2010, did not contain the information requested nor did subsequent filings, despite the company’s assurances.

In 2011 Brookfield Homes was renamed Brookfield Residential Properties after an internal reorganization of its operations.

To date, there appears to be no record of the company ever providing the expanded disclosure. And a Brookfield Asset Management spokesman, who assured the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation the company had indeed disclosed the information, declined to provide a link to a filing with it.

Fast-forward to the first quarter of 2013: The very same Morningside Ranch parcels at the heart of Brookfield Homes’ 2008 transaction suddenly pop up in the company’s corporate disclosures.

Tucked in the back of Brookfield Residential Properties’ filing for the first quarter of 2013 is a mention about an unnamed $29 million residential lot in California being purchased from Brookfield Asset Management during the three-month period.

In a departure from the typical corporate language for such transactions, the filing describes the payment as “measured at an exchange value of $29 million.” This suggests that cash may not have been used in the transaction.

Using public records, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation determined that the Morningside Ranch lots sold by Brookfield Homes in December 2008 were bought by an entity called MS451 Inc., and that by March 2013 MS451 Inc. had sold those lots to Brookfield Residential Properties.

According to California corporate documents, a Brookfield Homes executive named Stephen P. Doyle signed papers for both MS451 Inc. and Brookfield Homes during the late December 2008 transaction, as did Larry Cortes, then the chief financial officer of Brookfield Homes’ San Diego area operations and also CFO for MS451 Inc. At least four other Brookfield Homes executives had roles in MS451 Inc., according to these documents.

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation’s initial efforts to learn more about MS451 Inc. and its owners has led to still more questions. Dissolved in late March 2013 after the California lot deal closed, MS451 Inc. appears to have had three owners: Brookfield Asset Management, with a stake of less than 10 percent, and two brothers, real estate developers James and Charles Schmid, who are the chief executive and president, respectively, of Chelsea Investment Corp.

Brookfield Homes, Chelsea and MS451 Inc. have a few things in common: Two Brookfield Homes alumni (listed in filings as officers of MS451 Inc.) now work for Chelsea: The aforementioned Larry Cortes is currently a Chelsea project manager, and Liz Zepeda works for Chelsea as a risk analyst (the same role she played at Brookfield Homes).

The purpose of the Schmids’ involvement in the deal remains unclear. In deal documents, they are listed as individuals not corporate officers of Chelsea. Several phone calls made to James Schmid’s office requesting comment were not returned nor was a call to Charles Schmid’s home.

MS451 Inc.’s reasons for involvement with the property are not immediately apparent. And why did the property’s prepared lots stay undeveloped during the past half decade of record low interest rates?

Moreover, the 2008 transaction seems to have been conducted with MS451 Inc. receiving some very favorable terms. During a time of major financial stress for Brookfield Homes, the subsidiary accepted bonds as payment from MS451 Inc.—a company with no assets or operations—and not cash. (In 2008 Brookfield Asset Management provided a waiver when Brookfield Homes could not comply with its net debt to capitalization and minimum equity covenants, an issue the SEC had been quite curious about in its aforementioned 2009 letter.)

At least on paper, the owners of MS451 Inc. did well for themselves, realizing a profit of $10.5 million on the deal. And because of the related-party nature of the transaction, Brookfield Asset Management claimed the full amount of profit as its own. That’s the case even though Brookfield Asset Management directly earned only about $1 million from the deal, from its less than 10 percent stake.

While $10.5 million in consolidated earnings is immaterial when considering an income statement the size of Brookfield Asset Management’s, it does suggest a further question: How much of the company’s earnings come from related-party accounting maneuvers like this one involving MS451 Inc.? Indeed, as the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation showed in March, Brookfield Asset Management regularly generates hundreds of millions in profit through complex related-party dealings.

In response to reporter questions, Andrew Willis, a Brookfield Asset Management spokesman, sent responses but failed to make any of this any clearer: Concerning the Brookfield Homes-Brookfield Residential Properties disclosure above, he said, “[Brookfield Residential Properties] disclosed the related party nature and valuation basis for both transactions.” He declined to elaborate further when asked follow-up questions.

Brookfield’s Brazilian Headache

On Friday when Brookfield Asset Management released its third quarter results, it revealed an interesting development in another whole line of business in another corner of world – one involving potential fraud.

It revealed in the “Risks” section a new disclosure that the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice are investigating allegations that a Brazilian private equity unit had bribed local officials to approve certain real estate transactions. A public prosecutor in São Paulo has filed charges against three Brookfield Asset Management executives and seven municipal officials under the country’s anti-bribery statutes.

Long a key component of the Brookfield Asset Management empire, the Brazilian operations manage or own more than $13 billion worth of utilities and real estate. Indeed prior to becoming Brookfield Asset Management, the company was called Edper-Brascan, with Bras being short for Brazil.

The recent charges emerged following Brookfield Asset Management’s April 2010 dismissal of Daniela Spinola Gonzalez, the former chief financial officer of a Brookfield-managed real estate fund in São Paulo.

Reached by the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, Gonzalez said that in the spring of 2009 she uncovered a series of payments to São Paulo municipal officials aimed at obtaining approval of expansion projects at four different malls. Specifically she alleges they were designed to cover up the real estate fund’s lack of compliance with a series of pre-expansion mandates from the São Paulo building approval department designed to address a potential increase in traffic flow. When she discovered requests to approve large payments to holding companies she had never heard of, she investigated further and found municipal officials had set up entities to receive payments from the real estate fund.

Gonzalez alleges that when confronted her unit and corporate supervisors, including Steven J. Douglas, then the head of the Brookfield Asset Management’s international property portfolio, with news she felt sure would outrage them, she was told repeatedly, “This is the way of doing business in Brazil.” The angriest they got about the bribes, according to her, was when they chastised her for discussing sensitive fund business in an email. (In reporting on the claims of Gonzalez, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation examined a series of emails between Gonzalez and her supervisors, other internal Brookfield documents and a letter written to the SEC by her lawyers.)

Dismissed in April 2010, Gonzalez filed a labor grievance shortly thereafter in São Paulo. Brookfield Asset Management filed a lawsuit against her in 2011, alleging she had engaged in embezzlement; she says the charges are nothing more than “a complete fabrication to make me seem like a criminal.”

Asked about Gonzalez and her charges, Brookfield Asset Management spokesman Andrew Willis said, among other statements, “Notwithstanding the suspect source of the allegations, Brookfield conducted an investigation into these matters. The investigation found no evidence of wrongdoing by Brookfield or any of its employees.”

 

The People of the County of New York vs. Bryan Caisse

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Over five days in mid-October, prosecutors with the New York County District Attorney’s Major Economic Crimes unit brought forth a stream of witnesses who told a grand jury about a money manager named Bryan Caisse.

One after another, their testimonies painted a remarkably similar story: Caisse had borrowed money to aid his hedge fund, Huxley Capital Management, as it launched. Prosecutors allege that the distinctive feature of these loans is that they weren’t repaid. Moreover, they allege that some of the loans were used for Caisse's personal expenses.

The loans, based on documents shared with the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, appear to have been structured as so-called working capital loans whose purpose was to help the newly formed fund pay bills and launch new portfolios until the fund could generate enough profit to sustain itself.

Such loans are common enough in the hedge fund business and usually bear interest rates above the market rate--in one example, based on documents reviewed by the Foundation, the rate promised was 8 percent--and are typically paid off over the course of a year or two. Traditionally they represent decent risks in that many hedge funds make it past their first two years of existence and thus can pay the loans back.

Caisse’s marketing approach, according to his lenders, was tantalizing to lenders worried about risks in Huxley’s strategy of trading bonds (and derivatives) carved from pools of residential mortgage loans. He assured them that Huxley’s credit was essentially that of the U.S. government, reasoning that a portfolio invested solely in U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would always have streams of interest coming in.

More directly, Caisse was for many years a well-regarded figure in the mortgage-bond trading community and sported an impressive track record of generating returns for investors. Handsome and outgoing, he was a highly effective salesman.

Determining how much capital has allegedly been lost is not easy, but it is likely to be in the millions of dollars. The report of losses claimed vary. One person asserts having lost $15,000; one man alleges he obtained a second mortgage on his Manhattan residence to invest with Caisse. One Huxley lender told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that on the day he provided grand jury testimony he met two men (also there to provide testimony) who claimed they had each invested over $100,000.

Several weeks ago the grand jury handed down a sealed 10-count indictment against Caisse, including nine counts of larceny. It represents a truly stunning reversal of fortune for a man whose hedge fund launch was seen as being on a fast track to amassing a fortune.

When the indictment will be unsealed is not known and a spokesman for the New York County District Attorney’s office declined comment when reached by phone.

Complicating matters is that Caisse's whereabouts have been an open question for several months.

Interviews with lenders to the fund and a family member indicate that starting sometime in the late Spring he stopped returning calls and emails.

Caisse’s younger brother Steven, an owner of a software business catering to the power sports industry, told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation on December 5 that, “I haven’t spoken to Bryan in at least nine months and I honestly have no idea where he is.”

While denying any knowledge of his brother Bryan’s legal woes--Steven Caisse described the issue as “a private family matter”--he did acknowledge that he and his family have banded together to care for his brother Bryan’s teenage daughter.

Indeed for nearly a week, numerous attempts to reach Bryan Caisse on his cellphone and email accounts failed.

However on December 7 Caisse was reached through Facebook's instant messaging application and in a brief phone call he denied any awareness of legal problems stemming from his hedge fund.

In a call later that evening--and in a series of instant messages--Caisse’s tone shifted considerably and he alluded to a confluence of events that had led to the collapse of the fund, and he confirmed he had left New York City, at least temporarily.

(Caisse's initial call December 5 appears to have been made using a mobile phone’s voice over internet protocol application. A follow-up call he made that evening came from a phone number originating in Colombia.)

When one pieces together Caisse's breathless theory it all amounts to something of a conspiracy, where larger forces were at work against him. On first pass, these claims seem (to put it charitably) implausible. But investigation does confirm that Huxley Capital Management’s fate was highly unusual in many ways. Combined with some very consequential mistakes in personal judgment the District Attorney’s office had a trail of breadcrumbs laid before them leading right to Caisse’s front door.

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A screenwriter needing a character to illustrate a Wall Street fable could do a lot worse than using the life of Bryan Paul Caisse as a muse.

Born in the northern Massachusetts town of Athol and a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Caisse served four years of active duty on a nuclear sub and after leaving the service, found his way to New York.

Without a job and newly enrolled in New York University in pursuit of an M.B.A, Caisse, as he tells it, was half-drunk and shooting pool in a dive bar in 1991 when in walked a pair of guys in suits. More than a few rounds later, the suits were defeated and buying Caisse a nightcap. Learning that he had been a weapons officer aboard a nuclear sub--and could hustle like a champ--they suggested he interview at their firm. The next morning, after interviewing while hungover and wearing a stained shirt, he was hired by a firm he said he had never heard of by the name of Bear Stearns to sell a product he hadn’t supposed existed called mortgage-backed securities.

Bear Stearns and Bryan Caisse were a match made in heaven.

In the early 1990s, Bear Stearns was building out its capital markets unit and sought to emphasize its underwriting of mortgage-backed securities, volatile and complex instruments that even in 1991 had proven alternately lucrative and deadly for larger, more established firms like Salomon Brothers and Kidder Peabody.

Yet with an engineering degree and plenty of advanced training in physics, modeling and selling mortgage bonds wasn’t taxing to Caisse. Nor did Bear Stearns have problems with Caisse’s entertainment driven approach to building client relationships: If (most) every salesman on Wall Street was expected to entertain clients at dinners or sporting events, he would go much farther, taking them to getaway weekends where they would guzzle booze, eat like kings, fish offshore or attend the biggest games, all on Bear Stearns’ dime. (The expectation was that if Caisse spent $5,000 entertaining clients, he would in short order get $25,000 or $30,000 in trading commissions from them.)

Eventually Caisse would come to understand that being a salesmen at a big Wall Street firm was akin to being a good accountant: You would have something approaching job security and, in most years, a (very) good income. But the stars of Bear Stearns, who were paid well into the millions of dollars, were the traders. In 1994 he got his shot to trade when Bear Stearns's nascent asset management unit was expanding and for three years, he profitably and independently ran a mortgage book for Bear Stearns Investment Advisors.

In 1997 Caisse left Bear Stearns and joined his boss Gary Lieberman to help him launch West Side Advisors, a hedge fund managing only mortgage-backed securities. At Bear Stearns, the pair had done well but earned what the rapidly growing firm allowed them to keep; at a hedge fund the sky was the limit.

And for a decade West Side Advisors provided plenty of blue sky for Bryan Caisse.

At around $500 million in assets and posting steady returns, West Side avoided excessive leverage and the absurdly complex bond bets that occasionally turned the mortgage-backed securities markets into a charnel house for the mathematically apt.

Sticking to the fund's proverbial knitting proved lucrative for Gary Lieberman, who would buy a piece of the New Jersey Nets and a house once owned by Harrison Ford; Bryan Caisse, too, became wealthy and while sports franchise ownership wasn’t his thing, he began to have serious fun.

Summering in East Hampton and traveling the world, Caisse appears to have been the world’s happiest 20-year old (albeit one that was trapped in a 40-year old body) maintaining a social life that deserved professional chronicling, fueled by ample amounts of cold beer, expensive tequila and strong pot. With a pair of marriages behind him, New York’s Upper West Side was his playground as he dated models, had flings with actresses, went to the best restaurants and partied with rock stars.

But in several ways, Caisse retained a closeness to his roots that has rarely been seen in successful New York hedge fund managers; proudly loyal to family and old friends, staying in constant contact and entertaining them generously when they came to New York. Moreover, in 2007, he fought for and won a long custody battle for his daughter.

In 2008, with the mortgage bond market collapsing and West Side’s portfolio experiencing sharp losses, Caisse--who had spent much of 2007 on the sidelines in the midst of the custody battle--left to set up a hedge fund that sought to take advantage of the massive bargains that were for there for the taking for by someone with cash and experience. The fund was called Huxley Capital Management as a tribute to Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and a reference to the collapse of certainty in the wake of the credit crisis.

Statistically speaking, mortgage-bond traders said at the time (and with rank envy), that there was very little chance of Bryan Caisse not making an absolute killing.

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For something everyone said couldn’t fail, launching Huxley Capital Management was a hard road to travel.

To start: the paperwork alone set Caisse back six figures and then there was rent, accountants, compliance and a small blizzard of lesser expenses. Flying back and forth between Dubai and New York--itself quite an expense--where petrodollar princes sat atop virtual piles of cash they were newly keen to put to work in the capital markets, he secured a memorandum of understanding for a $200 million investment in the then near future.

So to keep the fund going until the Dubai capital came in and they could start charging 2 percent management fees, Caisse borrowed cash from his ever expanding circle of friends. One of those lenders was Dr. Wellington “Tony” Tichenor, a Park Avenue allergist Caisse had met on the East Hampton social scene through a mutual friend, acting coach Gary Swanson.

“Gary introduced me and he spoke highly of Bryan," said Tichenor. "His resume checked out and his credentials were solid; I liked the guy. He was smart.” Ultimately he would loan Caisse an amount he described as “more than $50,000, but not $100,000.” (Never paid back, Tichenor did arrange for a girlfriend to get a job at Huxley; Swanson did not return multiple phone calls seeking comment.)

Calamities big and small began to intervene, however.

On December 11, 2008, Bernard Madoff’s infamous Ponzi scheme surfaced, sending reverberations through the money management landscape. In short order, a nearly completed investment from Carl Icahn, the result of months of discussion, was canceled. Several days later Huxley was told that the pending Dubai investment was put on hold. (For hedge fund managers the true fallout from the Madoff scandal wasn’t over ethics, but funding. It would be several years before institutional investors would support a fund that wasn’t sponsored by a unit of Goldman Sachs or J.P. Morgan.)

In the post-Madoff wreckage, small funds like Caisse’s Huxley were truly orphans.

Six months later, in June 2009, Caisse secured a working capital loan from Chicago’s Ritchie Capital Management for $2 million. Ritchie, which had just put its own series of headaches behind it, owned Royal Palm Insurance and was able to secure Huxley $50 million from Royal Palm in a managed account. (A managed account is a portfolio within a hedge fund for a single client. While managed accounts are counted in the all important assets under management figure, the fund usually charges a 1 percent management fee and keeps 10 percent of profits, half the standard fees.)

Using leverage, Huxley got the Royal Palm portfolio up to $500 million in value and by all accounts did an absolutely stellar job managing it for a year.

Nonetheless, the reality of life at Huxley was hardly gilt-edged: With only $480,000 in annual management fees being generated, there wasn’t nearly enough to cover the $120,000 monthly in expenses from eight employees and a Third Avenue address. By that autumn, key employees began to leave. In a December 2010 trip to Dubai to raise funds, Caisse was able to peddle the leveraged $500 million in assets figure during a second attempt to get funding from Dubai, reckoning that Huxley's solid performance was sure to attract the investors who would make that a reality.

Once again Caisse returned to New York with a commitment from Dubai to invest in the fund.

The other shoe, however, was getting ready to drop.

Ritchie sold Royal Palm in February after a protracted arbitration against Security First Insurance was settled. (In a supreme irony, the chairman of Security First was a founder of Royal Palm). A central condition of the deal was that all of Royal Palm’s investment assets would be converted to cash.

By the end of the month, Huxley had effectively zero assets and owed Ritchie $2 million.

Soon afterward, finance officials in Dubai, not wanting to be the only investor in the fund, halted their investment.

Refusing to quit, but with a desperate need for cash, in the spring of 2011 Caisse again turned to friends and family, except this time they were old friends; their trust in Caisse was strong but their asset base was not. When he took working capital loans from these people--unlike Dr. Tichenor and other lenders from 2008--he was taking money that represented a material part of their net worth, slated to make future mortgage payments, college tuition or their retirement.

(So called friends and family money has long been a ready source of hedge fund start-up capital, but there is an unspoken tradition that the manager only take money from those best able to risk it, or who can live with a longer repayment time-frame.)

Still, Caisse again got the attention of institutional investors and by that June appeared well on the way to getting Huxley off its back for a third time, but a
bad car accident left Caisse effectively bedridden for the balance of 2011, and ended the resurrection efforts.

In January 2012 Caisse took a job at Performance Trust Investment Advisors in Chicago, signing a contract that was designed to provide him ample cash up front so he could pay back investors. Ultimately the deal fell through: chief executive officer Doug Rothschild said it was because Caisse wouldn’t move to Chicago for what he said were “personal reasons”; Caisse told people that it was because another executive got skittish over the use of derivatives in the fund's mortgage portfolio.

In February this year, back in New York and trying to get Huxley going again, the music finally stopped playing for Bryan Caisse.

The New York District Attorney’s Major Economic Crimes unit, with a host of complaints from lenders, opened an investigation into whether Caisse had used their funds for personal purposes. Many lenders, convinced that Caisse was not being forthcoming about repaying them, were grateful recipients of phone calls from Sean Pippen, the major economic crimes unit prosecutor leading the investigation and happily sent him emails, documents, texts and notes of their dealings with Huxley and Caisse.

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Borrowing from old friends appears to have been a profound mistake for Bryan Caisse, and one that was heroically compounded by his role in a series of increasingly implausible excuses for not returning their money.

One lender, whose loan represented 30 percent of his life’s savings and was invested in Huxley during 2011 on the promise that it would be paid off in one year, is illustrative of the circus that getting paid back could devolve into.

This lender spent excruciating weeks emailing with Caisse’s assistants at Performance Trust in late 2012 to get checks that he had been assured repeatedly were in the mail.

The emails--which were examined by the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation--document a host of concurrent personal and professional crises befalling Caisse and his assistants, all of which conspired to prevent them from successfully sending checks via overnight delivery.

To examine this correspondence is to plumb the depths of acute incompetence to a level rarely imagined (save by the drollest of comedy writers.) It is a world where seemingly educated and experienced professionals cannot send packages overnight to a neighboring state, where the post office returns every letter mailed damaged and undelivered, where wiring instructions are routinely bungled, where HSBC, a global money center bank, purportedly would not wire funds except to another HSBC account.

(A baffled banker from HSBC--who had handled some banking matters for Huxley--later appeared in front of the grand jury and would tell them that the bank regularly transfers funds to accounts at other banks.)

It gets better: All communication with Caisse had to be handled by email. One assistant, a woman named Kristy Smith, would not speak on the phone because, as Caisse explained to the lender, she had a strong lisp and English accent. A casual reading of several weeks of her emails however suggests a particularly American writing style, as well an unusually close working relationship with Caisse, in that she accompanied him to a hospital, for example, as he got chest X-rays. Shortly after the lender demanded to know the physical address of her office so he could send her a prepaid Federal Express envelope to expedite the delivery of his erstwhile checks, Smith told the lender she had been fired by Caisse.

A second assistant of Caisse’s, Christine Woo, then took over the hard work of finding new ways to avoid getting the lender his money back. Like her former colleague Kristy Smith, Woo also refused to talk on the phone. Shortly after engaging with the lender, she suddenly refused to deal with these issues any further, citing the complexity of the matter.

Having a pair of personal assistants is rare for an individual portfolio manager on Wall Street and having a pair of assistants that deal with nothing but his personal affairs--even as they pertain to a prior employer--is rarer still. What is even more unusual is how both Christine Woo and Kristy Smith didn’t have Performance Trust email addresses and used only Gmail addresses to communicate with the lender.

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation called Performance Trust and spoke to Megan Clark in its Human Resources department and she said that no one named Christine Woo or Kristy Smith had ever worked there. Nor were they former Huxley colleagues. Dan Castro, a former Huxley portfolio manager, said that no one with those names worked there.

In April, Caisse sent emails to the same lender’s wife promising repayment when his new assistant “Kristy” returned from England after caring for her sick father.

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Caisse has his defenders to be sure.

One of them is Ken Scott, a self-described private investor who was one of Huxley’s biggest lenders. He said that when the district attorney asked him about the loans, he replied that every penny of the working capital loans was used for normal business expenses, arguing that if it hadn’t been for some horrible luck, Huxley would have generated enough cash to pay everyone off.

Characterizing the grand jury as a witch hunt, Scott described it by referencing the infamous Lavrenti Beria quote, “Bring me the man and I’ll show you the crime.”

“No one has shown me what Bryan has done wrong, and that includes the DA,” said Scott.

Ritchie Capital Management’s general counsel noted to the grand jury that the firm’s management company made the loan, not one of its client portfolios. Fund officials acknowledge that while the loan is in arrears, they do not view the Huxley matter as a criminal issue, but rather a civil one where the fund itself is in debt, not Caisse. They have not sued Huxley and have extended the loan’s maturity several times.

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After some initial brief phone contact, described above, Bryan Caisse was unable, despite multiple promises, to connect via phone with the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, nor did he ever send the extensive series of emails he promised. On a few days he did manage to instant message for several minutes though Facebook. The day before this story posted, he appears to have deleted his Facebook account.

Caisse declined to make an on the record comment and he would not disclose his whereabouts, other than alluding to a lack of available privacy for discussing Huxley. Pressed on the matter, he would only say, "[I'm] staying with a friend."

 

Bryan Caisse Comes Home

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Bryan Caisse, the former submarine weapons officer turned hedge fund manager, was arrested Saturday in Bogota, Colombia, by officers from the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service.

His name should ring a bell for Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation readers: Caisse was the subject of a December report detailing how the once well-regarded mortgage-bond fund manager disappeared from New York in the autumn, leaving a daughter and numerous investors from his fund behind and in the dark.

In October, a prosecutor with the New York County District Attorney’s Major Economic Crimes Bureau impaneled a grand jury to investigate a host of allegations surrounding Caisse’s nonpayment of a series of so-called working capital loans to his hedge fund, Huxley Capital Management. Specifically, the prosecutor was interested in unpaid loans from Caisse’s friends and family, many of whom had lent him money on the assurance that there was virtually no risk involved and that it would be repaid with interest in under a year. The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation obtained documents showing Caisse avoided repaying several of these investors by creating email accounts for a pair of fictitious personal assistants that repeatedly assured the investors a wire transfer was forthcoming or an overnight mail delivery of a check was en route.

Manhattan District Attorney Vance unsealed the charges earlier today.

The article prompted a flood of replies from readers, many of whom were angry over the portrayal of Caisse, a proud U.S. Naval Academy graduate, recalling a generous and fun-loving friend and former colleague. Several writers noted that Ritchie Capital Management, which lent Caisse’s Huxley $2 million, had not claimed fraud despite having not been paid back. (Ritchie’s position is, however, more discreet: Representatives of the Chicago-based fund, which as the original article noted is no stranger to regulatory woes, argued to the grand jury that any issue is civil in scope and does not — in their view — appear to be criminal.)

In addition, there were numerous objections to a brief reference about Caisse’s drug use, drinking and colorful personal life, as well as expressions of doubt that the 50-year-old had fled the New York City area at all.

But there is no doubt that starting around the third week of October, Caisse showed up in Medellin, Colombia, claiming to be working closely with Colombian businessman Edgar Botero (an engineer best known in that country as the head of the Miss Colombia pageant) in developing a resort between the coastal cities of Cartagena and Barranquilla.

Nothing much emerged from those plans, but Caisse took up residence in Medellin, moving into a small apartment above the Shamrock Irish Pub. Spending many of his days (and nights) drinking with the small U.S. expatriate community there, Caisse alienated several Americans, who grew weary of business plans that never materialized, playing host to him and his increasing reliance on them for loans.

So earlier this month, when Antonio Zamudio, a special agent with the Diplomatic Security Service, showed up in Medellin asking questions about Caisse’s whereabouts, there was no shortage of people hanging around the Shamrock willing to spill the beans, a rare occurrence in a city where visibly cooperating with law enforcement has long been a death sentence.

Caisse’s former friends at the Shamrock told Zamudio that Caisse was planning to be back in Medellin on Saturday, January 18, providing an opportunity to interdict him as he sought to board a plane in Bogota for the trip. On Saturday afternoon, at least one Shamrock regular got a text from Caisse, saying he was “delayed” in Bogota by authorities for an unspecified reason.

Meet Benjamin Wey, Media Mogul

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Sometime on Sept. 3, Maureen Gearty, 56, of New York City started receiving emails and calls from old friends and colleagues asking about the details of her torrid affair with a man named Ronen Zakai, a former colleague at two since-shuttered small-cap boiler rooms.

Gearty told anyone who would listen she had never had any romantic involvement whatsoever with Zakai and that she was pretty certain she wouldn’t be hearing from him either since he was in a world of legal trouble for an alleged fraud involving some serious misuse of clients’ funds.

In January, less than 15 miles away from Gearty’s home in the borough of Queens, Dune Lawrence, 38, a highly decorated Bloomberg News reporter, went online one morning to find her picture splashed across a Web site with the headline “Is Dune Lawrence Racist?”

The two women are very different: Gearty is a 30-year veteran office manager of Wall Street’s rough-and-tumble boiler rooms, and Lawrence is an award-winning investigative reporter. Both became quite upset. Gearty was paralyzed by anger and disgust, she said, at the lies that seemed to metastasize from story to story, while Lawrence was taken aback by the bitter personal attacks, even if she understood the articles would not be seen as serious professional criticism of her journalism, she told her friends.

Although the two women have little in common, both had somehow managed to seriously anger the man who (very quietly) has backed a new Web site The Blot: Benjamin Wey a 42-year-old promoter of Chinese stocks. And so both women found themselves the subject of a series of relentlessly personal articles on The Blot, whose motto is “Never Be Boring.”

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Figuring out Wey’s connection to The Blot took the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation about 20 minutes.

Here’s how we did it:

Plugging the term “The Blot” into a search engine turned up a citation on CrunchBase, describing the publication’s office as being located on the 20th floor of 222 Broadway in New York City and listing Neil St. Clair as its founding publisher and editor. Confirming St. Clair’s role with The Blot was not hard; the New York Business Journal had profiled the new venture last July and even noted that the Web site had “a silent backer.”

Online searches for background on Neil St. Clair turned up his prior roles as an on-air reporter on New York City and Syracuse newscasts and that he is indeed operating a business from the 20th floor of 222 Broadway but not necessarily The Blot.

Additional Web searches surfaced St. Clair’s copyright claim for FNL Media, which is doing business as “theblot.com” and listing a work address at 40 Wall Street on the 38th floor. The New York Secretary of State’s business directory did not list much further information, but The Blot’s LinkedIn profile also included the 40 Wall Street address.

Plugging “40 Wall Street, 38th floor” into a search engine indicates another business associated with that address, Benjamin Wey’s financial advisory outfit, the New York Global Group.

One of The Blot’s few advertisers is FIKA, an upscale coffee and chocolate emporium which counts Ben Wey as one of its investors. The same lawyer, Neal N. Beaton, of Holland & Knight LLP, serves as the registered agent for both FNL Media and Wey’s coffee investments. (A man pictured with Wey on the Swedish news Web site, Nordstejrnan, is John Bostany, a lawyer whose 40 Wall Street offices are located several floors below Wey and whose firm is suing Maureen Gearty.)

In January when the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation called the New York Global Group’s number and asked to speak to a staffer at The Blot, the person answering the phone said she couldn’t transfer the call but would—after being requested to do so—pass a message to the editor, Alicia Lu. (Lu, however, did not return a call to the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation. Nor did she phone back after a message was left using The Blot’s primary number. Nor did Lu reply to an email sent her.)

The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation also called the two editors, Neil St. Clair and Alex Geana, who had been profiled in the New York Business Journal in mid-July around the time The Blot launched.

Reached on his cellphone, St. Clair was uncomfortable about discussing his role at The Blot, claiming that he was only a consultant who had helped launch the site. Pressed about the New York Business Journal’s description of him as “editor-in-chief” and “publisher,” St. Clair said he would not confirm or deny whether Wey had a role with the publication. Instead he noted that he was subject to a nondisclosure agreement.

Alex Geana was more forthcoming. He told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that Wey fired him on Jan. 2 after he refused to publish the first piece about Dune Lawrence.

“I was sick and tired of these libelous hit pieces,” said Geana. “The [Gearty stuff] was bad enough but when we are calling a reporter a ‘racist’ and we have no evidence to support that charge; that is immoral.”

The fight that eventually cost Geana his job had been in the making for a while, according to Geana: The tension started simmering when Wey grew angry at Geana for requesting proof of the allegations being made about Gearty and Lawrence in articles sent to The Blot by four columnists and reporters—whom Geana had never met or spoken with and whom Wey refused to put him in contact with.

After Wey repeatedly refused to provide him “notes” that Wey claimed the Blot’s authors had obtained during their “research process,” Geana told Wey that he refused to publish the articles, Geana recalled.

Wey fired him shortly afterward, Geana said. The pieces appeared anyway. See a statement from Geana regarding his termination from The Blot.

Wey could not be reached for comment about Geana’s allegations.

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Why Wey would create an organ like The Blot is a puzzling matter.

To arrive at a reason, it helps to understand that Maureen Gearty and Dune Lawrence, despite their differences, are very dangerous people to Ben Wey.

Wey is a stock promoter, a term of art on Wall Street as much as it is an actual job description.

Seen his way, Wey helps growing Chinese companies seeking access to the liquid U.S. capital markets find appropriate legal, accounting and financial advisers; the desired end result being a listing on an American stock exchange. Additionally, once a stock exchange listing is set up, he connects money managers to his client companies, with an eye toward helping the newly public companies navigate the challenging Wall Street investor-issuer relationships.

But Wey has not found it easy to accomplish all this.

The shares of Wey’s client companies have proved to be troubled investments in an asset class—Chinese reverse-merger stocks—that has suffered devastating price declines. New York Global Group’s clients have reliably separated investors and their capital, with one exception: Harbin Electric. (Wey took Harbin Electric private—at a sharp premium to its share price—in a management-led buyout.)

Earlier forays into stock sales, first as an Oklahoma based broker for Wilbanks Securities, and later as the owner (through his wife) of New York Global Securities, led to a series of regulatory headaches. (For his part, Wey is unrepentant for the controversies, telling the Financial Times in 2011 that with respect to the Oklahoma dispute—involving the sale of securities in a company in which he was an undisclosed adviser to—that he would do “the exact same thing.”)

In January 2012, the FBI raided Wey’s office and home. An FBI spokesman described the action as part of an “ongoing investigation.”

For Wey to be seen by potential Chinese clients as a credible promoter, he needs to not only get transactions done, but also to ensure stock is purchased by investors inclined to hold their positions and not panic at the first sign of bad news.

So when Gearty became a high-credibility witness last year for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA, during its examination of First Merger Capital (a firm that Wey played a role in establishing and where two of his close allies had worked), she became a big threat to his interests.

Wey’s New York Global Group had an extremely tight relationship with the founders of First Merger Capital, brokers William Scholander and Talman Harris: Nearly 80 percent of First Merger Capital’s revenue came from trading the shares of just three clients of Wey: Deer Consumer Electronics, SmartHeat and CleanTech Innovations.

The First Merger Capital brokers were the subject of a lengthy FINRA inquiry last year examining a $350,000 payment from Wey client Deer Consumer Products, a maker of kitchen appliances. Gearty’s testimony, laid out in an unusually blunt 45-page FINRA examination document released in August, disclosed how the payment was, in effect, used to set up First Merger Capital, where Gearty worked with Zakai. (At the time of First Merger Capital’s organization in the fall of 2009, Zakai was serving a 30-day FINRA suspension for a violation at his previous employer.)

Wey’s company Deer Consumer Products provided funds for the purchase of the former Brentworth & Co. brokerage firm from another penny stock impresario and paid rent, bought furniture and computers—all to create a new brokerage that could reliably promote Wey’s companies’ shares.

Ultimately, what Gearty did is remove the lid on the workings of a mini penny-stock empire that, according to her testimony in the FINRA report, had worked quite well for Wey, Scholander and Harris (although markedly less so for their clients). She put Wey much closer to Wall Street’s dark underbelly than his relentless self-promotion would let on. According to her testimony, there was little difference between Wey’s New York Global Group and First Merger Capital: They shared the same office suite at 40 Wall Street as they had earlier at 14 Wall Street, where Scholander and Harris had owned a branch office of another deeply troubled penny stock trader, Seaboard Securities. The FINRA report noted that Wey, Scholander and Harris began their relationship in 2004 when they worked at Wey’s now shuttered New York Global Securities.

Moreover, although The Blot blasted Zakai as well as Gearty, the FINRA report indicates that Wey and Zakai had enjoyed a profitable working relationship before Zakai went to work at First Merger Capital.

When Zakai worked at collapsed boiler room between 2001 and 2006 Great Eastern Securities, he helped Wey market his first reverse merger deal in the United States, for Bodisen Biotech. (The role Wey played as an adviser to that Bodisen Biotech proved controversial enough that the company ended up firing him and the American Stock Exchange delisted the company in 2007.)

This past summer, FINRA decided to bar Wey’s allies Scholander and Harris from working as brokers in the securities industry based on, among other things, their failure to disclose the $350,000 payment they had received from Deer Consumer Products. In a withering assessment from FINRA’s examiners, their testimony was described in the report as “demonstrably false” and “a brazen attempt to falsify.”

Both brokers are appealing the FINRA decision and until a final determination is released, they work at a firm they are co-owners of Cambridge Alliance Capital, a unit of Radnor Research and Trading. A receptionist at Cambridge Alliance told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation at the end of January that Scholander had not been seen in months and that he no longer worked there. When the receptionist was asked why he had left if he had told regulators he owned the firm, she hung up. Two calls to Radnor Research and Trading were not returned.

(In 2011, Scholander ran into trouble of an entirely different sort: According to the New York Post, he was arrested at a popular bar after he allegedly tried to take pictures of women as they used the toilet. He pleaded guilty to a criminal harassment charge and is being sued by a woman who said she caught him trying to photograph her.)

Both Harris and Scholander are also suing Gearty (as well as Zakai and his wife) for $10 million in damages, alleging, among other claims, that Gearty misappropriated their commission payments. Their suit was filed by John Bostany, a lawyer with personal connections to ex-First Merger Capital boiler-room stock sales veterans like Guy Durand (pictured in the middle of Business Insider photo with Bostany at his right at a charity function) and who also sued a short seller on behalf of Wey client Deer Consumer Products. (The case was dismissed in November 2012 on First Amendment grounds.)

Harris and Scholander continue to profit from their relationship with Wey and were listed as shareholders of Nova Lifestyle, a furniture company accepted for listing on Nasdaq in January and whose stock price has been on something of a tear. The August 2011 Nova Lifestyle equity offering did not name Wey as a shareholder or adviser, but his sister Sarah Wei is listed as a seller of 690,000 shares through a portfolio managed by Witter Global Opportunities Ltd., a fund that also collaborates with Wey’s New York Global Group. (James Baxter, the president of Wey’s New York Global Group, also sold 23,000 shares in the offering, through a holding company he and his two brothers own, Global Investment Alliance.)

Gearty, for her part, told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation last week that she is devastated to have been the subject of The Blot’s bombastic articles.

“I never slept with Zakai and no one [has] ever alleged it, ever. [Scholander, Harris and Wey] just want me to look bad for their fake lawsuit,” Gearty said. “I never took a penny of anyone’s money and no one who investigated these guys at FINRA or the Manhattan DA’s office ever said I did.”

“How could Zakai have given me gifts from client money when I never worked with him at his fund?” she said, responding to a claim in The Blot that she had siphoned off client monies from Zakai at an investment fund he had established after the collapse of First Merger Capital. “[The Blot] only said those things because I told [FINRA] the truth and they know I’m not rich and famous so I can’t hurt them back.”

Gearty said she did not benefit financially in an improper way when she worked at First Merger Capital and has not worked steadily since leaving the firm. She has been representing herself in a bid to fight off the Scholander and Harris lawsuit.

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Wey’s beef with Dune Lawrence follows a pattern that has emerged recently of companies using the Internet to strike back at investigative reporters whose reporting they deem offensive or threatening.

And harassing reporters offline, through means apart from the Internet, is hardly new. In 1998, Dan Borislow, the chief executive of highflying Telecom Tel-Save, had then TheStreet.com reporter Alex Berenson followed by private investigators after he wrote critically about his company. More recently, Hewlett Packard tried to obtain phone records of Wall Street Journal reporters and Allied Capital attempted to find the phone records of columnist Herb Greenberg and other company critics.

Like the suggestion that Gearty slept with an alleged thief, The Blot’s criticism of Dune Lawrence was obsessively personal: It alleged that she eats a problematic amount of Kentucky Fried Chicken meals to the detriment to her appearance, speaks Chinese poorly and takes bribes from short seller Jon Carnes.

The Blot did not, however, try to assert publicly online that Lawrence’s reporting has ever been wrong—nor have others, at least from what can be gleaned from an Internet search for lawsuits or substantive disagreements about her reporting.

To be certain, Lawrence’s work might win her few friends in China. With her colleague Michael Riley, Lawrence identified a lynchpin in a Chinese government-sanctioned computer-hacking unit. In December, Lawrence wrote about a long-running fraud at AgFeed Industries of China, a former client of Wey.

The Blot's articles on Lawrence appear designed to create a lasting search engine optimization headache for her. For Lawrence’s Western readers, raised in a tradition of critical reporting and free speech, The Blot’s impact is likely to be muted; for her Chinese sources, who do not have this background, the charges may well resonate more.

When Lawrence wrote about short seller Jon Carnes in a 2013 story, it likely reinforced Wey’s oft-stated view that short sellers of Chinese companies use dishonest means to incite panic, usually through manipulating a crooked and lazy business press.

In turn, Carnes became the target of The Blot’s animus on Jan. 23 in a story that compared him to Jordan Belfort, the former chief executive of penny-stock brokerage Stratton Oakmont who served a jail sentence for defrauding his clients.

When Deer Consumer Products sued Carnes and his EOS Holdings fund in 2011, Wey and his colleagues likely had high hopes of a sharp reversal of fortune for Carnes, a man whose fund’s research had a role in helping expose fraud that resulted in the collapse and delisting of seven different Chinese issuers. Deer Consumer Products, however, lost its suit against Carnes, and Nasdaq delisted Deer Consumer Products in March 2012 for a host of fraud-related issues.

A disclosure is important here: The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation has been a recipient of funds from Carnes through his charitable trust.

The war between short sellers and their critics took a sharply more serious turn when the British Columbia Securities Commission filed a claim in December that Carnes issued a misleading report on Silvercorp Metals, a company based in Vancouver with mines in China. In a statement posted on his Web site, Carnes said he is fighting the charges, which he characterized as “false and without merit.”

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Two phone calls and email messages (bearing a set of detailed questions) for Wey seeking comment were not returned. In recent weeks, as this article was being prepared, Wey began to use social media platforms to publicly link to articles from The Blot.

As he has done with other reporters whose work he does not like, Wey has extensively criticized the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation and its board members on various online platforms in the past.

 

How To Effortlessly Earn A Riskless 90% On Your Bitcoins Through The Magic of Binary Options Trading, Or, The Nigerian Email Con Comes To Wall Street

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Let’s discuss an ambitious African immigrant named Obawtaye Folayan who appears to have a very big American dream but an unfortunate approach to getting there.

Starting in the mid-90s Folayan started laying down some real markers on the road to success, picking up a finance degree from Delaware State University and later, a masters degree in education administration from New Jersey’s Rider University in 2002. Two years later he would become principal of a school in Bridgeton, New Jersey .

But Folayan was a restless sort and moved on from the principal’s office to start a host of businesses, from landscaping to a for-profit education initiative.

Like many a fellow before him, Folayan heard the siren song of Wall Street, and in 2012, he set up Folayan Financial Holdings, a Delaware-chartered company with some tall designs on the world of consumer financial services.

Credit where it’s due, Folayan Financial Holdings sounds professional enough.

Then you take a look at the website of the company and the alarm bells start screaming.

Folayan Financial’s website should strike anyone familiar with how Wall Street markets itself as one of two things: Either an unfinished template, with a series of random names, words and titles thrown together like a poorly tossed salad before it is properly completed, or it is a crude parody, designed to elicit laughs from knowing finance industry insiders.

Consider the names and titles of the company’s managers: “Adam Smith” is “Main Manager,” and he might--or might not be--related to “Jennifer Smith,” who has the very un-Wall Street title of “Team Manager.” Rounding out the senior ranks is Information Technology chief “John Doe” and Anna Brown, “Attorney.”

As noted above, Folayan has patterned itself after a Bank of America or Citigroup, offering a universe of financial services, like retail investments, investment banking, insurance, “holding services” and legal advice. Unlike Bank of America or Citigroup, which actually do those things, the tabs on the company's website go nowhere.

The chief executive is the aforementioned Obawtaye Folayan whose days patrolling school hallways and issuing detentions are long past. The site says he personally oversees international assets worth “$4.4 billion.” Despite living in New Jersey, Folayan has never felt the need to obtain any securities industry licenses or register as an investment advisor.

He’s not alone, however, as “Isaac Rothschild,” a “Senior Account Manager” with 30 years of global investment experience, is helping manage the assets and run the business. Rothschild, a surname with a profound lineage in finance, seems to have done the impossible in an internet age, putting together a 30 year career that includes holding no licenses or warranting any mentions in any Securities and Exchange Commission or Financial Industry Regulatory Authority filings. (Rothschild will make another, rather spectacular appearance below.)

Despite clearly seeking to do business with the U.S. investing public, Folayan Financial has no licenses and is registered with no U.S. regulator or agency; a search engine scan for some of these billions of dollars worth of transactions and assets turns up nothing. The company’s headquarters is in a virtual office complex in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey. It says it has been doing business since 1999 but its bare bones filings indicates it was organized in 2012.

A little additional digging turns up some very troubling things about Obawtaye Folayan. In October 2012 he pled guilty to simple assault; the New Jersey Board of Education stripped him of his teaching certificates in September. The idea of his considerable wealth is unlikely: He and his wife Malika--they appear to now live apart, according to a databases examined by the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation--have nine judgements between them for unpaid consumer debt and last year lost a Pompano Beach, Florida property to foreclosure.

Having a comically ill-conceived website is not, of course, a crime. Where things get interesting is sussing out whatever it is a pair of companies Folayan Financial owns, New York Stock Options and money manager NYSOHedge, are really up to.

Establishing a connection between Obawtaye Folayan and the two companes required some sifting. Here's how the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation established the links: The main number of New York Stock Options is 877-935-8468, a number that has been used by Folayan Financial. Moreover, in September 2012, the virtual office where Folayan Financial rents space posted a message to its Facebook account welcoming New York Stock Options and Folayan Financial. Finally, Folayan Financial's website had key components of its directory left exposed, and its index and old payment processing details firmly tie the companies.

There are many excellent reasons for investors to stay far away from New York Stock Options and NYSOHedge, not the least of which is the fact that its strategy of trading binary options is assuredly spectacularly ill-suited for the passive retail investors they are seeking.

New York Stock Options circumvents the obvious complexity of the securities by ignoring the matter completely, instead making a pitch to prospective clients that is simplicity itself: trading binary options --no amount of capital is too small--is effectively riskless because both New York Stock Options and NYSOHedge employ hedging strategies that "Insure against loss of principal.”

It is no easy feat to count how many laws, both written and unwritten, this approach flouts.

On the off chance that investing without risk to capital wasn't enough, NYSOHedge says it posts “average yields” of up to 123 percent in certain accounts; others book average "yields" of 84 and 90 percent. By way of comparison, here is Bloomberg's listing of the top-performing large hedge funds. (Shortly before this story was released, NYSOHedge took down its website.)

To evangelize the potential binary options trading pool, NYSO and NYSOHedge use video testimonials, satellite radio advertisements and YouTube videos to spread the word. There are plenty of eyebrow raising issues with the videos, such as the settings in generic, featureless offices, and the lack of detail about how the clients suddenly managed to amass compelling wealth through New York Stock Options. Visually, they are oddly sterile, with this video suggests 1980s pop icon Max Headroom more than it does the benefits from an esoteric options trading style.

(A brief aside: The man in the second video also appears in a video for a BitCoin rival, Dogecoin, hosted on Fiverr, a site where people are paid $5 for performing a service.)

Regulators might find it interesting that the people in the videos speak U.S. accented English. This matters because when the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation sought comment, David Goldberg, a senior executive of New York Stock Options, said the company is a startup in the U.S. and has no U.S. customers. When pressed on how the company's absence of U.S. investors was contradicted by the enthusiastic U.S. citizens in the videos, Goldberg declined further comment.

Where NYSOHedge might potentially be taking in some investor capital is through its recently announced decision to accept Bitcoin--a peer-to-peer crypto currency--for its managed investment accounts. Bitcoin is a controversial asset class (one of bitcoin's primary exchanges, Mt. Gox, is in duress and has not allowed withdrawals for several days) but for Folayan, the ability to move bitcoin assets rapidly across the world without prying compliance staff asking questions is perhaps attractive. Regardless, marketing to the BitCoin community seems central to the funds future since two weeks ago Obawtaye Folayan registered the BITX.US domain name.

The management of NYSO and NYSOHedge, like Folayan Financial, appears in no U.S filings; like the parent company, Isaac Rothschild is again listed as a senior manager, this time in charge of managing accounts over $100,000.

From a regulatory standpoint, New York Stock Options and NYSOHedge are complete ciphers.

Bizarrely, New York Stock Options insists repeatedly on its website that it is a member of the Independent Financial Regulatory Authority, a regulator whose influence is now more metaphysical than real since its website is no longer active. (The Internet Archive's WayBack Machine had a cache of its site, fortunately.) To start, the phone number is now disconnected and the address given, 22 West Washington Street in Chicago, is another virtual office. A woman answering the phone for the office owner told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that the Independent Financial Regulatory Authority had been gone since July “if not before that,” and had left no forwarding information.

In a series of email exchanges, New York Stock Options executive David Goldberg argued that not having a U.S. regulator--when operating on U.S. soil or planning to soliciting U.S.-citizens--is not an issue since New York Stock Options is registered in Belize and doesn’t have any U.S. clients yet. Moreover, he insisted that New York Stock Options complies with all regulators in the jurisdictions it does operate in. He was scornful of a reporter's query about regulators in North America and Europe having no record of his company.

"You obviously think America, Canada or Europe are the only place on earth firms are regulated," said Goldberg. He then ended the conversation by accusing the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation of being a front for BlackRock, the giant asset management firm. He did not elaborate on this theory and an email from Isaac Rothschild noted that the firm would not be commenting further.

Goldberg's reference to New York Stock Options registration in Belize might not instill much confidence in its governance. According to the International Consortium of  Investigative Journalists Offshore Leaks database, New York Stock Options address in Belize is a mail drop used by several other offshore entities to shield assets and business activity.

During its brief, likely imaginary lifespan, the Independent Financial Regulatory Authority certainly tried an entirely different approach to guarding customer assets than its peers at the SEC or FINRA, and planned a $100,000 per plate “IFRA Awards Dinner” gala to celebrate the companies it did not regulate at the Chicago Waldorf Astoria. One of the main attractions of the event was the chance to meet “multibillionaire” and "part-owner of New York Stock Options" Isaac Rothschild. (A representative of the hotel told the Southern Investigative Research Foundation that she had no record of this event.)

Given the above, it is perhaps difficult to be shocked at the news that New York Stock Options is planning to join Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in the ranks of publicly traded brokerages. A “preliminary prospectus announcement” posted on its website says a sale of six million shares at $25, raising $150 million, would  imply a $5.3 billion valuation.

Getting the sale done though will be no mean feat.

With a syndicate of Folayan Financial Holding and Turner Securities LLC as "lead joint book running managers," and “Thompson LLC, Phillip Davis, Price, Steinberg & Smith Incorporated, Steven Goldberg & Co. and Isaac W. Rothschild & Co. Incorporated” there certainly are enough firms in the mix, it's just that none of them exist.

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The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation went to great lengths to get comment from Obawtaye Folayan and New York Stock Options during this story.
Moreover, given the vast incongruities and departures from securities industry norms our reporting uncovered, we firmly communicated our deep concern about the legality of many of its business practices.

Getting someone on the phone was fruitless: repeated calls to all of the obtainable numbers for Folayan and his companies (from public and private databases) ended in disconnected phones or voice mailboxes that were invariably full. Other phone numbers we called for New York Stock Options included a Magic Jack account that had been discontinued and a Google Voice mailbox where repeated messages left for Folayan and his colleagues were not returned.

A series of email exchanges, referenced above, with New York Stock Options executive David Goldberg resulted in little substantive discussion; after initially agreeing to call the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation, he did not follow through. As noted, the email discussion ended when Goldberg accused the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation of colluding with a giant money manager.

 

The Copper Archipelago: InterCloud

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Editors note: In addition to several minor copy edits to correct spelling and grammar usage, the article was amended to include a comment from John Mylant denying that he is part of an organized stock promotion effort. A disputed December 2011 transaction between Orlando Birbragher and the stock promoter Richard Barsom was mischaracterized and was changed to reflect the claims in a lawsuit.

It’s fair to say that a recent New York Observer article ably framed what every investor needs to know about a curious enterprise named InterCloud Systems: its prospects are marginal and the management doubly so. Experience, however, often shows that companies surfacing from the bronze deep of small-capitalization stock finance have rich backstories.

With that in mind, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation dove in, tracing the backgrounds of its executives, advisors and following the money trails between the two.

An examination of InterCloud’s filings did not disappoint, revealing a company that Oliver Stone might love, a rich corporate vein of collapsed ventures and peopled with the alpha promoters of the penny stock world, whose conflicts of interest and links to the graveyards of investor capital are legion.

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InterCloud wants you to see it as a “cloud computing” vendor, selling software platforms and services by way of the internet, in the fashion of a Rackspace or Amazon.

What it does for money, as the Observer reported however, is more broadly understood as “cable installation.” Putting in cable is a legitimate business, but it is not one that day traders and momentum investors--the two sorts of investors most likely to own InterCloud at this point in its history--are likely to bid up the share price to own.

So InterCloud is a good example of an important corporate marketing maxim: words matter. “Cloud computing” or even “carrier network expansion” sound better than “a series of servers” or “cable installation.” (In turn, both of those sound better than the truly accurate descriptor: “A company’s fifth attempt at developing a business model in under 15 years.”

InterCloud’s lineage traces to the industry of Michael D. Farkas, a broker in the boiler rooms of New York and Miami in the early and mid-1990s who managed to evolve up that food chain into founding and running companies that inevitably became heavily promoted penny stocks. In 1999, in conjunction with his former secretary Jamee Freeman, he spun a pair of reverse mergers, I-RealtyAuction.com and Sky Way Communications, out of a late Dot Com era construct he launched called I-Incubator.com. For three years I-RealtyAuction.com went nowhere until 2001 when Farkas struck a deal with veteran real estate developers Darren and Jeffrey Glick, renaming the company Genesis Realty and promptly resigning. The rebranding didn’t work though and the company lay dormant until 2009.

(Sky Way Communications, those with longer memories may recall, got some attention when an aircraft it leased was seized in Mexico in 2006 with over five tons of cocaine on board. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued two of Farkas’ colleagues in Sky Way with misleading investors. Farkas, the company’s biggest investor, was not charged in either episode. He is now the chief executive of an electric car charging station vendor.)

In 2009 Gideon Taylor, the former CEO of Able Telecom, a lower-tier fiber installation company whose pronouncements of looming success did not translate into a sustainable business, took over Genesis Realty and began a series of acquisitions within the cable installation field.

To get some capital Taylor first went to Udi Toledano, who runs a series of portfolios that act as a form of small-cap private equity fund and who wound up managing some of the then frozen assets of controversial hedge fund manager Michael Lauer. (Charged with wire fraud and conspiracy violations by Federal prosecutors in 2008, Lauer was acquitted after a jury trial in 2011.) In 2010, Taylor cut a deal with Orlando Birbragher, who had just emerged from serving a 35 month prison sentence for running Pharmacom, an online drugstore whose business model was to sell anyone willing to pay its high-prices for prescription medications, drawing the wrath of the Department of Justice.

The mention of the Birbragher deal in InterClouds filings is sterile enough: in February 2011, in exchange for some unspecified consulting services, Birbragher was paid $240,000 in shares in InterCloud predecessor Genesis Group.

Additional digging reveals a clearer sense of Birbragher's background, which seems to have been ripped from the pages of both Carl Hiaasen and Robert Ludlum in equal measure.

According to Drug Enforcement Agency Special Agent Gary Coffman (who gave detailed testimony about Birbragher’s undisclosed history as part of a pretrial motion Federal prosecutors submitted in December 2007), Orlando Birbragher was a drug smuggler for a group allied with a senior general in the Panamanian Defense Forces in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, Birbragher and his father, according to DEA special agent Coffman, also ran a busy weapons smuggling network whose customer was M-19, the Colombian guerilla movement.

Birbragher was a particularly talented money launderer, according to the DEA’s special agent Coffman, and even after his days of shipping cocaine from Panama to Florida were over, he faithfully moved millions of purportedly ill-gotten dollars for Colombian drug traffickers. His efforts in moving cash for these groups through a series of banks--including the one where his then girlfriend (now his wife) Alexis was employed--breached an immunity agreement Birbragher struck in 1991 with Federal prosecutors, and led to his 1994 arrest in Aspen for money laundering charges. (The DEA special agent said Birbragher managed to cut a second immunity deal in exchange for his cooperation.)

This is not the first Birbragher to garner attention for money laundering in South Florida.

In 1981 a Fernando Birbragher was charged for laundering money for Colombian drug group, but it is unclear if he is related to Orlando and he appears not to have been convicted. A call and email to Orlando Birbragher seeking comment were not returned; Fernando Birbragher, who has been involved in a series of small-cap stock ventures, as well as the South Florida aviation business, could not be reached.

Even within the often woolly realm of small cap equity finance, where civil and regulatory headaches are happily dismissed or buried, a transaction with the likes of an Orlando Birbragher is not an everyday development.

So the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation reached out to the company for a response. InterCloud’s contact for press inquiries is a man named Lawrence Sands, who per the Observer, is an unusual choice to serve in the role of a senior vice president and board secretary of a publicly traded company.

Why is Sands an odd choice? To start with, he resigned as a lawyer in New York State in June 2000 in front of a full-bore State Bar review for misconduct involving a client’s escrow account. Sands also served a stint as the chief executive of Paivis Corp., a penny stock that tried to sell prepaid phone cards and which sought (unsuccessfully) to merge with TrustCash, an online money transfer service. (In September the U.S. Attorney’s office in Newark sued a unit of TrustCash for illegal money transmittal activities.)

Sands told the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation that there had been no “transaction with Birbragher” who had “only helped the previous management” with some “consulting related to introductions to banks.” To that end, “No one [at InterCloud] has ever had anything to do with [Birbragher] since then, we’ve totally divorced ourselves from that relationship.” (It bears noting that Sands was also part of the previous management team, and the current CEO, Mark Munro, was one of the company’s biggest investors.)

Shortly after the call, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation found a January 2012 lawsuit on PACER filed by Birbragher against Richard Barsom, a New York-based stock promoter. The gist of the suit is that Barsom purportedly failed to deliver a $75, 000 payment for 50,000 shares of Blue Sky Holdings, a then client of Barsom’s company, to Birbragher. Birbragher’s signatory on the collapsed deal was Lawrence Sands, according to the suit. (The suit was dismissed in June of 2012 when the court ruled that Barsom had never been served. Reached at his residence, Barsom declined comment about the case and his dealings with Birbragher and Sands, saying only, “I can’t stand thinking about those two fucking clowns.”)

So the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation called Sands again.

“Look,” said Sands when confronted with evidence of his professional relationship with Birbragher despite his assurances of several minutes prior, “I was doing some work for [Birbragher] in 2012 because he had a connection in California and it looked like we were going to do some deals and he needed some advice. I promise that I stopped working with him after about three months.”

In response to questions about what prompted the relationship to stop, Sands was emphatic, “[Birbragher] stiffed me; he just never paid me. I thought he had money but he didn’t. I can’t deal with liars, integrity is everything to me.” Despite a series of questions about Birbragher, drug smuggling and money laundering, Sands described that period in InterCloud’s history as, “Being really rough to get [a deal] going. You have to remember, our stock price was really low then and people didn’t like dealing with Gideon Taylor. Mark Munro has made things much easier.”

Unsurprisingly, the Sands-Birbragher axis had one more angle left to explore and in a follow-up call, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation asked Sands about a pair of businesses registered on the same day in January 2012, Card Technology Service LLC and Card Technology Inc. Seemingly identical, the LLC listed Birbragher as an officer but expired in October 2012 and is classified as “inactive”; the corporation listed “Larry Sands” at the address of the InterCloud office in Boca Raton. Moreover, both businesses appear to be connected to credit card processing, the same business that Blue Sky Holdings was in.

After initially denying that he had ever heard of these people or businesses, Sands suggested that since “I try to help so many people because I am a lawyer, maybe I signed something and can’t remember when [or for whom.]” After several minutes Sands also recalled the name of one of the other officers but he took great pains to note that signing a document “Larry” is not something he would ever do because, “It is inappropriate to use a nickname in business dealings.”

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The balance of InterCloud’s filings are also revealing.

Consider that its auditor was Sherb & Co. LLP, a firm the Securities and Exchange Commission sued last year for failure to properly supervise and make necessary disclosures about the audits of three China-based client, resulting in a fine and the multiyear suspension of its general partner and two other employees. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has posted a series of unflattering examinations of Sherb’s audit work going back almost a decade, regularly questioning whether the firm’s auditors conducted standard procedures like revenue verification. (It has since hired BDO USA Inc.)

When the shares of a typical company start to run up in price, there could be anything behind it, from a surprisingly good earnings report, to a bullish analyst call or even a well-regarded money manager proclaiming the value in a specific market sector.

When a penny stock is moving, it’s a certainty that someone, somewhere is saying or doing something to pump the share price.

While InterCloud’s never-ending flow of press releases proclaiming its new opportunities in a popular sector have certainly attracted buyers, the company’s use of promoters--a classic sign of a penny stock--has kept the company in the spotlight, after a fashion. For example, last week RedChip Companies released a report that put a $47.10 price target on InterCloud’s shares. Looking and reading every bit as crisply as a standard brokerage report, investors might assume that the industry and sales metrics cited for a likely 250% gain in share price were coming from someone who had independently weighted these arguments and made a bold call.

But that would be wrong: the Maitland Fla.-based RedChip is an investor relations firm whose strategy centers on putting out “research reports” written for, and approved by, its clients. In other words, they are press releases seeking to appeal to the marginally aware investor (RedChip’s work on behalf of its Chinese clients proved so damaging to investors that they dropped “coverage” of the sector in January 2013.)

For its work on InterCloud, the fine print at the bottom of the 14-page report discloses RedChip was paid 7,500 shares and is being paid a monthly cash fee for six months of investor relations work.

As the Observer reported, an odd footnote to InterCloud’s promotional gambit was the appearance of a pair of articles on the stock market commentary website Seeking Alpha that touted InterCloud’s prospects, posted in December and in January. Authored by John Mylant and a writer using the pseudonym “Kingmaker,” the pieces strongly advocated for InterCloud’s bright prospects because of the talent of its management and the fast growth of the cloud computing sector.

Not disclosed was the fact that the authors unflinching support for InterCloud was also a function of being paid to promote the shares. Last week, Rick Pearson, a West Coast-based investor, posted an article on Seeking Alpha describing how DreamTeamGroup, an investor relations firm ostensibly based in Indianapolis, solicited and paid writers to write enthusiastic, company reviewed and approved articles for release on Seeking Alpha, with the goal being to attract investors and drive up the share price.

According to Pearson, two of the more prolific DreamTeamGroup veiled touts were John Mylant and a man named Tom Meyer, a DreamTeamGroup employee who admitted to using the “Kingmaker” pseudonym.

(Mylant, who contacted the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation after this story was posted, said he has regularly posted articles and comments on Seeking Alpha and that the opinions he expresses were his own. He acknowledges being contacted by a "Tom"--Mylant did not recall his last name or company--who offered to pay him for articles written about companies he was already interested in. He said he is no longer working with "Tom.")

So a call to Lawrence Sands was in order.

Sands initially denied having heard of or used DreamTeamGroup but after being pressed on the matter said that he has “gotten maybe a few emails from them, stuff that got caught in the ‘spam’ filter.” He continued to argue that it was unlikely InterCloud used DreamTeamGroup for anything, however, since RedChip and a small New York firm, CSIR, were handling the company’s investor relations work. (CSIR founder Christine Petraglia said she had nothing to do with this issue, and said she provided InterCloud standard public- and investor relations services.)

Just before releasing this article, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation found a clear link between DreamTeamGroup and InterCloud: a January 21 posting on DreamTeamGroup’s own blog that was cross-posted to a unit of DreamTeamGroup’s “Instablog” at Seeking Alpha.

A call to Lawrence Sands was not returned.


Kindred Healthcare Chairman Snares Loaded Retirement Sendoff

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Editors Note: This is a cross-posting of an article released today from the Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting that we felt would be of interest for our readers.

Kindred Hospital in the 1300 block of St. Anthony Place in Louisville.

James McNair / Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting

Kindred Hospital in the 1300 block of St. Anthony Place in Louisville.

At Kindred Healthcare Inc., retirement gifts have gone way beyond the farewell cake, the cheap wristwatch and the sendoff reception at the local sports bar.

Last December the Louisville-based hospital and nursing home chain announced that its chairman, Edward Kuntz, would be quitting the board of directors after its annual shareholders meeting in May. Kuntz is 68 and has been chairman since 1999. Until 2004, he was also the publicly traded company’s chief executive.

“He has served as a mentor to me and others in our organization, and I will miss his guidance and advice,” Kindred CEO Paul Diaz said in a Dec. 13 press release.

Actually, he won’t. One day before his retirement was announced, Kuntz agreed to a two-year consulting deal that will pay him $120,000 a year. The contract, buried deep in the Kindred (NYSE: KND) annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Feb. 28, permits  Diaz or the board -- whoever needs him -- to tap Kuntz up to 12 days per year. For every day of work beyond that, Kindred will pay him $10,000. Per day.

Edward L. Kuntz

Sentinel Partners

Edward L. Kuntz

The contract contains no usage limits. If Kindred puts him to work for 30 extra days, Kuntz will  make $300,000, or almost as much as his current $315,000 annual salary as chairman. If he puts in 100 extra days, he’ll make $1 million.

Paul Hodgson, an independent corporate governance analyst in Maine, was baffled by the consulting deal.

“This kind of situation is relatively common if the CEO is new and has been brought in from the outside and doesn’t have the knowledge or experience of running a company,” Hodgson said. “I can’t see the need for any hand-holding in this situation. It doesn’t seem particularly necessary for accessing the former CEO and chairman.”

Kuntz’s open-ended, $10,000-per-day consulting deal could become quite an expense, Hodgson said. “I can see that mounting up to $300,000 fairly quickly.”

Kuntz’s contract affords other perks, too. Kindred will give him access to its company jet, a twin-engine, 13-passenger Cessna 560XL. Whether he takes the private jet or not, Kuntz will recoup all travel expenses while working for the company. When he’s consulting from his home in Houston, he’ll have an office -- and an administrative assistant -- paid for by the company. (Read the consulting deal)

Kuntz could not be reached and did not return a phone call. Kindred spokeswoman Susan Moss would not answer questions about the consulting deal.

“Why is that news?” she asked.

It was news to Graef Crystal, Bloomberg News’ compensation expert and author of six books on the subject. He reviewed Kuntz’s consulting contract for the Kentucky Center for Investigative Reporting.

“The thing that jumps out of the page is the $10,000 per day,” Crystal said. “I’ve never heard of anything like that. I don’t know why they’d want to do that.”

Kindred is one of the biggest companies headquartered in Kentucky. With rehab hospitals, nursing homes, other health care centers and 63,000 employees in 47 states, Kindred calls itself the “largest diversified provider of post-acute services” in the nation.

But Kindred could use some treatment itself -- for financial hemophilia. In the last three years, Kindred lost a combined $262.3 million. It racked up $4.9 billion in sales in 2013 -- more than half of which came from Medicaid and Medicare billings -- only to show a bottom line loss of $168.5 million. And although its stock price, at about $22, is again showing a heartbeat and rebounding from a three-year slump, it is no higher than where it was in 2011 and 2008.

It isn’t clear from the consulting agreement why, exactly, Kuntz’s counsel would be so vital. Diaz, 52, has served as Kindred’s CEO for more than 10 years, a little longer than the average 9.7-year tenure of departing U.S. CEOs in 2013, according to a Conference Board study.

Diaz is also generously compensated for his leadership. His 2013 pay hasn’t been reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission yet, but during the four preceding years, he received $21.4 million in total compensation. His 2012 gross of $4.6 million made him the fifth highest-paid executive of a publicly traded company in Kentucky, according to the AFL-CIO’s Executive PayWatch survey.

Kuntz’s availability as a consultant might provide some continuity in dealing not only with business issues, but legal issues as well.

As of last Nov. 20, the U.S. Justice Department was investigating a whistleblower’s claim that Kindred and two other companies had taken millions of dollars in kickbacks for promoting the use of Amgen Inc.’s Aranesp anemia drug over a competitor’s brand. The widely publicized whistleblower suit was filed in federal court in South Carolina in 2007. Amgen cut its losses by settling out of court last April and agreeing to pay $24.9 million.

As for Kindred and its Louisville-based spinoff, PharMerica Corp., the lawsuit accuses them of taking $20.6 million worth of Amgen incentive money -- euphemistically described as “rebates” -- from 2003 to 2008.

“Amgen paid kickbacks to long-term care pharmacy providers Omnicare Inc, PharMerica Corp. and Kindred Healthcare Inc. in return for implementing ‘therapeutic interchange’ programs that were designed to switch Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries from a competitor drug to Aranesp,” the government said in its summary of health care fraud enforcement actions in 2013.

The companies deny the allegations.

Facing a Nov. 20 court deadline, the Justice Department could not make up its mind about assuming the role as lead plaintiff against the companies. It chose instead to stay in the background and investigate on its own. Meanwhile, Cincinnati-based Omnicare settled its case last month by agreeing to pay a $4.19 million fine to the government.

That left the two Louisville companies as the remaining targets of the fraud suit. Reuben Guttman, the Washington, D.C., attorney who filed the suit for Amgen whistleblower Frank Kurnik, said that the government is “significantly interested” in Kindred and PharMerica.

 

The Copper Archipelago: Truth, Lies and InterCloud Systems

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InterCloud Systems, a company familiar to Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation readers, put out a press release late last week sharply disagreeing with the claim that they had hired a controversial public relations firm to promote its shares.

While affirming a commitment to grow its businesses, InterCloud’s statement said that it had retained an unnamed former Securities and Exchange Commission attorney who had not found any evidence that the company used the Dream Team Group, a public relations outfit whose practice includes paying authors to post favorable, company-vetted articles about its clients on popular stock market websites.

The unambiguous stance worked and reversed a week of constant decline in InterCloud’s share price when a series of plaintiff law firms announced their investigations into InterCloud’s undisclosed promotional activities.

A public relations firm that hires authors to write flattering articles about a clients prospects without disclosing they are being compensated to do so isn’t just gaming public opinion, but is running the risk of violating the Rule 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, which mandates disclosure of an economic interest in the promotion or sale of securities.

One company that had their public relations firm commission articles, Galena Pharmaceuticals, is already in the SEC’s crosshairs, having received a demand for documents related to this issue.

(Seeking Alpha, the popular stock market news and discussion site, announced last week that it is cracking down on this behavior, largely because of the efforts of short-seller Rick Pearson, whose pair of articles highlighted a network of small-cap stock promoters using the site to manufacture good news in order to bolster the share price of their clients.)

The strength of InterCloud’s denial regarding its use of the Dream Team Group prompted SIRF to closely examine our reporting to ensure accuracy and fairness.

A careful re-reporting of the issue suggests that we stand by our work.

Make no mistake: regardless of the findings of InterCloud’s former SEC attorney or the forcefulness of its press release, authors were clearly paid to publish favorable articles on InterCloud. Moreover, the shares increased in value during the time of this promotion, and according to the terms of the solicitation, senior management was allowed to see articles prior to publication. The only thing limiting the practice appears to have been the inability to find more authors willing to write on the company.

As it stands, InterCloud’s marketing strategy is already centered on using shareholder capital to whip-up short-term trading interest. Recall how the company retained the RedChip Companies, a Florida-based small-cap stock promotion outfit, paying them in cash and shares. RedChip’s signature move is to put out a lengthy, easy-reading press release constructed to look exactly like a brokerage firm’s report, including an astronomical “target price,” based on grave-seeming metrics that are equal parts surrealist fantasy and comedy.

The CSIR Group, a Manhattan based investor relations firm under contract to InterCloud, is the enterprise behind the practice that InterCloud’s chief executive Mark Munro formally assured investors was—after an internal investigation—inaccurate.

(The initial SIRF article had linked the Dream Team Group to these articles, based on conversations with CSIR management and one of the authors. As shown below, their stories have changed considerably.)

This email exchange between Rick Pearson (who used a pseudonym to pose as a prospective author of these articles) and Herina Ayot, an employee of CSIR, is evidence that CSIR was involved in recruiting and paying authors to write favorable, InterCloud-approved articles.

In the most direct terms possible, Ayot laid out to Pearson how CSIR sought an author for an article developing “convincing arguments for buying the stock,” one that CEO Mark Munro would review. The author would be paid $500 upon publication of the article.

All of which was strange: when SIRF asked CSIR’s founder Christine Petraglia for comment two weeks ago about her firm’s involvement with paid articles, she denied any role in the practice, insisting her firm only provided basic investor relation help to InterCloud.

"We’re too small to do much more than help spread the word and arrange meetings,” Petraglia said at the time.

SIRF called Ayot for some help in resolving this issue.

Ayot, an aspiring novelist whose Twitter feed is chock full of references to God and warm spiritual affirmations, confirmed CSIR recruited and paid writers to write pro-InterCloud articles.

Regarding the question of Petraglia’s denials, Ayot’s explanation was simplicity itself:

“Christine lied,” Ayot said.

“In her defense,” Ayot continued, “This is Wall Street and everyone [lies.] We had no idea who you are or why you were asking those questions; you might have been an investor or someone posing as one. We get thousands of calls each day. So we lied to get rid of you.”

When asked if Ayot understood what exactly she was saying about her firm’s actions—lying and covering up, for example, about a serious disclosure matter that the SEC is investigating—she seemed unfazed about the potential for controversy.

“You need to know that on Wall Street, everyone lies and we lied to you to protect ourselves,” Ayot said, before declining to comment about the specifics of CSIRs work for InterCloud.

Given the regulatory scrutiny ongoing with respect to disclosure, SIRF made repeated attempts to give Ayot a chance to expand on or clarify her remarks. Numerous phone calls were made to residence and cellphone numbers obtained from a private database, and several emails were sent to her CSIR account, but Ayot never replied.

Shortly before this story was released, however, Petraglia called back to explain her side of the story.

She said that CSIR gets many calls daily from investors and traders seeking inside information on her clients and so when SIRF contacted her, “my first instinct was to deny that we did this.”

When asked why she would lie about it—as opposed to issuing a standard “no comment”—and incur possible reputation risk or regulatory scrutiny, Petraglia said only: “I don’t speak to many reporters and I guess I made a mistake.”

With regards to Ayot, Petraglia said she was not an employee of CSIR, but rather worked as a “part time contractor” for CSIR, whose job was to line up authors to write articles on behalf of CSIR clients. She added that CSIR has stopped doing “that kind of work” for InterCloud Systems and other clients. She declined to comment about who initiated the program and how much it cost.

“I never focused on this issue, and I had never looked at Seeking Alpha before, so I didn’t comprehend that [the lack of disclosure] was a problem,” Petraglia said.

Petraglia is the unconventional choice to publicly represent InterCloud. She is, for example, a licensed stock broker, registered since 2010 with Oberon Securities, according to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s BrokerCheck database. Oberon and CSIR Group share the same office at 1412 Broadway in New York. (Calls made to Oberon co-founders Elad Epstein and Nicole Schmidt were not returned.)

Active in the financial services industry since 1991, Petraglia’s resume includes stints with major firms like PIMCO, Prudential Securities and Nuveen. There has been one regulatory black eye though—coincidentally over a disclosure issue—and she worked for one of the most troubling penny-stock firms during its sanction-inducing heyday.

In 2004, while working for Bear Stearns’ Bear Wagner Specialist unit at the New York Stock Exchange, Petraglia was fired when a firm official uncovered how she had been employed at one firm, but kept her Series 7 brokerage registration listed (or “parked”) at another firm. As financial crimes go it is a minor one, but the intentional deception provided the impetus for her dismissal.

At another point, she spent 16 months working at the investor relations subsidiary of Ross Mandell’s infamous boiler room Sky Capital. (To be fair, there is no indication that she did business with the investing public at Sky.)

Moving in a different direction, Petraglia was one of the featured “cougars” in an erstwhile reality TV show, “True Cougar Life” that was designed to follow the active lives of five older women who sought relationships with younger men. It was hosted and produced by Brittany Andrews, an award-winning former adult film star who has appeared in 270 different features, according to adult film archives.

Finally, SIRF called John Mylant, the busy author of over 800 articles on Seeking Alpha, several of which were compensated by the likes of Galena Pharmaceutical and InterCloud Systems, to get his take on CSIR’s role.

A self-described options trading coach who earns his income primarily from the sale of health insurance, the Colorado resident said CSIR approached him to write about InterCloud. Like Petraglia, he told SIRF he was unaware of the disclosure issues surrounding this practice.

“I just thought it was a way for me to earn extra money and write about what was interesting to me,” said Mylant, adding that he had retained a lawyer to help him with an interview with the  SEC last week.

Mylant said that he was offered $50 to write a pro-InterCloud article for the Dream Team Group and he suggested that it was for the company’s bid to attract attention from a potential client. He declined comment on whether he took the assignment, citing his lawyer’s advice and the SEC investigation.

SIRF sought to discuss our findings with InterCloud's executive vice-president Larry Sands, but he did not return a phone message or an email seeking comment.

What’s in a Name: The Ongoing Saga of Medbox

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It is the third week of April of 2011 and Rishi Patel is on a mission: He is taking a hard look at business opportunities in the wake of Arizona’s decision to permit the sale of medical marijuana in dispensaries across the state.

To Patel’s thinking, selling medical marijuana is going to be a fantastic opportunity to earn money while offering a scientifically valid therapeutic service to people wrestling with disease.

Patel had come across an ad from Prescription Vending Machines, a company helping folks like him get into the medical marijuana business, and in short order he was in a running dialogue with the company’s founder, an agreeable and talkative fellow named Vincent Mehdizadeh. From there, it wasn’t long before Patel and a pair of friends had struck a plan to help Prescription Vending Machines land a dispensary permit in Arizona.

Just before he wrote a very large check—his father was staking him the capital—Patel did a background search on Mehdizadeh.

After getting the report, Patel was astonished to see a laundry list of crimes and lawsuits; one more serious than the other, all of which Mehdizadeh was at the center. (All involved negotiated pleas, with none of the charges resulting in a trial or jail time. The civil charges were settled after extensive negotiations.)

An irritated Patel called Mehdizadeh first thing the next morning, wanting to know why these legal woes weren’t properly disclosed.

Mehdizadeh’s reaction during the call was unexpected. There was no yelling or smooth-talking; rather, he radiated a calm and sustained astonishment. He tells Patel that there has been a mistake, and that something somewhere is terribly wrong since he hasn’t been repeatedly sued or arrested.

Patel is dubious, having taken the precaution of using Pejman as Mehdizadeh’s given name to run the search. He is thoroughly convinced that the report is accurate. Detail after detail matches up; he is convinced he has his man. After their conversation, Patel e-mails him a copy of the background report.

But there’s no angry hang-up or fumbling apology from Mehdizadeh when he calls back. Instead, he tells Patel he can see exactly what happened. The background search was run using the wrong name, he said, telling Patel that his formal first name is Pegah and not Pejman.

To correct the record, Mehdizadeh e-mails Patel a scan of his driver’s license and another background report. 

Shortly after the call ended, Patel opened up the files. As promised, the documents belonged to Pegah Vincent Mehdizadeh, a man from California whose spotless criminal record was the polar opposite of Pejman Vincent Mehdizadeh.

It is, as Patel was forced to concede, more than strange.

[Editor's note: Rishi Patel has a "Road to Damascus" conversion. Continue reading to see why and when.]

Patel thought he’d had the right name and was certain Vince has even mentioned the name Pejman to him, but the documents sitting right there on his laptop screen looked, for all the world, to be in good order. What’s more, Mehdizadeh called back and said he had found his birth certificate and social security card, and wanted to know if Patel needed those scans as well.

Patel felt there was nothing more he could do. He eventually shrugged the matter off and patched things up with Mehdizadeh, even if he wouldn't accept that he had gotten his name so completely wrong. But he ignored the feeling and bet on his dreams, sending the check to Prescription Vending Machines for what he assumed—after plenty of sweat and hustle—would be the ticket to a good job and a meaningful life.

For a while, the process of being a medical marijuana entrepreneur proceeded apace. If things ever seemed to get more complex with delays, costs or red tape that hadn’t been discussed … well, such was life.

And then in July 2011 Patel got his dispensary and within minutes knew that everything was wrong. The furniture was used, the location wasn’t what they’d bargained for, and even the vaunted dispensary system they’d been promised didn’t do what was advertised.

As Patel assessed the mess, an e-mail from Mehdizadeh arrived bearing an offer to meet that weekend in Las Vegas. To help the decision-making process along, he included photographs of four strippers he had “recruited from [his] travels from Colorado to Arizona” that they were slated to meet up with as well. Mehdizadeh didn’t leave much to the imagination when he described their role on the trip as “bringing sand to the beach.”

Patel declined the Vegas junket.

In the following weeks, Patel would tell his partners, family and friends that the biggest mistake he had made, even greater than sending that big check, was that he did not trust his instincts on the basis of the background report. Because as Pejman Vincent Mehdizadeh caroused in Vegas with his four dancer friends, Patel came to the conclusion that you are given instincts for a reason.

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The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation’s interest in these documents was straightforward: Vincent Mehdizadeh has an acknowledged history of inventing credentials he has not earned, most notably when he posed as a law school graduate to bolster his legal referral service business.

When SIRF approached Mehdizadeh for comment, providing him with the e-mails and documents in question, the situation quickly got heated.

What follows is the byproduct of the collision of a host of issues: investigative reporting on a subject who was angry at SIRF’s previous reporting, the collapse of a source-reporter relationship under legal and economic duress, and the permanence of electronic communications.

Here’s how it all started:

On April 10, Mehdizadeh, after initially refusing comment, strongly denied that he had ever posed as Pegah Mehdizadeh, or arranged a stripper-accompanied trip to Las Vegas. By the afternoon of April 11, he was promising to litigate against SIRF.

A lawyer Mehdizadeh retained attempted to smooth matters out and questions that were submitted to him and through his lawyers, sent his reply April 15.

That is all the standard operating procedure in the world of investigative reporting. Where the real drama was playing out, however, was far behind the scenes between Patel and Mehdizadeh.

When SIRF provided Mehdizadeh with the Pegah Mehdizadeh e-mails April 10, Patel's name and e-mail address was removed. Despite this, Mehdizadeh insisted to SIRF that he knew the real source behind it, and that this source was demanding compensation.

While Mehdizadeh sharply denied the authenticity of the documents, Patel described the pressure from Mehdizadeh in a series of phone calls, e-mails and texts as “unbelievable.” Specifically, Mehdizadeh wanted Patel to e-mail SIRF a note describing how the documents were fabricated. In turn, Patel told SIRF--and Mehdizadeh--that he viewed this pressure from him as a direct threat to him and his family.

Throughout the weekend of April 11-13, Patel, in a series of phone calls and texts, insisted to SIRF that he sought protection as a source but that he was adamant in opposing financial inducements from Mehdizadeh. On the evening of April 11, he texted, "I got hit with a bribe again man. [You] won't believe this."

After a particularly heated exchange with Mehdizadeh April 11, Patel said that if Mehdizadeh sued SIRF, he would surrender his anonymity and voluntarily testify, stating that "someone has to stop this crap. It has to end--the bad deals, dispensary owners getting screwed--and if I have to go into court, I'll do it."

Then Patel went silent for three days without returning numerous e-mails, phone and text messages. On the afternoon of April 14 he sent a brief text, "too many cooks in the kitchen."

Later that afternoon, Mehdizadeh's lawyer sent SIRF a signed and notarized statement from Patel, stating that all of the information he had provided to SIRF about Vincent Mehdizadeh and Medbox was false.

-----------------------

In certain circumstances that affidavit might be definitive, but in this instance it is virtually meaningless. Here is why:

Patel initiated contact with SIRF in the middle of October last year and never wavered in his desire to contribute documents to a follow-up exposé of Medbox, despite an equally profound fear of being discovered doing so. Though SIRF declined to pursue an investigation of the Arizona dispensaries, he provided the Pegah Mehdizadeh e-mails to SIRF in December. His explanations of the circumstances and conversations surrounding his obtaining these documents were corroborated by others interviewed by SIRF. For his part, Patel said he had given the Pegah Mehdizadeh documents (among many others) to a local prosecutor in Arizona who retired suddenly last year. A subsequent relationship with a plaintiff’s attorney was terminated due to a demand for a retainer that he said he could not afford.

The e-mail thread he forwarded to SIRF gave no appearance of having been manipulated, and the e-mail address is one Mehdizadeh had used during that period.

To the extent that was even feasible for Patel to do so, generating these documents would have involved unusual risk, expense and effort and for absolutely no payoff. How would having created a fake driver’s license and a background report help him to recoup his investment, or even further his cause in a potential legal fight? On another note, being caught generating those documents would almost certainly result in felony prosecution under identity theft status and a guarantee of civil liability.

At the time of the disputed e-mails, Patel told SIRF that he and Mehdizadeh were on friendly terms, something Mehdizadeh would acknowledge with the Las Vegas invitation; Patel told SIRF he thought his relationship with Prescription Vending Machines was going to make him a lot of money. Accordingly, he had no reason at the time to try and portray Mehdizadeh in a negative light. (Mehdizadeh described Patel repeatedly as seeking to "extort" him, charges Patel laughed about when approached for comment by SIRF on April 10 and 11.)

There are some compelling linkages between the documents and Vincent Mehdizadeh.

One data point connecting the disputed Pegah Mehdizadeh's license and Vincent Mehdizadeh is the address: 4351 Park Arroyo in Calabasas, a property owned by the Michelle Mehdizadeh Family Trust. In addition, Parviz Mehdizadeh, Vincent's father, has used the address to register a series of businesses.

(Pegah Mehdizadeh is a 37-year female physician whose address is listed in the disputed background report, and whose birthday is the same as the one on the driver’s license. She did not return a call seeking comment.)

Additionally, the Intelius report clearly identifies the account holder as vin.zadeh@gmail.com. That e-mail address belongs to Vincent Mehdizadeh and he has frequently used it to communicate with SIRF.

SIRF asked a spokesman for Intelius about the role e-mail addresses play in setting up and maintaining an account. In reply he wrote, "An e-mail address serves as a username in an Intelius account. A customer supplies an e-mail address and password when they create an account, and they use that e-mail address and password to access their account."

The account was opened at some point in 2010, months before Patel said he saw the Prescription Vending Machines ad and began communicating with Mehdizadeh.

Put bluntly, Patel signed the affidavit under financial and legal duress. Though he comes from a middle-class background, he is a 33-year old single parent of multiple children and currently lives with his oncologist brother's family while he attempts to launch a medical marijuana business. Apart from his family's support, he says he has little money of his own and would appear to have no capacity to wage a legal fight against Mehdizadeh, who is now a multimillionaire.

To that end and throughout his dialogue with SIRF, Patel's fear of being involved in litigation with Mehdizadeh was palpable (even if he initiated contact with SIRF) and he constantly reiterated his anxiety about exposing his young children to the stress of litigation.

Even after declaiming the documents he sent SIRF--despite spending many hours discussing their origins and what he believed they implied about Mehdizadeh's business conduct--Patel left little to the imagination about his motivation for his actions.

The evening of April 15, Patel wrote to SIRF, "I did what I had to for my family in good faith that good men will carry the torch of truth." A day earlier (post-affidavit), he described himself as "a victim of fraud” while discussing his experience with Mehdizadeh in an e-mail.

---------------------------------------------

Vincent Mehdizadeh is a familiar name for Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation readers. Last September, SIRF released an investigation into the many undisclosed legal issues in Mehdizadeh’s background and the then high-flying company he’d founded to capture a piece of the medical marijuana business.

The story above and the related e-mails prompted SIRF to begin additional investigation into Mehdizadeh’s background, starting with a re-examination of our notes from the many phone calls and e-mail exchanges with him during the reporting process last summer.

What emerged from this study were questions about a California-domiciled holding company set up in March 2009 called Sniperella Investments Inc., whose initial president was Mehdizadeh’s then-girlfriend Yocelin Legaspi.

The company was set up, he told SIRF, as he transitioned away from the legal referral service business in 2008, where his activities prompted a joint Los Angeles Department of Consumer Affairs and District Attorney suit--he was ordered to pay back $450,000 to his victims by October 21--and transitioned into what would become Medbox.

It was also the job he held prior to seeking creditor protection under the bankruptcy code.

Last summer, in an e-mail exchange with SIRF, Mehdizadeh described Sniperella as a “consulting firm I was associated with in 2009. It ceased doing business in January 2010.”

Sniperella has little public documentary footprint save for this June 2010 suit filed against both Mehdizadeh and Sniperella by Los Angeles resident Abdul Ala Ahmed, which described Sniperella as an “alter ego” of Mehdizadeh. As support for this “alter ego” status, Ahmed’s suit claims the $50,000 cashier’s check he gave Mehdizadeh to purchase a marijuana dispensary was made out to him personally, and promptly deposited in Sniperella’s account with Bank of America.

(Ahmed’s suit, having been amended to make Sniperella the defendant, is proceeding to trial according to his lawyer, Stanley Kimmel.)

SIRF examined Sniperella's financial records as part of this investigation and it appears Mehdizadeh and Sniperella are effectively one in the same: Mehdizadeh wrote and cashed checks within the account, wired money in and out of it, and paid bills on behalf of his father and girlfriend.

To that end, the defining feature of Sniperella’s brief economic life is the sheer velocity of activity in its checking account: Based on SIRF’s analysis, the account had just over $2.97 million worth of deposits and withdrawals from March 2009 to July 2010. (About $148,000 of the account’s activity occurred in 2010.)

There was over $42,000 spent on five weekend trips to Las Vegas (this includes cash withdrawals from Vegas banks), $9,342 for auto maintenance and payments, $6,400 in legal fees and expenses, $4,581 at Ticketmaster for unspecified tickets, and over $24,400 in payments made for his girlfriend’s Discover card. Thousands of additional dollars were spent on high-end clothing stores, trendy Los Angeles area restaurants and clubs and travel around the California coast.

More importantly, Sniperella provided Mehdizadeh with a veritable river of cash. In 2009, he withdrew over $160,000 from various Los Angeles and Las Vegas Bank of America branches, and that December alone he cashed checks for $43,000. Additionally, over the life of the account, he withdrew more than $26,000 from ATMs.

The last activity for the Sniperella account was on July 12, 2010: a $20 payment to the California Secretary of State and a $26 payment to the Apple iTunes store.

Though there were numerous checks written, the payee was not designated in the financial records SIRF examined, so determining in which businesses (if any) Sniperella was making investments was not possible.

Of particular note was the activity between November 10 and December 10, 2009 when a $300,000 online transfer was made to Sniperella from another account. Between November 17 and 24, $42,000 was withdrawn from Sniperella, and over the course of this period, more than $158,000 was transferred back to the account, with $100,000 remaining with Sniperella.

Mehdizadeh filed his bankruptcy petition July 14, 2010 listing $9,500 in assets, an income of $3,800 monthly and declaring that his 2009 income was $90,000 from “consulting.”

When asked about Sniperella in light of these details, Mehdizadeh replied through his lawyer, "[Sniperella Investments] had a focus of investing in different industries that were of interest. My girlfriend at the time was operating the company as she possessed a real estate license and was pursuing real estate investments. When I filed for bankruptcy in 2010, these company’s bank statements as well as 2 others were asked for by the US Trustee’s office overseeing the bankruptcy petition. I was also interviewed and asked questions about the statements and cleared all inquiries without a problem at all. My bankruptcy was discharged in 2011."

Pressed on the matter, he angrily declined to go into detail about what industries Sniperella targeted for investment, or where the flow of deposits in 2009 came from.

------------------------

A final matter of interest for SIRF was what Vincent Mehdizadeh has done with his shares. Specifically, an impressively large block of his holdings were sold or transferred, and it's not clear to whom or for how much.

In a December filing, Mehdizadeh is listed as owning 17,882,240 shares (adjusting for a 100 percent stock dividend paid in February.) Less than three months later, however, in this filing he is listed March 24 as owning 16,238,940 shares--both personally and through a holding company he controls--a difference of 1,643,300, or more than 9% of his shares as of the end of the year.

An executive choosing not to disclose the sale or transfer of their shares is exceedingly rare among public issuers, regardless of the company's size. Moreover, the shares could have been easily worth more than $40 million given Medbox's share prices in the first quarter. Mehdizadeh did not address SIRF’s request to elaborate on where the shares went in a lengthy statement.

His response, in full: "As the majority shareholder and founder of this company, I put the burden on myself to attract talent to our board and executive management team for the benefit of the company and its shareholders. I have used my shares over the last few years in many ways to directly and indirectly benefit the company. As a non-reporting pink-sheet company during the period in time referenced, I had no obligation to document my private share sales/transfers. However, I did voluntarily disclose my share count in quarterly reports filed with OTC Markets as well as registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Again, I did so voluntarily and specifically for a higher level of transparency for shareholders. Now that we are an SEC filer, I would have to file Form 4’s every time I have a change in share count. I look forward to keeping investors in the loop as that is a duty I personally subjected myself to."

 

 

 

 

 

The Mitzvah Factory

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Sirf Roddy Boyd dollar sign

Imagine you and your younger brother are poor Jewish kids in mid-1950s Hungary. Unlike so many, you managed to avoid the Holocaust only to be swept up in a bitter revolt against the cruel Soviet occupation government.

The revolt fails, and like tens of thousands of your countrymen you leave your homeland and its bloodshed, and manage to make your way to New York and a new future.

Your name is Michael Karfunkel, your younger brother is George and, fast forwarding nearly 60 years, your future is something even Horatio Alger wouldn’t have thought possible.

Quiet careers in business at the periphery of Wall Street, New York, real estate and the insurance industry, with an aversion to publicity that is rarely seen, have made both men billionaires, according to Forbes magazine.

Like so many rich people, the Karfunkels opened non-profit foundations to share
their good fortune. Through the donation of large blocks of AmTrust Financial Services shares — an insurance concern they built in the 1990s — their foundations have amassed considerable size as the share price rose: by the end of 2013 Michael Karfunkel’s Hod Foundation had assets of $286 million; his brother George’s Chesed Foundation of America had assets of $293 million.

(Their foundations give almost exclusively to yeshivas and synagogues connected to Haredi Judaism, many of which are affiliated with the Belz Hasidic sect.)

And this is where the story would normally end: a miraculously successful pair of brothers who, in their later years — Michael is now 71 and George is 65 — have the rare privilege of seeing their fortunes put to good use.

Except that, taking a hard look at how these foundations operate leaves a lot more questions than answers.

For three months the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation analyzed the foundations’ publicly available documents, primarily though CitizenAudit.org, an online repository of non-profit foundation annual reports. What we found was that all good intentions aside (Hod means “prayerful submission” in Hebrew and Chesed translates to “loving kindness”), regulatory filings indicate that the foundations, while generously supportive of the Belz Hasidic community, have become key instruments in furthering the Karfunkels' business interests.

Unfortunately for them, based on SIRF's analysis, it appears that their management of the foundations may expose them to regulatory scrutiny and possibly force them to sell a large amount of their foundation's AmTrust shares, creating a material concern for company shareholders.

What follows below is how lax regulation and imprudent management turned the capstone of the American dream into what may be the first act of an American nightmare.

-----------------------------

The Karfunkel brothers non-profit foundations reflect their unusual tolerance for risk.

George and Michael Karfunkel’s first attempt at making their way on Wall Street is illustrative. Employees at a mutual fund boiler room called Economic Planning Corp., their bid to diversify the firm into the capital markets ended with them in the center of a wide-ranging pump and dump scam that collapsed in 1971. Never disclosed in their AmTrust filings, the Securities and Exchange Commission injunction and suspensions they received hardly set them back.

In response to a question about the lack of disclosure surrounding their SEC sanctions, the Karfunkels' spokesman, Kekst and Company's Robert Siegfried, said the brothers have nothing to disclose, having sought and obtained a dissolution of the SEC injunction in January, 2000. (The Karfunkels' spokesman declined to provide SIRF with the motions arguing for dismissal, stating that they are a matter of public record. A search of PACER the online legal database, however, did not yield any results.)

Their next venture, American Stock Transfer & Trust, a share registry that tracked changes in holders of record in the stock and options of publicly-traded corporations, was a spectacular success and was sold to an Australian company for $1 billion in May 2008.

While managing American Stock Transfer, the brothers began cobbling together seemingly disparate insurance units in 1998, calling the collection AmTrust Financial Services. The company listed shares in 2006 with Barry Zyskind, Michael Karfunkel's son-in-law, installed as chief executive.

Unlike other medium-sized commercial insurers like W.R. Berkeley who focus on standard retail and commercial policy business, AmTrust is a publicly-traded portfolio of  insurance risks, like Italian medical malpractice, manufacturer warranties and California workers' compensation.

From enough distance, there’s wisdom aplenty in seeking out niche markets as less competition in insurance can offer high returns, but those profits come with ample risk.

There is an established pattern of insurance companies that grow quickly misjudging the breadth of risk in their portfolio and facing cruel reckonings when claims begin to mount and reserves prove inadequate.

AmTrust, however, has had no reckoning despite a mounting chorus of critics who have voiced their concerns over the quality of its disclosures and accounting.  The company's response to the skeptics was bolstered by the company's strong recent earnings report.

The Hod and Chesed foundation's employ risk in a fashion rarely seen in other private foundations. This is an interesting orientation for a foundation given that the IRS, the federal regulator for private foundations, has a blunt view of the role of risk in managing foundation's operations and assets — namely, to avoid it.

But in case a foundation executive didn’t get the message, the IRS released guidelines designed to prevent "a lack of reasonable business care and prudence" in the foundation's management.

Called "Jeopardizing Investments," the IRS document promises additional scrutiny of a foundation if it starts to do things like use options, employ leverage or started making swing-for-the-fences trades, where the risk/reward ration was clearly skewed towards risk.

Spending time in the Hod and Chesed filings reveals that the IRS memorandum didn't make much of an impression on the Karfunkels because much of what the IRS warned about is how their foundations have regularly done business.

For instance, they used their foundations to make aggressive, directional market bets on controversial stocks. To that end, consider Michael Karfunkel’s waltz with Fannie Mae put options in mid-2008.

According to the Hod Foundation filings, starting in June 2008 and ending a year later, Michael Karfunkel began selling put options on Fannie Mae stock, a strategy that limited his profit to the option premium (or price) on the put options he sold.

But in mid-2008, Fannie Mae, the Grand Central Terminal of mortgage risk, was the proverbial house on fire, a once high-flying company en route to a collapse into  conservatorship.

The high-stakes wager on Fannie Mae’s survival cost the foundation a total of $10.5 million. The rationale for the trade aside, it is a fine example of the skewed risk/reward ratio the IRS warned about — Hod’s profits were capped at $2.6 million.

Chesed also paid dearly for George Karfunkel’s adventures with Citigroup options trading in 2008, when he sold nearly 500 put option contracts, making him effectively long the stock as the bank began to totter towards its mid-September bailout. Like his brothers bet on Fannie Mae, he was effectively betting that an institution laden with dubious mortgage-related securities would emerge essentially unscathed from the then raging crisis.

As it stands, it was a spectacularly bad bet, with the trade costing Chesed over $820,000, with potential profits capped at about $105,000. Similar bets on AIG (a loss of nearly $500,000) and Lehman Brothers (a loss of almost $250,000) also proved costly.

Another remarkable aspect of these trades is their timing, with the Lehman Brothers and AIG option positions being opened on Friday, Sept.12, with both once iconic companies promptly collapsing that weekend. The historical price action for both Lehman and AIG in the weeks leading up to that Friday is testament to the depth of investor panic. Shorting the puts of these companies wasn't so much speculation as an attempt to catch a falling knife.

Contrary to the Karfunkel's assertions below, losses from their option trading adventures — in combination with the collapse in the equity markets — had a disastrous effect on the fair market value of the foundation's portfolios, with declines of 64 percent for Hod and 43 percent for Chesed.

Through their spokesman, the Karfunkel's responded that the use of options — common among veteran market participants such as themselves — did not lead to a material decline in the size of the foundation portfolios, especially given the intensity of the 2008-2009 market collapse. A chart they provided SIRF of both foundations portrayed their book value growth as favorable to a peer group of similarly-sized family foundations. This is the full Karfunkel reply.

The more you dig into how Hod and Chesed conduct their affairs, the idea of the foundations as complex economic vehicles begins to emerge.

For instance both foundations use margin — money borrowed from a bank or broker — to (presumably) amplify investment returns. The 2011 Chesed filing lists a $9.8 million margin account; Hod’s 2013 margin account filing shows just under $1.35 million of margin owed.

Moreover, both foundations regularly extend loans, like Hod’s unnamed $2.5 million receivable from 2013. This is a potential red flag: According to regulations, foundations are allowed to receive zero interest loans, but they are prohibited from making loans or extending credit, especially to what the IRS refers to as "disqualified persons," a term meaning the founder, their spouse and immediate family members, as well as substantial donors to the fund.

These issues come to the fore when the relationships between Hod and Chesed and a complex entity called the Michael Karfunkel 2005 Grantor Annuity Trust are explored. Known in financial planning circles as a GRAT, these structures are a popular way for the ultra-wealthy to pass down part of their estate tax-free.

GRAT’s allow a grantor like Michael Karfunkel to transfer assets into a trust for a specified period; in return the trust pays the grantor an annuity over a set period of time. At the end of the term, what assets remain can be distributed tax-free among beneficiaries. Distilled to its essence, a GRAT is a bet that the assets in the trust will increase in value. (This Bloomberg News article argues that for the grantor, the bet often pays off spectacularly.)

Filings disclose that Hod was owed money by the Michael Karfunkel 2005 Grantor Annuity Trust $375,055 in 2010 and 2011, and Chesed started disclosing a receivable in 2010 with a $199,219 loan. After 2011, Hod's filings no longer mention a receivable to the GRAT but Chesed does.

With the beneficiaries of the trust disclosed as Michael Karfunkel’s wife Leah and their children, including his daughter Esther (the wife of AmTrust CEO Barry Zyskind), the concept of the GRAT owing money is troubling, given the self-dealing prohibitions described above.

More than just being at the center of a series of eyebrow-raising transactions, however, the Michael Karfunkel 2005 GRAT is also the owner of ACP Re Holdings Ltd., a Bermuda-based reinsurer that is attempting to purchase troubled insurer Tower Group International Ltd.

One of the fundamental questions SIRF had about Michael Karfunkel's GRAT was about a July 22, 2013 SEC filing disclosing that he had “gifted” 320,000 (worth over $10 million at the then share price) AmTrust shares to the GRAT. Two things are noteworthy about the filing: The first is that it was made four months late, with the transaction occurring on March 25. The second is that making a contribution of additional shares to a GRAT is flat out forbidden.

In reply to SIRF's questions, the Karfunkel's said that no loans were extended to or from the GRAT, but rather the receivable balance was due to the transfer agent getting behind on book-entries which led to the GRAT receiving dividends otherwise owed to Hod, a problem soon discovered and corrected.

The issue of the additional contribution to the GRAT was, according to the spokesman, part of the transfer agent lag time issue referenced above. (Their response in full is here.)

The Karfunkel response is, quite frankly, odd. Start with the fact that IRS and SEC filings have no record of, or reference to, any stock transfer whatsoever between Hod and the GRAT. (An elaboration on these points from the Karfunkels' spokesman is linked at the bottom.)

Reconciling the balance of their reply with the documentary record didn't get any easier.

For example, the GRAT, by definition, is prohibited from distributing assets — like their purported 2008 gift of AmTrust shares to Hod — to anyone (including beneficiaries) until the annuity with Michael Karfunkel, the grantor, is executed. Whatever the attributes or drawbacks to the GRAT as a financial instrument, it is designed as a simple contract: There is an annuitant (Karfunkel), the beneficiaries (his family) and the rest is math. Based on interviews with Wall Street operations department veterans, it appears unusual that a transfer agent would be unable to discern who the grantor was.

Nor would a "donation" from a GRAT — imagining that it was even legally feasible — be a rational exercise: If a donor wanted to make a donation to a charity, why would they take assets from the tax-advantaged GRAT structure and defeat the purpose of passing on tax-free gains to beneficiaries?

For an independent view, SIRF called Richard B. Covey, the 85-year-old Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP partner who developed the GRAT in 1990 and without using their name, described the Karfunkel GRAT transactions, as laid out in the SEC and IRS filings transactions.

Contacted at his Spring Lake, N.J., home in early August, Mr. Covey was blunt in his response to the scenario we posed.

“That’s an absurd question. No one rational would seek to add assets after the annuity is struck, it would violate the agreement under most every understanding of [a GRAT],” said Covey. “They would be better off just [opening] a second GRAT.”

When asked to elaborate on this, Covey said the construct of a GRAT is cut and dry: Its fundamental component is the annuity, which, at bottom, is a contract that takes an asset and pays out a specified amount at some agreed upon date in the future.

Adding assets after the contract is struck changes the contract’s entire equation, Covey said. Nor, for the record, did he understand why a GRAT could make a donation.

Covey, when asked if there was some long-buried exception to these GRAT rules, said that without resorting to broad brush condemnations, he still wouldn’t want to be a lawyer pressing the argument in front of a [hypothetical] judge but perhaps, “there is a one in one thousand scenario where they could [convince a judge an exception was warranted].”

-----------------------------

The Karfunkel brothers foundations grew to their current size after an earlier family charitable vehicle, the Karfunkel Family Foundation, distributed most of its assets to Hod and Chesed between 2000 and 2003 — almost $45 million, or 87 percent of its then $51 million was given to the foundations — and their asset base continued to grow sharply afterwards from large grants of AmTrust and other stocks.

That's all standard enough. What's really interesting is buried towards the back of the filings where the donations are disclosed, where some arithmetic reveals that the large blocks of stock donated were valued at prices sharply higher than the market price on the day of the grant.

There’s only one beneficiary from inflating an asset value and it’s the donor, who gets a receipt allowing them to claim an out sized — and inappropriate — deduction. For its part, a foundation is saddled with an overpriced asset that locks in a loss if they sell in the near term and which exaggerates their asset base.

The donation of overvalued shares was not a one-time event for the Karfunkel brothers, but was done at least six times between 2005 and 2012.

Of the nearly $110 million in shares Chesed received from George Karfunkel, SIRF estimates that almost $31 million of this came from valuations above the then-market prices.

For his part, Michael Karfunkel’s donation on Dec. 31, 2009 of Fannie Mae, Maiden Holdings and AmTrust stock that he valued at $60,974,615 to Hod appear to have been $8.65 million overvalued.

To prevent something like this from happening, the IRS implemented an accounting policy, fair market value, to serve as a template for gifts of publicly listed securities. Whether its Berkshire Hathaway or a mercurial biotech start-up, all stock gifts are put on the books at the average of the high and low-trades on the day the donation is made.

So how could rich, sophisticated donors like the Karfunkels stumble over this methodology?

SIRF asked Ronnie McLure, a Dallas, Texas, accountant and university professor whose practice has frequently provided accounting services to private foundations, if there is room for interpretation in the statutes.

“There isn’t really a way around using fair market value for public securities,” McLure said. “The Federal regulations make that one easy and with liquid stocks the accountant can’t avoid it.”

Regardless, the Karfunkels seem to prefer a more freewheeling approach.

Consider the Nov. 1, 2005 donation of 187,500 shares of MRU Holdings to Chesed. Valued at $806,250 in the annual filing, this implies a price of $4.30 a share. The closing price on that date, however, was $1.03, making Chesed’s valuation — and his deduction — over $613,000 greater than if he had donated it at market price.

Other instances would emerge.

On Jul. 1, 2009 George Karfunkel gave Chesed one million shares of Plano, Texas-based energy concern Cubic Energy and 6.15 million shares of AmTrust, worth, the filing asserted, $78.33 million. Chesed’s claimed value was well above the market value of the securities. According to Yahoo!Finance, the average of the high and low prices for Cubic and AmTrust on Jul. 1, 2009 were, respectively, $1.07 and $11.55 versus Chesed’s implied values of $4.50 and $12 per share.

(SIRF used Yahoo!Finance for historical prices and used the unadjusted stock price to reflect the price of the security on that date so that subsequent dividends and stock splits would not distort comparisons.)

Using the average of the high and low stock prices on Jul. 1, 2009, the gift should have been worth $72.1 million.

On Jul. 1, 2010, Chesed received 380,853 shares of Citigroup from Karfunkel that it claimed were worth $17.98 million, or $47.21 per share.

Citigroup’s average share price on the date the donation was recorded was $3.74, making the value of the entire block of stock just over $1.42 million, a difference of $16.55 million.

And it gets weirder.

Recall that Chesed’s tax year is from Jul. 1 to Jun. 30 (the 2010 Form 990 has a filing date of Jun. 30, 2011), so when Citigroup announced a 1-10 reverse split on May 9, 2011, the share prices were readjusted upwards by a factor of 10. What Chesed did is claim a value for the Jul. 1, 2010 donation that was not in effect until over 10 months later.

Incredibly, even after the reverse split, Chesed’s implied value of $47.21 (or $4.72) was still above the $3.74 average Jul. 1, 2010 price.

In 2012, George Karfunkel made another two grants to Chesed: 200,000 shares of Organovo on November 13 and 1.8 million shares of BioTime on Jul. 1. Valued at $12.67 million, or $9.35 and $6 a share, respectively, the claimed values were again higher than Organovo’s then-average market prices of $2.34 and BioTime’s $4.38. (The market was closed Jul. 1, 2012 so SIRF used prices from Jun. 29, 2012.)

The fair value of the gift comes in just under $3.72 million, $8.95 million under what Chesed stated.

 

Company 

Symbol 

Shares Granted

Value of Grant

Implied Px.

FMV

Difference

MRU Holdings

187,500

$806,250

$4.30

$1.03

$613,125

Cubic Energy

CBNR

1,000,000

$4,500,000

$4.50

$1.07

$3,435,000

AmTrust 

AFSI

6,150,000

$73,835,500

$12.01

$11.55

$2,803,000

Citigroup

C

380,853

$17,980,070

$47.21

$3.74

$16,557,584

BioTime

BTX

200,000

$1,870,000

$9.35

$4.48

$975,000

Organovo

ONVO

1,800,000

$10,800,000

$6.00

$2.34

$6,588,000

$109,791,820

$30,971,709

How did a pair of billionaires end up donating over $170 million dollars of stock at prices that were not fully reflective of the then market conditions? The answer isn't clear but the Karfunkels, as the sole signatories and directors of their foundations, sure can’t claim ignorance.

In response to SIRF questions, the Karfunkels replied that the issue was a time lag between the date of the donation and the foundation's receipt of the shares. See their full response here. With regard to the grant of Citigroup shares discussed above, the issue was apparently more complex:

"The lag time between date of the grant by George Karfunkel and date of receipt of the shares by Chesed spanned approximately 2 years. The reason for the long lag time was that the certificates for Citicorp shares donated by George Karfunkel bore a legend and could not be transferred physically at the time he made the donation."

Like the reply to SIRF's GRAT questions above, the Karfunkel's answer frames an unusual scenario that is difficult to square with current market practices.

The concept of the physical delivery or transfer of shares between a buyer and seller — or a donor and foundation — is something that over the past 25 years has become increasingly rare in the U.S. capital markets. To be fair, there are hobbyists who collect stock certificates, and, rarer still, investors who insist on having their shares in physical form to prevent them from being lent out to short-sellers, but beyond that, share transfers in the U.S. capital markets are entirely digital.

It bears recalling that the Karfunkel brothers founded and ran a successful, technologically advanced stock transfer operation and would, as a matter of daily business, understand fully what is necessary to transfer stock to another entity. As such, the central role repeated transfer agency mistakes play in their explanation for both the GRAT above and the valuation question is notable.

The concept of a legend posing a significant hurdle for the transfer of the shares is also difficult to wrap your arms around.

A legend is a restriction on the sale or transfer of stock, usually because the shares were purchased during a private placement of shares (a sale of stock to higher-net worth investors or institutions) that requires an agreed upon holding period, or, alternately, legends are often attached to shares issued as payment in a transaction. To remove a legend requires two things George Karfunkel had ample access to: a legal opinion stating that the conditions of the restriction had been fulfilled and a transfer agent to process the removal.

Poking around SEC filings, however, brought the explanation. In Aug. 2000, Michael and George Karfunkel sold a unit of American Stock Transfer & Trust then called AST StockPlan Inc. to Citigroup for an undisclosed sum. An SEC filing, a registration statement called an S-3, notes that as of Dec. 20, 2001, each brother held 380,853 shares of the bank. A previous registration referenced a filing the Karfunkel brothers made on Sept. 26, 2000, and which was approved by the SEC on Oct. 5, 2000, granting registration (and transferability) for the majority of their Citigroup holdings.

Additionally, there is the quality of the foundation's disclosures.

If, as the Karfunkels warrant, there was a substantial difference between the date of every stock donation the brothers made to Hod and Chesed and the receipt of the shares, then the IRS filings should reflect that the date the foundation received those shares is the formal date of donation. The IRS rules on the issue leave little to the imagination.

In late July, SIRF attempted to contact Henry Reinhold, the Brooklyn accountant who is paid around $40,000 annually to prepare the Karfunkel foundation annual filings (he also prepares the filings for Barry Zyskind's Teferes foundation) and served as an officer of American Stock Transfer & Trust and an AmTrust subsidiary. Samuel Reinhold, Henry's son declined comment on his behalf.

-----------------------------

Per Alexander Pope, if mighty contests really do rise from trivial things, then the Karfunkels may someday wish they had given a different answer to question 3a on page 5, part VIIB on the Hod and Chesed annual filing.

The question, “Did the foundation hold more than a 2 percent direct or indirect interest in any business enterprise at any time during the year?” was checked off in the negative but its own filings say otherwise.

The Karfunkel brothers foundations are chock full of AmTrust shares; Hod and Chesed, respectively, hold 9.6 percent and 10.5 percent of the shares outstanding.

In case there is any doubt, according to the most recent proxy agreement, the Karfunkel family controls 59 percent, or 44.4 million of AmTrust’s 75.3 million shares outstanding. The Hod Foundation controls just over 7.2 million of these shares and Chesed has 7.9 million.

Keeping their economic good fortune closely wrapped in a series of family trusts and foundations was an understandable strategy by the Karfunkel brothers. AmTrust is literally a family business — apart from Barry Zyskind, several of Michael and George's children hold important positions in its subsidiaries — and their massive stake in the company makes it immune to takeover or raids from activist investors. Moreover, Wall Street's analysts and money managers often find attractive a company whose founders have maintained a large equity stake once they have publicly listed the stock.

So it is an irony of cosmic proportions that their moves to insure the effective Karfunkel family control of AmTrust may well lead to that iron grip being forcibly shattered.

The problem, in a nutshell, isn't so much that the annual filings don't reflect the truth so much as it is that the U.S. government has some unmistakable rules in place to prevent private foundations from holding that much stock in an enterprise.

A quick history lesson: in the 1960s, officials from the Department of the Treasury began to cast a skeptical eye on the use of private foundations to warehouse large corporate ownership positions company on the view that it was a distortion of both free-market and non-profit principles. The rule that emerged to combat this is IRS section 4943 and it is primarily concerned with the idea of excess business holdings, or the amount of stock a private foundation can own — Here is an accessible primer on key aspects of the rule — when so-called disqualified persons (the founder, directors, their family members and key donors) have significant holdings too.

Traditionally the IRS mandates a bit of arithmetic to get to the foundations "permitted holdings" figure — the formula being 20 percent of the shares outstanding less the percentage of stock held by disqualified persons. In this case the Karfunkel family and their controlled entities own about 59 percent, making the point moot.

Under a provision of rule 4943 there is a second approach, known as the "de minimus rule," with each foundation permitted to hold 2 percent of the shares outstanding, meaning that Hod and Chesed could hold slightly more than 1.5 million each.

It is difficult to interpret the IRS rules as meaning anything other than a lot of AmTrust stock needs to be sold or donated away — about 6.4 million shares for Chesed and 5.7 million shares for Hod, nearly 16 percent of the shares outstanding.

There is a catch, and as catches go, it is a significant one: the AmTrust stock that Hod and Chesed need to sell cannot be sold to those same disqualified persons, meaning that neither the brothers nor their families can bid for any shares the others foundation is forced to sell. (A second option is for the shares to be donated to an unaffiliated public charity, like the Red Cross, who would almost certainly begin selling the shares upon delivery.)

That's news no AmTrust investor, even with the stock price on a tear, likely wants to hear.

For the Karfunkels and, seemingly, AmTrust investors, this headache has been a long time brewing.

Hod and Chesed began to build up there massive position in AmTrust stock at the end of 2007 when an otherwise unmemorable SEC filing disclosed a transfer of AmTrust shares on Dec. 31, 2007 from New Gulf Holdings, a holding company the brothers jointly owned, to Hod and Chesed. An additional transfer took place on Aug. 1, 2008. When the dust settled, the foundations owned more than 5.6 percent of the then nearly 60 million shares outstanding and had crossed the 2 percent de minimus threshold the IRS had laid down.

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Hod

669,643

1,819,643

5,812,500

5,812,500

5,964,277

5,964,277

6,560,704

7,216,773

Chesed

401,786

1,551,786

5,544,643

5,544,643

6,551,786

6,551,786

7,206,964

7,927,660

Shares Outstanding

59,959,000

59,989,839

59,330,836

59,349,202

59,638,526

60,210,356

67,326,549

75,320,865

% Shares

Hod 

1.1%

3.0%

9.8%

9.8%

10.0%

9.9%

9.7%

9.6%

Chesed

0.7%

2.6%

9.3%

9.3%

11.0%

10.9%

10.7%

10.5%

An outside observer, aware of the Karfunkels' business successes, can be forgiven for struggling to understand how basic guardrails of non-profit law like the IRS' permitted holdings rule were blown through.

They certainly had enough time to comply, since the IRS gives foundations a five-year window to dispose of gifted shares. So in Chesed’s case, after receiving 6.15 million AmTrust shares from George Karfunkel on Jul. 1, 2009, the foundation had until this Jul. 1 to whittle down the stake to the requisite 2 percent of the shares outstanding. Hod, having received its AmTrust stock from Michael Karfunkel on Dec. 31, 2009, has until Dec. 31 to meet the requirements.

Being tax law, of course, no rule would be complete without footnotes and buried exceptions and IRS rule 4943 (emphasis added) is no different, providing foundations an additional five-year window to sell down excess business holdings but even this has a proviso to be hurdled: the foundations can only qualify if they demonstrate that “Diligent efforts to dispose of such holdings have been made within the initial 5-year period.” This is going to be a tough sell since the past five years saw the brothers actively adding AmTrust shares into their foundations.

To put some teeth into the rules, the IRS taxes those foundations not in compliance 10 percent on the excess holdings of shares; lest that message not be received, the IRS levies an additional 200 percent tax penalty for any excess holdings not disposed of by the end of the foundation’s tax year.

In this case, that’s Jun. 30, 2015 and the size of a prospective fine, even with a back of the envelope calculation, rapidly crosses into $100 million territory if the IRS isn't satisfied.

In a reply to SIRFs request for comment regarding the foundation's AmTrust holdings,  the Karfunkel's spokesman wrote, "The Karfunkels are highly-sophisticated successful investors. They are the founders of AmTrust, its largest shareholders and extremely confident about the Company’s long-term potential. They are confident as well in the profile of their respective Foundations’ investment portfolios."

-----------------------------

SIRF approached the Karfunkels through their spokesman Robert Siegfried of Kekst on Jul. 25 and, because of the brothers religious observances, subsequent vacation travel and related business obligations, was unable to begin a formal dialogue with a representative of theirs until an Aug. 5 phone call.

On that call and through a series of emails, SIRF provided the Karfunkel's spokesman questions we sought answers to, source documents central to our investigation and any necessary context surrounding the questions. On Aug. 13 the Karfunkels replied. Seeking additional clarification, SIRF asked follow-up questions; the Karfunkel response to those questions is here.

With respect to the amount of AmTrust stock held in Hod and Chesed, seemingly in the face of IRS regulations, SIRF found the Karfunkel's response puzzling and asked their spokesmen if they stood by their statement in a follow up email Aug. 15. They did, with the added remark that they did not know what "IRS rules and regulations" SIRF was referencing. See their full reply here. (Editors note: SIRF, in phone calls and email--including an hour plus conversation with the Karfunkels longtime attorney--repeatedly mentioned "excess business holdings" and the foundations holdings of AmTrust stock as lines of inquiry.)

Please read this disclosure about SIRF and a donor during the preparation of this story.

The Invention of Professor Dr. Anthony Nobles

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Reader, let’s not mince any words about Dr. Anthony Nobles, a 50-year old inventor, teacher, community leader, entrepreneur and soon-to-be space tourist: his life is vastly better than yours.

Hailing from Michigan, Nobles didn’t start with much but using his pair of Biomedical Engineering doctorates he developed a patented heart suture technology that he claims has saved thousands of lives; it certainly saved his bank account, because he has been able to buy residences in Steamboat Springs and a seaside boro of Orange County's Huntington Beach. How many Biomedical Engineering doctorates do you have, reader? None? SIRF thought so.

A man of enterprise, Nobles has folded these patents into a host of public and private companies he’s launched over the years—about two dozen at last count (including a private equity firm that raises money to invest in companies Nobles already runs.)

But let us not get bogged down in commerce and instead celebrate how this man lives so much more fully than the rest of us.

For instance, perhaps you enjoy decorating your house at Halloween, maybe making an extra trip to the store to get cardboard skeletons and a few hanging spiders?

Silly reader, you are not even in the game: Nobles oversees one of the largest Halloween displays in California, with 30,000 people coming to his 2012 effort, which featured 15 actors, 40 robots and one year cost upwards of $250,000. Does your Halloween display have actors and robots? Of course it doesn’t. Did you drop $250,000 on it? How silly are we for even asking?

So you like going to the museum? Good for you, but you should know that Nobles built his very own, “The Nobles Family Auto Museum,” housing his collection of 105 vintage and rare cars, (including racing legend Michael Schumacher’s 2001 Formula 1 race car and, he said, 38 Ferraris.) No need to be difficult about it, but if you were going to build a museum, dear reader, it would probably have things like your uncle's uniform from the Korean war, not cool stuff like race cars.

So if you had a "bucket list," loyal reader, what would be on it? Whatever it is, SIRF is sure that it doesn't include getting awarded the Nobel Prize for curing "disease states."

Maybe you fancy yourself tech-savvy and like to keep up on the latest gadgets?

Well, the next time you use a portable computer or electronic book, please offer a silent word of thanks to Anthony Nobles because he helped develop them which, let's face it, could not have been easy when studying for two doctorates and running a lot of companies.

While dominating this mortal coil, Nobles takes time out to be a civic minded fellow, with he and his wife donating so much money to their town’s community center refurbishment project that it was renamed the “Nobles Family Community Center.” Shortly after it was renamed, Nobles stood for a seat on the town council and won. It is a safe bet, of course, that you, dear reader, did not donate enough cash to your town’s community center so that it was named after you.

Putting it bluntly, comparing the life of Anthony Nobles to ourselves is a fool’s errand — most of us would be happy to vacation near a beach in Southern California, or to
spend a few minutes behind the wheel of a Ferrari; Anthony Nobles calls that “Tuesday.”

Incredibly however, lurking here and there, are a ragged band of malcontents and embittered cynics who don’t see Anthony Nobles as a real life Tony Stark or even a community-minded entrepreneur.

Heretics all, they see a businessman whose true vocation is selling ideas and investible notions that never emerge as promised.

A better word for these people is “investors” and with few exceptions, they appear to be correct. Anthony Nobles has a storybook life yet, according to Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation research, it appears most (if not all) of the capital he has raised has failed to earn a return.

Over the course of two months SIRF investigated Anthony Nobles and his business career, conducting interviews with a series of his former investors and colleagues and analyzing documents from both his public and private ventures.

What follows are the broad strokes of how Nobles used a combination of imagined and overstated credentials about his schooling, his teaching career, and his success as a entrepreneur to craft his greatest invention -- the legend of himself as a medical technology renaissance man.

Time and again, for more than two decades, high-profile and sophisticated investors have reached for their checkbooks.

In the main, based on what SIRF can determine, most of those investors don't do terribly well and, according to several sources, Nobles has been actively trying to expand his investor base, especially in Asia and Europe.

What follows below is how he does it.

———————————————————

Anthony Nobles is a man eternally on the hunt.

What he seeks is capital to grow his many ventures, businesses that in turn have provided him the lifestyle discussed above.

His many businesses, in other words, require a long ton of cash.

It’s not an irrational concern because Nobles' enterprises compete against the world’s largest Biomedical technology companies, whose research departments are staffed into the thousands with annual budgets of many hundreds of millions of dollars.

And those Ferrari Formula 1 racing cars start at $1 million each.

Anyone looking for big venture capital money needs a sell, that thing which instantly sets them apart and gets a foot in the door. For those who compete on the perception of superior brains and creativity, having little to point to educationally, especially when the others guys have platoons of Ph.D’s, is probably not so easy to explain away.

So Anthony Nobles came up with what video game players call a “cheat,” or a shortcut around an otherwise complex problem, like, for instance, a lack of the academic credentials that make investors comfortable with medical device entrepreneurs. So he launched what might be called "an academic arms race." If research scientists elsewhere had Ph.D's, he would have two. If those scientists publicly used the honorific “Dr.,” Nobles used “Professor Dr.” in his communications.

Evidence the first: Nobles claimed to have earned two Ph.D’s, both in Biomedical Engineering, from Glendale and Redding Universities. For years the dual doctorates were the centerpiece of Nobles’ credentials — click here to see what the biography page of his dranthonynobles.com website looked like and here for a reference to them in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

(Over the past few months, Nobles’ has been carefully amending his once flamboyant online profile and has been removing many of the mentions of his so-called degrees.)

It worked. Nobles’ implicit assertion that he was among the most credentialed people working in the medical device industry was at least tacitly accepted, and few, if any, asked what kinds of schools Redding and Glendale Universities are.

Because if someone had, it would take them maybe three minutes to see that they were online diploma mills: give them your credit card number and you instantly have a degree in most anything.

As it emerges, both schools have fallen on hard times, with federal prosecutors charging James Enowitch, the Connecticut man who founded both Redding and Glendale, with mail fraud. In May he pled guilty to selling $5 million worth of fake diplomas.

Central to Enowitch’s diploma mill scam, according to prosecutors, was setting up a phony degree verification service and for an additional fee, allowing the purchaser to select the courses and grades to be featured on the fake transcript.

The cost to Nobles for all of this ersatz educational experience? According to federal prosecutors, $550 for a doctorate and 50% off for a second diploma, so figure about $825 all in. (This 2006 New York Times article presents a clear picture of how diploma mills operate.)

Let’s be perfectly clear: Glendale and Redding are not accredited, and do not have faculties, curricula or campuses. No one with a “degree” bearing their names can say they learned—or earned—anything. The schools only employ sales staff, who pitch computer-generated diplomas and a few fake transcripts.

Here are the diplomas and here is an analysis of Nobles' Redding degree by Harv Lyter, an Idaho State Board of Education official who had looked at the school when Redding claimed, at one point, to have a school in Idaho.

There are several things noteworthy about the documents. Absurdly (and impossibly) both schools share the same President and Chairman of its Board of Trustees. Secondly, Nobles managed to be awarded all those diplomas on the same day, February 14, 2007. While this made for a potentially memorable Valentine’s Day dinner for Nobles and his wife, as an academic achievement it is rather improbable.

Finally, in a truly surreal twist, Nobles entered copies of his fake diplomas as evidence that he had doctorates—and used the “Dr.” title—in a very real legal filing he submitted as part of an ongoing defamation suit he has brought against a pair of private investigators who had posted online that (among other things) his academic credentials are bogus. (Online sleuths, however, sussed out Nobles’ dubious Redding and Glendale doctorates years ago.)

Controversy over fake degrees is old hat to Nobles though, having been nailed for making up a series of degrees before.

In the early 1990s, the Vancouver Sun first broke the news that Nobles—then the founder and chief executive of privately-held Surgical Visions Inc.—was lying about having a bachelors degree in physics from the University of Texas-Arlington and a Ph.D from the University of California Los Angeles in electrical engineering.

Much like using the fake doctorates as evidence in a legal filing, Nobles apparently was convinced that he would not be caught. John Rogitz, a former in-house attorney for Nobles who sued him in 1993 for breach of contract, claimed that he prominently displayed the fake UCLA and University of Texas diplomas in his office. (The case was settled and terms not disclosed.)

Being publicly exposed levied some rough justice on Nobles: the $5 million investment from another company that was the centerpiece of the deal was pulled, the public listing was halted, he was forced to resign and was later sued by an investor, Dr. Joseph Litner.

A physician who provided a declaration to the defense team in Nobles' litigation against the private investigators, Dr. Litner asserts that Nobles, circa 1992, knew very little about human anatomy and even when trying to stage a demonstration on a cantaloupe (at a business meeting at a restaurant) could not clearly assert what his technology was designed to do.

Nobles would later publicly acknowledge that the degrees were fake but argues that he was put up to it by some of the characters advising him, which included legendary Vancouver Stock Exchange stock tout Harry Moll, whose promotions over the years have run the gamut from self-watering plant minders to mega-pearls harvested from a giant clam.

Moll, whose stock pumping days are over, is now firing back at Nobles and he’s not shooting blanks.

Here is Moll’s declaration (entered by the defense in the aforementioned defamation case) about his experience with Nobles.

To wit: Moll, in laying the groundwork for a possible listing for the Nobles helmed company, had commissioned a Kroll Associates background investigation into Nobles after getting a tip that his background might not be what he was claiming, i.e. a Ph.D and a medical doctor.

The tip was spot on and Kroll found no evidence of either the medical training or college degrees, and Moll confronted Nobles about it.

Moll said the then 27-year old Nobles explained the discrepancies away by telling him that the Central Intelligence Agency had purged all of his academic records a few years prior. This, he said, occurred during his tenure as a physician “working on aliens” at a secret facility in Roswell, New Mexico, so his work and credentials would have to remain classified.

Space aliens and the CIA are rare combinations in a business story. To get to the bottom of this SIRF called the 80-year old Moll, now living in retirement in Nevada, and rather forcefully demanded an explanation.

Moll was blunt and measured in his insistence that his signed declaration is accurate, that the conversation between he and Nobles occurred in that exact fashion and there was more to the story but he kept the filing brief. It was made and sworn to in late January when he was approached by a lawyer for the investigators and he was relieved, he told SIRF, to finally establish the record about Nobles had said.

(Finally, he let SIRF have it with both barrels for questioning his honesty; the remarks were truly unprintable.)

“He said every word of this and more. He had a lot to tell me about this super secret project and was really afraid that I would tell people about it,” said Moll, who alternately said he is still baffled and angry about Nobles and what he called his “bullshit story.”

“[Nobles] thought I would quietly tell investors that he worked on a super-secret CIA project and [his lies] would be ok,” he said. “I walked out of the room and couldn’t believe that he thought this kind of insane bullshit was acceptable. I lost a lot of money—another guy lost almost $500,000”—and he was making up something about...flying saucers.”

Moll insisted that he would happily defend his entire declaration in court if called upon to and that he wasn’t paid any money to write it.

“My big regret is that I didn’t go public with [Noble’s] excuse sooner since he would have been ruined,” he told SIRF. “I sat on the truth and feel badly about that; maybe I could have saved people money.”

Another former Nobles colleague told SIRF that Nobles had referenced a stint working with the CIA in discussing his background.

In the late 1990s, Nobles met with Alfred Novak, the former chief financial officer of Cordis corp. (Nobles had done some contract work for Cordis in the mid-90s) to discuss a possible investment in his then-company, Sutura. As part of their conversation, Novak told SIRF, Nobles told him about working with the CIA “in a special program” but would not discuss it further; Novak said he turned the conversation quickly to business and the matter was dropped.

The CIA has not responded to a request for comment regarding Nobles’ claims.

(Novak, along with friends and a private equity fund would eventually invest $11 million in Sutura in 1999; in 2005 the group sued Nobles and the company alleging a host of operational and governance problems. The suit was settled in 2007 and their investment was lost as Sutura collapsed.)

—————————-

The “Professor” part of “Professor Anthony Nobles” is only slightly more accurate.

As part of a court submission (see page 11), Nobles described how affiliation with a college lent prestige and attracted investors: “The credibility afforded me as a university professor or lecturer aids immeasurably in building the credibility I need to build my company and complete the pending investment under diligence.”

For several years Nobles website claimed he was a “visiting professor” at the University of California Irvine but the reality is less exalted: never a faculty member, he was part of a volunteer mentor program working with students in the Biomedical Engineering department and had spoken in several classes.

According to emails reviewed by SIRF, the prominence of Nobles’ claimed UC Irvine affiliation occasioned a mini-revolt within the department in the early fall of 2013. After Nobles asked to join the faculty as a visiting professor, red flags emerged when, upon being asked to submit a resume to begin the formal consideration process, what he provided was what someone in the School of Engineering’s Dean’s office described as “a list of accomplishments....it was like he had no idea what a resume is."

Concern among faculty members soon spread as professors unearthed his diploma mill degrees and the Vancouver controversy and one suggested hiring a private investigator to dig into his background.

Ironically, the faculty emails show the professors were less concerned over Nobles' lack of academic credentials than they were about his track record of making them up.

“No one cares if you don’t have a degree. Look at Steve Jobs/Bill Gates/Mark Zuckerberg,” wrote another professor. “So why does he have all these fake degrees and everyone calls him  "Prof. Dr. Nobles?’”

While there existed a consensus to bring the Nobles matter up more formally in a department meeting, in early November, the Dean's office--who, in other emails read by SIRF, had sought to build a donor relationship with Nobles--ordered the Biomedical Engineering department to terminate the mentor relationship with Nobles.

A second university relationship that Nobles asserts, the West Saxon University of Applied Sciences in Zwickau, Germany, a vocational university, appears to be accurate.

Nobles' resume looks impressive but a closer look is telling. He has indeed contributed to several articles and textbook chapters, but a good deal of his conference attendance was at "scientific poster sessions," involving the public presentation of a display and answering questions about your procedure or device. Note also the 16-year hiatus in conference attendance and research presentations.

Moreover, not much effort is required to raise questions about how meaningful a role Nobles' played in the development of the electronic book and portable computer.

Trying to discern the reality of where Nobles' work stands in the marketplace is not easy.

An initial search of the US patent office surfaces six patents held in his name and a search using "Sutura" provides another few dozen references, broadly supportive of his claim to have 31 patents. But searching the National Institute of Health’s U.S. Library of Medicine Pub Med directory—an authoritative index of published medical research whose records go back decades—and there is no mention of Anthony Nobles, his companies or any of his devices.

One unabashed proponent of Anthony Nobles' work is John Wyall of Orem, Utah who was the first U.S. recipient of the "Noblestitch" procedure to close the patent foramen ovale, the tunnel between the left and right side of the heart. He told SIRF that he had the procedure done in France by an associate of Nobles's and that he no longer suffers from the pain and exhaustion that had forced him to be bedridden for up to 16 hours a day.

---------------------------

Investors would likely forgive Nobles' being a fabulist if he was able to generate a return on their capital. Unfortunately for them, based on the available evidence, it would appear that this is something that occurs rarely.

Consider Nobles' experience with public companies. There was the debacle surrounding the attempted Surgical Visions merger in 1992, likely costing investors over $1 million prior to the deal's collapse.

The $11 million invested in Sutura by the Synapse fund et al. is entirely gone, but not before, per the Chiu declaration above, Nobles borrowed corporate funds from Sutura and bought the building that now houses the Noble Family Automotive Museum--the partnership that owned it charged Sutura over $27,000 per month in rent--and put his wife on the payroll as a consultant. (When private, Sutura had around $9 million in additional investor capital apart from Synapse that also did not fare too well.)

Starting in 2004, Whitebox Advisors, a Minnesota-based hedge fund that rocketed to fame when they bet correctly on the then-emerging credit crisis, began a series of investments in Sutura that totaled over $20.5 million. In a series of newsletters to investors, they expressed confidence that Nobles, despite the Vancouver woes, would prove competent in the job.

The Whitebox investment started out in trouble and rapidly went downhill.

In 2005 the company lost $12.3 million; in 2006 it was just over $12 million. David Teckman, a Whitebox director with medical industry management experience, was brought in as CEO at the end of September 2006; by February 2008 he had been dismissed and had sued Nobles and Sutura.  (The suit appears to have settled for back pay of just over $520,000 plus shares of stock and reimbursement for legal fees.)

In December of 2008 Sutura effectively wound down operations with Nobles buying (back) all Sutura's non-cash assets and $3 million in cash for $6.75 million.

Whitebox declined comment on their investment with Sutura and Nobles when SIRF contacted them by phone.

One curiosity: in 2007 Sutura negotiated a $23 million settlement in a patent violation suit brought against Abbott Labs, Shortly after, according to the company's 2007 10-K annual report, $11.96 million in marketable securities were purchased at a point that year. Who got custody of these assets is not clear.

While tallying up Whitebox's profit or loss is no easy thing because of the different ways they were exposed to Sutura, such as with common stock and interest-bearing loans, it's easier to render an accounting for the experience of Loni Pham, an Orange County resident who met Nobles in July of 2004. In a suit filed in 2007, she alleged that Nobles began courting her investment by claiming he was a medical doctor who had used Sutura's product on a personal friend, saving his life.

According to her suit, she said Nobles told her that a sale to Johnson & Johnson was looming, but that he sought a greater value for the company by "going public," something she claimed Nobles said was a few months away, pending her $250,000 investment.

In an interview with SIRF, Pham said that as part of that pitch, Nobles sketched out for her on a piece of paper how she would make the "two to four times" her initial investment in under six months. She said when she had questions about what his illustration meant, Nobles became frustrated and threw it out. (She retrieved it from the wastebasket.)

Pham told SIRF Nobles used an initial list of Sutura shareholders as an example of the sophisticated investors that had backed him. The shares she ultimately was given under what she claimed Nobles described as "The friends and family plan" valued Sutura, pre-initial public offering, at $27.16 per share, a remarkable valuation for a company with little operating history.

After months of delays, even after Sutura's reverse merger with a near dormant penny stock gave them a stock listing, Pham's suit claimed Nobles told her that her shares were not freely tradeable for a year; Nobles purportedly offered twice to buy her shares back for $250,000, but the exchange never occurred. (The suit was forced into arbitration in 2008 where she eventually dropped the matter because of legal expense.)

Looking back at the episode, Pham, who works as an asset lender, said she should have paid more attention to issues like the lack of employees at Sutura's office and Nobles' refusal to talk with her when she had questions after she had handed over the money.

Another investor, Croatian investor Bruno Mlinar, who met Nobles when both were in Europe racing Ferraris in 2008, gave Nobles $2.5 million for a stake in Nobles Medical Technology and a new venture, Gyntlecare, after Nobles assured him that his company was going to be worth over $150 million pending some Food and Drug Administration approvals.

Fast forward to 2010, and after what Mlinar claims was more than a year of frustrated calls about not getting stock certificates, he received shares in a company called Nobles Medical Technology II, which he said he had never heard of and hadn't invested in. He also received $435,000 in cash from one Karen Glassman at Gyntlecare (who also appears listed as a representative of HeartStitch and other Anthony Nobles entities.) The problem is, Mlinar's suit about the matter asserts, one of the companies he thought he was investing in, Nobles Medical Technology, had been sold to Medtronic for $15 million in 2010 and Mlinar didn’t profit because he was given shares in a different company.

For Mlinar, it gets worse in that Nobles also talked him into shipping him a Ferrari worth what he claimed was $750,000 on the view that Nobles would use it as collateral for financing (but somehow preserving Mlinar’s ownership.) In short order, he alleges, a bill-of-sale was forged and Nobles took delivery of the car. Nobles, in a response, argues that Mlinar signed forms stipulating that the car was worth $200,000 and that there was no preservation of ownership clause.

---------------------------

SIRF reached out to Anthony Nobles four times via phone to his work and cell phone numbers and left a series of detailed messages about this article but no calls were returned.

Attempts to reach him via email were moderately more successful, although SIRF did not ultimately secure an interview.

SIRF also sought answers from Nobles' attorney, John van Loben Sels, but he did not return a detailed voice message at his new firm, Fish & Tsang LLP. He did, however, file this declaration in Los Angeles Superior Court about SIRFs attempts to contact both of them with questions.

 

 

 

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